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SUBREGIONAL COALESCENCE IN EUROPEAN REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
Helen E. Hartnell' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Analysts tend to view post-1989 East-West European integration 
through the unilateral lens of European Union (EU) enlargement or, rather 
m<?re broadly, as a structural problem of integrating developed with 
developing countries. I This article will assimilate these earlier approaches, 
but also move beyond them, by emphasizing the view from the peripheral 
area of Central and Eastern Europe. Significant developments taking place 
there have the potential to alter our way of thinking about the process of 
regional economic integration, in Europe if not elsewhere. The recent 
trends demonstrate a coalescence2 at the margins, a subregional 
• Visiting Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law. I am grateful to have 
enjoyed the support of the Graduate Program and of the European Law Research Center at Harvard Law 
School, where I was visiting scholar and graduate instructor while writing this article, which is based 
on a paper initially presented in May 1996 at the Conference on Institutions for International Economic 
Integration organized by the International Economic Law Interest Group of the American Society of 
International Law. Special thanks to David Kennedy, David Kershaw, Matjaz Nahtigal, John 
Ohnesorge, and the participants in the Seminar on Law and International Relations (particularly Andrew 
Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Joseph Weiler) for their comments on earlier drafts. I would 
also like to thank Pamela Licht at the American University of Armenia Legal Resource Center for her 
invaluable research assistance. All views expressed herein are my own. 
I See; e.g., IAN & PAMELA BARNES, THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION (1995); ANDREW EVANS, 
THE INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THIRD STATES IN EUROPE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(1996); Alain GuggenbUhl, The Politica(Economy of Association with Eastern Europe, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 211 (Finn Laursen ed., 1995); Helen E. Hartnell, 
Central/Eastern Europe: The Long and Winding Road toward European Union, 15 COMPo L. Y.B. INT'L 
Bus. 179 (1993) [hereinafter Hartnell, Long and Winding Road]; Helen E. Hartnell, Association 
Agreements between the EC and Central and Eastern European States, 35 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
225 (1993) [hereinafter Hartnell, Association Agreements]; Dan Horowitz; EC-CentrallEast European 
Relations: New Principles for a New Era, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 259 (1990); David Kennedy, 
Turning to Market Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32 HARV. INT'L. L. 1. 373 (1991) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Architectures); David Kennedy & David E. Webb, The Limits of Integration: 
Eastern Europe and the European Communities, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1095 (1993); Marc 
Maresceau & Elisabetta Montaguti, The Relations Between the European Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe: A Legal Appraisal, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1327 (1995); Patrick A. Messerlin, The 
EC and Central Europe: The Missed Rendez-vous of 1992?, 1993 ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, vol. 1(1), 
89 (1993); Steve Peers, An Ever-Closer Waiting Room? The Case for Eastern European Accession to 
the European Economic Area, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 187 (1995); STEFAN RICHTER, DIE 
ASSOZIIERUNG OSTEUROPAISCHER STAATEN DURCH DIE EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (1993). See 
also Vit Barta & Sandor Richter, Eastern Enlargement of the European Unionfrom the Western and 
from the Eastern Perspective (unpublished 1996 manuscript, copy on file with author); ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION BETWEEN UNEQUAL PARTNERS (Theodore Georgakopoulos et aI. eds., 1994); Sanjay 
Peters, Barriers to Regional Economic Integration between Unequal Partners: The Case of Spain and 
the European Union (Quaderns de treball #19, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, 1996). 
2 This term was first suggested to me by Joel Trachtman. Subsequent to adopting it for my 
purposes, I encountered a similar usage in George Kolankiewicz, Consensus and Competition in the 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, 70 INT'L AFF. 477,478 (1994) (stating that "apart from 
the largely endogenous centrifugal forces of competition lmpelling each country to mv'! its way to 
Europe, there are increasing centripetal tendencies, mostly exogenous in nature and emanating from the 
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solidification, which in tum suggests the advent of a counterweight to the 
powerful regional integration initiatives such as the EU.3 This coalescence 
has caused the Ell's hitherto top-down, vertical integration strategy vis-a-vis 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to tilt ever so slightly, towards 
the horizontal. The effect ofthis power shift is to introduce a new dynamic 
into the process of East-West integration, and to take one step away from 
monologue, and towards conversation among neighbors. 
The growing importance and self-confidence of subregional 
initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe offer hope that future integration 
will rectify some of the inequities of the top-down, vertical integration 
model by taking a more balanced approach to solving common problems. 
The recent trend constitutes a positive move, economically and politically, 
on the part of the new democracies, which are learning to make their way 
in an amorphous Europe where bipolarity is mostly a memory. Coalescence 
falls short of more dramatic reforms that have been envisioned,4 hut at least 
offers a model with which to build. 
Part II of this article presents the vertical integration model 
deployed by the European Union vis-a-vis the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Part III critiques the Ell's approach by analyzing five 
paradoxes present in the current model: the trade paradox, the aspirational 
paradox, the participation paradox, the sovereignty paradox, and the 
competition-cooperation paradox. Part IV examines key integration· 
developments in Central and Eastern Europe, places them in the context of 
the EU enlargement process, and considers the extent to which they remedy 
the pathologies inherent in the vertical model. And finaliy, Part V 
concludes by questioning the broader implications of these European 
developments. 
east and west forcing [some countries] to coalesce for [their] own future benefit."). 
) While the emphasis in this article will be on the EU, it will make occasion,,: reference to 
initiatives underway in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as well. The EU exerts 
a much stronger economic and political pull on most (but not all) of the countries located (figuratively, 
if not geographically) between the Russian Federation and the West. There is, however, a move to 
establish an alternative to the EU. See discussion infra of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States 
(CIS) and related undertakings in Part IV. C.3. It would be premature to engage in detailed comparisons 
between the Brussels-based and the Moscow-based European integration models at this time, since the 
CIS integration project is still in its infancy. However, such analyses will be needed in the future, ifand 
when the CIS model develops further. 
4 See Kennedy, Architectures, supra note 1, at 396 (emphasizing rupture and calling for 
convergence of the two integration models, i.e. the international trade system, on the one hand, and the 
EC's internal market, on the other). 
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The term "Eastern Europe" conjures up gray, looming images in 
most Western minds.6 Thus, one cannot invoke this geographical 
designation without confronting these persistent negative connotations. 
However much one might wish to abandon this term as a Cold War relic, the 
idea of Eastern Europe -- "a work of cultural creation, of intellectual artifice, 
of ideological self-interest and self-promotion,,7 -- clearly precedes the Cold 
War.s A similar dilemma attends use of the term "Central Europe," which 
invokes for some the frightening memory of Germany's Mitteleuropa,9 even 
while it represents for others an alternative to the "oppressive idea of 
Eastern Europe."lo 
Sensitivity to such historical notions is essential when writing about 
Europe, but does not dictate that they be taken as immutable. These "maps 
in the mind" surely need to be "adjusted; adapted, reconceived"ll as part of 
the integration process. And yet, for the purposes of this article, it is 
expedient to employ the notions in current usage. Thus, this article will 
l LARRY WOLFF, INVENTING EASTERN EUROPE: THE MAP OF CIVILIZATION ON THE MIND OF THE 
ENUGHTENMENT 6 (1994) [citing John Ledyard, John LedYard's Journey Through Russia and Siberia 
1787-1788: The Journal and Selected Letters, ed. Stephen D. Watrous (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin 
Press, 1966)]. 
6 Idat 1 ("[W]ho could see through an iron curtain and discern the shapes enveloped in shadow?"); 
id. at 2 ("Throughout the Cold War the iron curtain would be envisioned as a barrier of quarantine, 
separating the light of Christian civilization from whatever lurked in the shadows, and such a conception 
was all the more justification for not looking too closely at the lands behind. "). A version of this vision 
pervades some Eastern minds as well. See SLAVENKA DRAKULlC, CAFE EUROPA: LIFE AFTER 
COMMUNlsM!6 (1996) (Croatian author describes "that grey, monolithic vision of the USSR [that] is 
rigidly cemented in [her] mind"). 
7 Wolff, supra note 5, at 4. This author argues that "[i]t was Western Europe that invented Eastern 
Europe as its complementary other half in the eighteenth century, the age of Enlightenment. It was also 
the Enlightenment, with its intellectual centers in Western Europe, that cultivated and appropriated to 
itself the new notion of 'civilization,' ... and ... discovered its complement, within the same continent, 
in shadowed lands of backwardness, even barbarism." Id. See also THE ORIGINS OF BACKWARDNESS 
IN EASTERN EUROPE: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS FROM THE MIDDLE AGES UNTIL THE EAF.LY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (Daniel Chirot ed., 1989); EDWARD W. SAID, ORiENTALlSM (1979). Compare NEAL 
ASCHERSON, BLACK SEA 49-88 (1995) (tracing these ideas back to Herodotus). 
8 See Wolff, supra note 5, at 3 ("The shadow persists, because the idea of Eastern Europe remains, 
even without the iron curtain ... because that idea ... is much older than the Cold War."). In WoUl's 
account, "[t]he new idea of civilization was the crucial and indispensable point of reference that made 
possible the consolidation and articulation of the inchoate idea of Eastern Europe in the eighteenth 
century." Id. at 12. 
9 FRIEDRICH NAUMANN, MIITELEUROPA (1915). 
10 Wolff, supra note 5, at 15. See generally Timothy Garton Ash, Does Central Europe Exist?, 
N.Y. REv. BOOKS (October 9,1996); Timothy Garton Ash, Mitteleuropa?, DAEDALUS: JAM. ACAD. 
ARTS & SCI., Vol. 119, No.1, 1-21 (1990); Ferenc Feher, On Making Central Europe, 3 E. EUR. POL. 
& SOCIETIES 412 (1989); THOMAS JAGER, EUROPAS NEUE ORDNUNG: MrrrELEUROPA ALS AL TERNA T1V? 
(1990); loNNIE R. JOHNSON, CENTRAL EUROPE: ENEMIES, NEIGHBORS, FRIENDS (1996); MrrrELEuRoPA: 
HISTORY AND PROSPECTS (Peter Stirk ed., 1994). 
11 Wolff, supra note S, at 3. 
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adhere to convention and use the term "Central and Eastern Europe" to 
include all 27 post-Cold War transition countries. 12 This term is less than 
perfect,13 but has the minor virtue of being consistent with EU usage. This 
article will focus on functional differences, rather than conceptual or 
historical ones. Still, reference will be made to a variety of geographic 
subgroupings, some labelled as such by the EU, and others named by the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe themselves. 
The main concern here is to investigate the dynamics of a 
relationship between a dominant integrative force -- the European Union --
and the non-member countries that are attracted with more or less force by 
its gravitational pull. The emphasis on the EU is not meant to belie the 
existence of other integrative forces in Europe,14 but rather to highlight 
problems in the process of European integration -- still largely conceived as 
one of East-West rapprochement -- and to examine the possibility of 
intermediation by marginal actors. This task is undertaken with an 
awareness of the historical notion that Central and Eastern Europe are 
located "not down in the depths of barbarism, but rather on the 
developmental scale that measured the distance between civilization and 
barbarism. ,,15 
This article begins by invoking the conceptual map of Europe as 
having two centers, namely the Brussels-based EU and the Moscow-based 
CIS. This fairly common vision is both oversimplified 16 and problematic.17 
12 They are: Albania, Annenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
. Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro). The situation of Mongolia is 
not considered in this article, although the EU sometimes includes it among the beneficiaries of 
measures for the benefit of Central and East European countries. 
I) It is conceptually flawed because some of the countries included belong more to Asia than to 
Europe. Rather than resolving any boundary disputes between Europe and Asia, the EU applies the 
umbrella term "CEEC" to all, but gradually differentiates various geographic areas within the mass (e.g. 
the Baltics, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia). Another flaw is that this umbrella term inevitably raises 
the question "which countries are central and which are eastern?" The tendency is to Uf.e "eastern" to 
refer to the former USSR, and "central" to refer to all other countries, but this convention would surely 
offend some former members of the USSR that identify today more strongly with Brussels than with 
Moscow. Lithuania, for example, has stated that it "wants to be a Central European country, not a Baltic 
republic." OPEN MEDIA REsEARCH INSTrrtITE, DAILY DIGEST, Jan. 7, 1997 
<http://www.omri.cZ/index.html> [hereinafter OMRI). Another puzzling question is "which Balkan 
countries are Balkan, and which are central European?" 
14 The CIS actually draws in about half of the 27 post-Cold War transition countries noted supra 
in note 12, all of which can be described as emerging markets and many of which as emerging 
democracies. 
IS Wolff, supra note 5, at 13. 
16 It is oversimplified because there are other relevant non-European centers which are attractive 
to some of these countries (e.g. in Asia Minor, see further discussion infra in parts IV.D.2 and IV.D.4), 
and because of the new subregional initiatives, which are elaborated in Part III below. 
17 Salman Rushdie has criticized a center-periphery analysis ofliterature as "flat earth ... with 
jaded Romans at the center and frightfully gifted Hottentots and anthropaphagi lurking at the edges . 
. . an imperial map, [and yet] Europe's empires are long gone." Salman Rushdie, In Defense of the 
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As the analysis of subregional developments shows, this dipolar, centrist 
map is evolving towards "a new world ... disorder" that is "postcolonial, . 
. . decentered, [and] transnational .. ."18 This article will visit some ofthe 
multiple perspectives on this integration process. But even this task 
presupposes identification of the perspectives to be explored and 
clarification of the geographical terms used. This will be accomplished first 
through the lens of the EU association process, which establishes a set of 
geographical as well as functional concepts essential to the analysis, and 
later through the lens of subregional integration initiatives, which manifest 
the geographical decentering process and further the functional analysis. 
II.THE EUROPEAN UNION'S INTEGRATION MODEL 
A.THE ASSOCIATION PROCESS 
The EUl9 deploys its integration strategy vis-ii-vis the Central and 
East European countries (CEECs)20 primarily via the association process.21 
An "association agreement" is a treaty entered into by the European 
Community (or Communities)22 with a non-member country, which involves 
Novel. Yet Again. NEW YORKER, June 24,1996, at 48,50. 
18 [d. (speaking about literature, which is additionally "interlingual [and] cross-cultural"). 
19 The focus of this article is on relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe; 
however, it should be noted that EU member states also pursue bilateral or multilateral relations with 
these countries in areas that fall outside exclusive EU competence. For example, Franc" signed five 
economic agreements with Russia at the first meeting of the Franco-Russian Economic Commission. 
OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 16, 1996. Austria signed a protocol on health insurance with Latvia. 
OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 12, 1996 (Austrian specialists will give advice on legislative issues, 
including standards for health care and for accreditation of medical establishments). 
20 The acronym "CEEC" is commonly used by the EU in English-language texts. The acronym 
"PECO" often crops up in EU texts which are in (or have been translated from) the French language (i.e. 
Pays Europeenes Centrales et Orientales). 
21 Other vehicles of Western European policy towards the CEECs, such as the Council of Europe, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization on Cooperation and Security in 
Europe (OCSE), the Organization on Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the 
Western European Union (WEU), are beyond the scope of this article. It is conceded, however, that the 
current dynamics of integration in Europe cannot be fully comprehended without taking into account 
the security concerns that have crystallized around the decision at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 to 
invite certain CEECs (i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) to join NATO. See also Kirchberg 
Declaration of9 May 1994, Communique ofWEU Council of Ministers, AGENCE EUR. Docs., May II, 
1994 (announcing the opening of the WEU to CEECs as "associate partners"); Declaration of the Paris 
Conference 'on Stability in Europe, Pact on Stability in Europe (Paris, Mar. 21-22, 1995), BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Mar. 1995, point 2.2.1. B6rta& Richter, supra note I, at 18, observe that "[i]fNA.TO accession 
... took place before ... EU accession, most but by no means all political motivations for full EU 
membership would vanish." 
22 The term "European Communities" is the pre-Maastricht way to refer collectively to the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Since the effective date of the Treaty on European Union, 
'however, the term "European Community" (EC) has technically replaced the term "European Economic 
Community" (EEC). See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 1 
[hereinafter EC TREATY], as amended at Maastricht by the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 
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"reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures."23 
The individual treaties between the EC and the CEECs are bilateraP4 
Association agreements between the EC and its neighbors in Central 
and Eastern Europe existed long before the dramatic events of 1989.25 In 
fact, the EC maintained ongoing trading relationships with numerous 
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,26 and even 
entered into bilateral agreements with some of them during the Cold War.27 
1992 OJ. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. Since it is the EC (rather than the EU) 
that concludes treaties per EC TREAlY, art. 238, the tenn "EC" will be used in its technical sense where 
appropriate in this article. See TEU, art. G(I). 
The reader is forewarned, however, that current usage commonly (and confusingly) uses the 
singular tenn "European Community" to encompass all three communities (i.e. the ECSC, EURATOM 
and the fonner EEC). That confusing usage will be avoided here, insofar as it is possible to do so. In 
the context of association agreements with CEECs, it is often the case that all three communities are 
signatories. See, e.g., Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part (signed June 14, 1994) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Ukrainian PCA] (defining the tenn "European Community," for purposes of 
the agreement, to include the EC, EURATOM, and the ECSC). 
23 EC TREATY, art. 238. If an association agreement falls within exclusive Community 
competence, the EC may act on its own; otherwise, the member states must also participate in the 
conclusion (and ratification) of the agreement. See Opinion 1194, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) 
of the EC Treaty, 1994 E.C.R. 5267, I C.M.L.R. 205 (1994)(Uruguay Round Treaties). 
24 They are between the EC and its member states, on the one hand, and the associated country, 
on the other (although, as noted supra in note 22, some such treaties also involve the ECSC and/or 
EURATOM, in addition to the EC proper). Article 238 of the EC Treaty contemplates the conclusion 
of association agreements "with one or more States or international organisations." EC TREATY, art. 
238. The procedure for negotiation of an association agreement starts with a mandate from the Council 
of Ministers to the Commission, instructing it to open negotiations. Id. art. 228(1). The Commission 
then conducts negotiations with the prospective associated country, and initials the draft agreement. 
Id. Final negotiations are conducted within the framework of the Council of Ministers, which ultimately 
concludes the treaty on behalf of the EC and the member states. Id. art. 228(2). The treaty becomes 
effective once it has been approved by the European Parliament, id. art. 238, and ratified by each EU 
member state and by the associated country (in accordance with the domestic law of each such country). 
On the role of so-called "interim agreements," see infra note 74. 
25 For an overview of the post-World War II development of relations between the EC and the 
CEECs, see Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I, at 179-83, and references cited therein. 
26 According to one expert, "very little is known about the beginnings of' the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (better known as "COMECON" or the "CMEA"). GIUSEPPE SCIDAVONE, THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF COMECON 14 (1981). The founding members of COMECON (in 1949) were 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Albaniajoined later that 
same year, and the Gennan Democratic Republic joined in 1950. Id. Se'e generally JENNY B.RINE, 
COMECON: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION (1992); Linda Ervin, 
A Selective Bibliography, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF COMECON, supra, at 187-246. COMECON, unlike 
the EC, never had external competence to sign international agreements and thereby bind its members. 
Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note 1, at 180. 
27 For example, the EC concluded agreements covering trade in certain agricultural products with 
Poland in 1965 and, in 1968, with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (again). See, e.g., Council 
Regulation 2045/68, 19680.1. (L 303) 43. In addition to these sector-specific agreements, the EC 
entered into a general trade framework agreement with Yugoslavia in 1970. 19700.1. (L 58) 1. The 
Benelux countries concluded an agreement with Romania in 1969. 1969 OJ. (L 326) 43. See generally 
Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I, at 180. During the 1970s, the EC tried but failed to 
reach agreement with the CMEA on a framework for developing trade relations among member 
countries. Id. Since bilateral arrangements were largely beyond reach, this era was characterized by 
the so-called "autonomous" trade policy. Id. at 181. The EC did, however, conclude bilateral 
agreements covering trade in textiles (1973) and in coal and steel products (1978 and 1979) with 
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These relationships were being expanded in the 1980s, both before and 
during the collapse of the COMECON system. Still, the increase in number 
and types of association agreement since 1989 has been dramatic. 
The EU moved in the early 1990s to adapt the association process 
to the changing needs of the CEECs.28 Indeed, the task of keeping up with 
the ongoing metamorphoses of its neighbors in transition has been 
enonnously challenging for the EU.29 Part III below analyzes the ways in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. ld. at 182. 
28 First, at its April 1990 Dublin Summit, the European Council decided to offer a new type of 
association agreement to the CEECs. Conclusions of the Presidency (Dublin European Council, Apr. 
1990), BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1990, points 1.1 - 1.16 [hereinafter 1990 Dublin Summit 
Conclusions], at point 1.8. Second, the Commission prepared a report pursuant to the European 
Council's request. See Communication from the Commission to the Council on Association Agreements 
with the Countries of Central and East Europe: General Framework, COM(90)398 [hereinafter 
Association Agreements: General Framework]. Third, negotiating directives for the first EAs were 
issued in December 1990. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1990, point 1.4.6. Fourth, the European 
Parliament resolved that "whereas, although the [earlier form of association agreements] are a welcome 
first step towards improving trade relations and economic cooperation, in view of the problems faced 
by these countries, cooperation over and above these agreements is needed as part of an association that 
must be seen in the context of the possible accession of these countries to the [EU] ... " European 
Parliament Resolution AJ-00SS/91 of Apr. 18, 1991 on a General Outline for Association Agreements 
with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 1991 OJ. (C 129) 142. The association process was 
initially viewed as more or less distinct from the programs initiated by the EU to provide aid and 
technical assistance to the CEECs, notably PHARE and T ACIS, but these initiatives have subsequently 
become thoroughly intertwined. See discussion, infra text accompanying notes 58-59. 
29 The relationship between the EU and the CEECs has been addressed at each European Council 
summit since 1989, notably at: Strasbourg (Dec. 1989); Dublin (Apr. 1990); Rome (Dec. 1990); 
Luxembourg (June 1991); Maastricht (Dec. 1991); Lisbon (June 1992); Edinburgh (Dec. 1992); 
Copenhagen (June 1993); Brussels (Oct. 1993); Corfu (June 1994); Essen (Dec. 1994); Cannes (June 
1995); Madrid (Dec. 1995); Florence (June 1996); Dublin (Dec. 1996); Amsterdam (June 1997); and 
Luxembourg (Dec. 1997). Also, a special Paris Summit was held in November 1989 to discuss 
developments in Eastern Europe. Shiela Rule, Europeans Press Case For Shaping the Future, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1989, atAl4. 
The Commission has been active in preparing reports. See Association Agreements: General 
Framework, supra note 28; European Commission Guidelines of 28 April 1993 on the Future of 
Relations Between the EC and Central and Eastern Europe: Report by the Commi~sion to the 
[Edinburgh] European Council, reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs., Dec. 9, 1992, reported in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1993, point l.3.S [hereinafter Commission Guidelines]; Communication of 18 May 
1993 on Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, reprinted in 
AGENCE EUR. Docs., May 6, 1993, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1993, point 1.3.4 
[hereinafter Commission Communication on Closer Association]; Communication of 13 July 1994 on 
The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries ofCentra1 and Eastern Europe 
for Accession, COM(94)320 final, reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs., July 21, 1994 [hereinafter 
Commission Strategy]; Suggestions of 26 July 1994 on the Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe for Accession, COM(94)361 final, reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs., Sept. 14, 1994 
[hereinafter Commission Suggestions]; Communication of 14 March 1995 on Industrial Cooperation 
with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, COM(9S)71 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, 
Mar. 1995, point 1.4.51 (proposing measures to improve the framework conditions for industrial 
development, step up industrial restructuring and modernization, and promote investment);. White Paper 
on the Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the 
Internal Market of the Union, COM(9S)163 final and COM(9S) 163 finall2 (addendum), reported in 
BULL. EUR. UNION, May 1995, point 1.4.63 [hereinafter CEEC White Paper]; Follow-up to the White 
Paper on the Preparation of the Associated Countries ofCentra1 and'Eastern Europe for Integration into 
the Internal Market of the Union; Technical Assistance, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, 
point 1.4.63 [hereinafter White Paper Follow-Up]; Progress Report of 29 November 1995 on Pre-
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which the EU has met (and failed to meet) this challenge. Before 
undertaking a critique of the association process, however, some 
background information is required. This article will not recount the entire 
historical development of the current forms of association. agreement, or 
provide a detailed analysis of the contents of each type of framework 
association agreement.30 Rather, it will establish a taxonomy of association 
agreements, summarize the key features of the association regime, and 
accession Strategy with the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.46 [hereinafter Pre-accession Progress Report]; Interim Report of 29 
November 1995 from the Commission to the [Madrid] European Council on the Effects of the Policies 
of the EU of Enlargement to the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, reported in BULL. 
EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.47 [hereinafter Enlargement Interim Report]; Study Into Ways of 
Developing Agricultural Relations of the European Union and the Associated Countries with a View 
to Their Accession, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.48 [hereinafter CEEC 
Agricultural Study}; State of Progress in Preparing for EU Enlargement: Commission Information 
Memo, reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs., Aug. 9, 1996; Agenda 2000; For a Stronger and Wider 
Europe, COM (97)2000 final/l and The Challenge of Enlargement, COM (97)2000 finall2, also 
available at <http://europa.eu.intlcomrnlagenda2000/0verview/eulagenda.htrn> (both presented by the 
Commission on July IS, 1997) [hereinafter Agenda 2000]. See also Opinion by Agriculture 
Commissioner Steichen on The Common Agricultural Policy: The Medium-Term Outlook in the 
Context of Future Trends in International Trade in Agriculture, reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs., Dec. 
7, 1994. 
Based on the Commission Strategy and the Commission Suggestions, supra, the General Affairs 
Council submitted a Strategy to Prepare for the Accession of the Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe to the [Essen] European Council, reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs. Dec. 14, 1994 
[hereinafter Pre-accession Strategy}. The Essen Summit approved the Pre-acces~iun Strategy. 
Conclusions of the Presidency (Essen European Council, Dec. 1994), reprinted in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1994, points 1.1-.55 [hereinafter Essen Summit Conclusions], at points 1.13, 1.39-
.54. The CEEC White Paper, supra, was approved by the European Council at its Cannes Summit in 
June 1995. Conclusions of the Presidency (Cannes European Council, June 1995), reprinted in BULL. 
EUR. UNION, June 1995, points 1.1-.56 [hereinafter Cannes Summit Conclusions}. 
The European Parliament, too, has participated in the debate surrounding enlargement. See, e.g., 
EP Resolution on Institutional Problems, the Council's Institutional Role, and the Cooperation 
Procedure, AGENCE EUR. Docs., Jan. 30, 1993; EP Resolution of27 May 1993 on the Conclusions of 
the Edinburgh European Council Concerning Relations with Central and Eastern Europe, 1993 0.1. (C 
176) 168; 1995 OJ. (C 323) 41,41-44 (EP assent, subject to amendments, to new TACIS programme; 
EP asked to be consulted prior to Council adoption of measures against a partner state in cases of 
violation of democratic principles, human rights or minority rights); EP Resolution on Commission 
Communication on Industrial Cooperation, 1996 OJ. (C 166) 262; EP Resolution on Commission Study 
on Alternative Strategies for the Development of Relations in the Field of Agriculture, reported in 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1996, point 1.4.50. 
See also Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Future Enlargement of the 
Community [hereinafter ECOSOC Opinion on Enlargement], CES(92} 1039, reported in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Sept. 1992, point 1.3.1 (noting that enlargement of the Community should not be 
achieved at the expense of its consolidation);ECOSOC Opinion of Sept. 25, 1996 on the CEEC White 
Paper, 1997 OJ. (C 30) 59; ECOSOC Opinion on the Implications for the CAP of the Accession of 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1996, point 1.4.51; 
Committee of the Regions Opinion on the CAP and Eastward Enlargement, reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1997, point 1.3.69. 
)0 For an historical overview of the evolution of the so-called "First Generation" and "Second 
Generation" agreements, see Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I, at 182-83. Further 
analysis of the principal types of agreement can be found therein at 184-97, and in Hartnell, Association 
Agreements, supra note I, at 226-29. See also Marc Maresceau, On Association, Partnership, Pre-
Accession and Accession, in ENLARGING THE EUROPEAN UNION: RELATIONS BETWEl;l'I THE EU AND 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (Marc Maresceau ed., 1997). 
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detail the current status of each CEEC. 
The ED's association strategy has become highly differentiated: It 
draws a distinction between those countries which have concluded a "pre-
accession"3l Europe Agreement (EA)32 with the European Communities and 
those which have concluded (or are expected to conclude) a "mere" 
. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).33 The differences between 
31 "Accession" is the technical term for joining the EU. See TEU, art. O. Any "European State" 
may apply for membership. Id. As for the meaning of "European" see Commission Report on Europe 
and the Challenge of Enlargement, BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES SuPP. 3/1992 at 11 [hereinafter 
Commission Enlargement Report] ("European identity" cannot be condensed into a single formula, but 
refers to the "shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction" and is comprised 
of geographical, historical, and cultural elements). 
At its Maastricht Summit, the European Council clarified that applications would be accepted from 
"any European State whose systems of government are founded on the principle of democracy." 
Conclusions of the Presidency (Maastricht European Council, Dec. 1991), reprinted in BULL. EUR. 
CoMMUNmES, Dec. 1991, points I.J-.19 [hereinafter Maastricht Summit Conclusions], at pOint 1.4. The 
Commission Enlargement Report, supra, elaborated three threshold criteria to determine an applicant's 
eligibility: European identity, democratic status, and respect for human rights. Further criteria pertain 
to the applicant's "acceptance of the Community system, and its capacity to implement it." Id. At its 
Copenhagen Summit, the European Council elaborated the following accession criteria: stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of 
minorities; a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union; and the applicant's ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
Le. the acquis communautaire, and adhere to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
Conclusions of the Presidency (Copenhagen European Council, June 1993), reprinted in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNmES, June 1993, points 1.1 - .41 [hereinafter Copenhagen Summit Conclusions], at point 1.26. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam concluded in June 1997 will, when effective, modify the provisions of 
the TEU pertaining to accession. Amended Article 0 will read: "Any European State which respects 
the principles set out in Article F(I) may apply to become a member of the Union." Amended Article 
F(l) will read: "The Union is founded on the principles ofliberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule oflaw, principles which are common[to] the Member States." 
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, concluded by the Intergovernmental Conference in June 1997, 
<http://europa.eu.intlabc/objlamstlenlindex.html> [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]. 
II EAs used to be called "Second Generation" agreements. The first tier of Central and East 
European countries includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Within this group often EA countries, there exist two mutually-
exclusive geographical sub-groupings: the Visegrad Group (consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia), and the Baltic States (consisting of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). For a 
discussion of the Visegrad Group, see infra text accompanying notes 127-30. Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia are not usually considered to be members of thi: Visegrad Group, but these countries consider 
themselves to be Central European and thus tend to align with the Visegrad Group. See, e.g., AGENCE 
EUR., July 18-19, 1994, at 10 (Slovene Finance Minister Gaspari said that Slovenia wished "to be treated 
on an equal footing with the Visegrad countries" and "insisted on the importance cf :onsidering 
Slovenia not as a Mediterranean state ... , but as a Central European country."). See infra discussion 
of CEFTA and CEI in Parts IV.C.l and IV.D.3. The EAs "are the main base for helping CEECs 
accomplish the macro-economic restructuring and adjustments that are indispensable for accession to 
the EU." AGENCE EUR., July 18-19, 1994, at 9. 
33 PCAs used to be called "First Generation" agreements. See Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, 
supra note 1, at 182-83. Today there are two major sub-types of PC A, described more fully infra at note 
73. A de jure hierarchy exists among the PCA countries, corresponding to the more or less 
comprehensive nature of the association agreement offered to them by the EC. 
The second tier of Central and East European countries includes Albania, the remaining members 
of the former Yugoslavia (Le. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro), and all members of the CIS (Le. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
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the archetypal EA and PCA framework agreements are many, and their 
significance tends to reflect the goal of eventual accession vel non. And yet, 
these differences also have implications that reach beyond their particular 
European context. 
Economically, the key distinction between the PC As and the EAs 
is that the former merely normalize trade, whereas the latter are preferential. 
The peAs normalize trade by granting most-favored-nation (MFN) 
treatment,34 whereas the EAs grant preferential access (Le. apply even lower 
tariffs than are applied to goods coming from countries entitled to MFN 
treatment).35 In technical terms, the difference is that the EAs purport to be 
free trade agreements within the meaning of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,36 whereas the peAs do not?7 The EAs 
provide for the gradual implementation of free trade in industrial goods; 
such products originating in the territory of an EA country have preferential 
access to the Ee market and vice versa.38 The EAs are thus bilateral trade 
regimes that are meant to be exceptions to the most-favored-nation 
obligation imposed on WTO countries. However, both peAs and EAs 
provide for a variety of protective trade measures, the impact of which is 
likely "to be significant in the medium term notwithstanding integrationist 
enthusiasm. "39 
Both the EAs and the peAs call for political dialogue40 and create 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). Among the CIS countries, there exist two mutually-exclusive geographical 
subgroups: Central Asia (consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan), and the Transcaucasus (consisting of Annenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). 
34 On occasion, however, the EC has entered into a PCA with a country to which it had previously 
granted preferential treatment in accordance with the niles governing the generali7etl system of 
preferences. In such cases, the arrangement set down in the PCA may in fact be a preferential one, but 
it is not the PCA that is the agent of preference. Further, some PCAs concluded by the EC (e.g. with 
Russia) pennit the associated country to "apply preferential treatment to the other independent States 
ofthe fonner Soviet Union," notwithstanding that the PCAs are based on the "most-favored-nation" 
principle. See BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.89. 
3S See generally Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I, at 187-92 (describing in detail 
the movement of goods aspects of the EAs). 
36 All EU and EA countries are members of the World Trade Organization, and thus obliged to 
abide by the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-ll, T.LA.S. 
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194. These issues are discussed in Part V below. 
37 Some PCAs, however, contain a clause calling for subsequent negotiations with an eye to 
establishing a free trade area. See the discussion infra in text accompanying note 70. 
38 The EAs do not provide for free trade in sensitive goods (e.g. agriculture, coal and steel, 
textiles), although they do include protocols covering some aspects of such trade. 
39 Maresceau & Montaguti, supra note 1, at 1343. These authors provide an excellent, 
comprehensive analysis of the trade-related provisions of the EAs and PCAs. Id. at 1343-67. See the 
discussion of antidumping at 1345-52, safeguards and other import trade barriers at 1352-56, the infant 
industry clause at 1356-58, and consultation and dispute settlement procedures at 1358-62. See also 
Hartnell, Association Agreements, supra note I, at 229. 
40 The EAs "establish and institutionalize regular meetings at the highest level to discuss matters 
of common interest, with the particular aim of bringing the parties' positions on foreign policy closer 
together." BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1991; point 1.3 .2. 
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a weak institutional structure.41 These superficial similarities, however, 
cannot mask the key political distinction between EAs and PCAs: The 
former are designed to lay the foundation for full political and economic 
integration into the EO, while the latter are not. The differences reach far 
beyond mere language.42 As between EA and PCA countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe,43 only the EA countries are invited to participate in the 
multilateral Structured Dialogue, established by the EO at the Copenhagen 
41 For a deSCription of the institutional framework of association, see Hartnell, Long and Winding 
Road, supra note I, at 185-87. The institutional structures of EAs and PCAs are similar, but not 
identical. The EAs provide for the creation of the following bilateral institutions: an Association 
Council, an Association Committee, and an Association Parliamentary Committee. First, the 
Association Council meets at ministerial level, albeit infrequently; it is responsible for the 
implementation of the agreement, and for considering any issues of mutual interest. See, e.g., BULL. 
EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.66 (second meeting ofEU-Hungary ASsociation Council) and 
point 1.4.67 (second meeting of EU-Poland Association Council); [lULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, 
point 1.4.82 (second meeting of EU-Bulgaria Association Council), point 1.4.85 (second meeting of 
EU-Czech Republic Association Council), point 1.4.87 (second meeting of EU-Romania Association 
Council), iIIld point 1.4.89 (second meeting of EU-Slovakia Association Council). Second, the 
Association Committee carries out day-to-day business and exercises any powers delegated to it by the 
Association Council. Third, the Association Parliamentary Committee, composed of the members of 
the European Parliament and the respective EA country's parliament, has the power to !equest and 
receive information, and to make recommendations to the Association Council. The EA dispute 
settlement procedures (calling for arbitration) were invoked for the first time by the EU against the 
Czech compulsory import deposit system. AGENCE EUR., July 25, 1997, at 9. 
The PCAs call for the establishment of a Joint Committee, rather than an Association Council and 
an Association Committee. They also provide for interparliamentary cooperation. 
A new bilateral institution, not called for by the EAs, appeared in mid-1997. The Joint Advisory 
Group, composed of representatives of the EU's Economic and Social Committee and the EA country, 
will discuss economic and social aspects of bilateral relations. The first Joint Advisory Group was set 
up with Hungary, but others are planned with each EA country. First Joint Advisory Group Set Up, in 
EUR. DIALOGUE: THE MAGAZINE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (July/Aug. 1997) 
<http://europa.eu.intlenlcomrnldgIO/infcornleur_ diallindex.htrnl> [hereinafter EUR. DIALOGUE)' EUR. 
DIALOGUE is the EU's new online magazine aimed at CEEC "decision makers and policy-formers." Id. 
The EA countries themselves have developed new institutions to manage their relations with the 
EU and their obligations under their association agreements. See, e.g., Hartnell, Long and Winding 
Road, supra note I, at 187 (describing Hungarian developments, including the inter-ministerial 
committee for the coordination of tasks connected with European integration); OMRI, supra note 13, 
Feb. 23,1996 (meeting of Hungarian-EU Integration Committee; reference to Poland's Ministry for EU 
Affairs); HUNG. REp., No. 2.25, Dec. 9, 1996 <http://www.isys.hulhrepl> (a study by the Hungarian 
State Audit Office showed a total of 1,000 people from various Hungarian state institutions working on 
EU integration matters); RFEIRL NEWSLINE (May 12,1997) <http://www.rferl.org> (polish Premier 
Cimoszewicz appointed 68-member EU integration advisory council). 
42 This is not to suggest that language is unimportant. For example, the preamble of the Europe 
Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the One Part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the Other Part, 19930.1. (L 347) 17 [hereinafter 
Hungarian EA] provides: "Considering Hungary's firm intention to seek full integration in the political, 
economic and security order of a new Europe; Having in mind that the final objective of Hungary is to 
become a member of the Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to 
achieve this objective." Id. Preamble. Similar language was included in the early EAs with 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. The first group of EA countries protested vigorously against this one-sided 
language and eventually managed to extract from the EU less non-committal language. See discussion 
infra accompanying notes 177-78. 
43 However, the EU extended these programs to other countries in line for accession, i.e. Cyprus 
and Malta. See infra notes 193-94. 
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Summit in June 1993, as a way to include them on a regular basis in some 
aspects of European summitry;44 included in the Pre-accession Strategy, 
approved by the European Council at the Essen Summit in December 
1994;45 and covered by the CEEC White Paper, designed to prepare them for 
integration into the single market.46 
The key to the "pre-accession" nature of the EAs, as indicated both 
in the text of the treaties and in pertinent EU policy papers,47 is the 
obligation to approximate48 the legislation of the associated country to that 
of the EU.49 The Hungarian EA, for example, states that: 
63. 
The Contracting Parties recognize that the major 
precondition for Hungary's economic integration into the 
Community is the approximation of that country's existing 
and future legislation to that ofthe Community. Hungary 
shall act to ensure that future legislation is compatible with 
44 See Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31. See infra text accompanying notes 257-
'5 See Pre-accession Strategy, supra note 29. See a/so Commission Strategy and Commission 
Suggestions"supra note 29; Pre-Accession Progress Report, supra note 29, at point 1.4.4~ (outlining 
the general political and economic situation in each EA country and assessing progress made under the 
Pre-accession Strategy). 
'6 See CEEC White Paper, supra note 29. See a/so White Paper Follow-Up, supra note 29 . 
., See Essen Summit Conclusions, supra note 29; CEEC White Paper, supra note 29. See also 
Statement of Commissioner Brittan, IP(92) 4S I (June I, 1992), quoted in Hartnell, Long and Winding 
Road, supra note I, at 22S n.99 ("new members must take on not only the full acquis communautaire, 
but thejinalitepolitique of the Community. The EC, in other words, must be taken not only for what 
it is, but for what it is determined to become. "). 
48 "Approximation" is a term derived from Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome. EC TREATY, art. 
100. The term "harmonization" is a more common, generic term for the process of bringing legal 
systems into alignment, both substantively and procedurally . 
• 9 Article 68 of the Hungarian EA illustrates the broad range of areas in which approximation is 
expected to occur: 
The approximation oflaws shall extend to the following areas in particular: customs law, company 
law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of workers at the 
workplace, financial services, rules on competition, protection I)f health and life of humans, 
animals and plants, food legislation, consumer protection including product liability, indirect 
taxation, technical rules and standards, transport and the environment. 
Hungarian EA, supra note 42, art. 68. The EA between the EC and Poland contains identical language 
in Article 69. Europe Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and 
Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Poland, of the Other Part, 1993 OJ. (L 348) 
2 [hereinafter Polish EA]. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, Modernization, Codification, and 
Harmonization: The Influence of the Economic Law of the European Union on Law Reform in the 
Former Socialist Bloc in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 125-35 (Buxbaum et aI. eds., 1996). See generally Andrew 
Evans, Voluntary Harmonization in Integration Between the European Community and Eastern Europe, 
22 EUR. L. REv. 201 (1997); Mikl6s Kiraly, Is Hungary Prepared for Accession to the European 
Community?, ANNALES OF ELTE UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST S3 (1994); Mikl6s Kiraly, Some 
Characteristics of the Approximation of Laws in Hungary, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AT THE DAWN OF 
A NEW CENTURY 225-38 (Juridicia ed., 1997). 
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Community legislation as far as possible.so 
The pre-accession EAs thus require the EA countries to recreate themselves 
in the ED's image.sl PCA countries, in contrast, are not required to 
undertake such concrete obligations in exchange for the market access and 
aid that are part and parcel of association.s2 
EAs have a much broader substantive scope than PCAs. For 
example, EAs contain detailed provisions on matters such as the movement 
of workers, establishment, and trade in services; however, they do not go so 
far as to create free movement in any of these areas.S3 EAs also impose 
so Hungarian EA, supra note 42, art. 67 (emphasis added). The Polish EA contains slightly milder 
language; it provides that "Poland shall use its best efforts to ensure that future legislation is compatible 
with Community legislation." Polish EA, supra note 49, art. 68 (emphasis added). The presence of this 
weaker language in the Polish EA does not in any way detract from the fact that approximation is seen 
as a precondition to eventual Polish accession. 
SI For an analysis of the "classical method" by which the EU has concluded past enlargement 
rounds, see Christopher Preston, Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and 
the Prospects/or a Wider Europe, 33 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 451 (1995). Preston argues that the 
"recently concluded EFTA enlargement is likely to be the last 'classical' enlargement, and that in future 
a more radical approach, questioning some basic assumptions about the EU's guiding principles will 
have to be developed if the goal of a genuinely pan-European Union is to be realized." Id. at 452. One 
of the principles he would call into question is that "formal accession negotiations focus solely on the 
practicalities of the applicants taking on the acquis." Id. at 453. In his view, in the case of the EA 
countries "the practicalities of taking on the acquis would quickly deadlock negotiations" and thus a 
"more searching debate would therefore be needed before negotiations could be started." Id. at 454. 
For examples of the types of problem Preston foresees, see Interview with Marian Brzoska, 
WARSAW Bus. J., Sept. 30-Oct. 6, 1996, at 12 (for the agricultural sector to "adjust well to the EU we 
must change several hundred agricultural laws. Now, Parliament is only able to process five a year 
because it keeps mulling over abortion and the Concordat [with the Vatican]. They talk about 
everything but the economy."); Agriculture Meeting, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 106, Apr. 1, 1997 
(during a March 1997 meeting with their EU counterparts, CEEC agriculture ministers pointed to their 
"progress in adapting their legislation as well as their monitoring and inspection infrastructure to the 
requirements of the internal veterinary and plant-protection market"; noted their "financial and 
technical" problems ... in applying certain EU requirements"; and "emphasised that these additional 
responsibilities imply that the improvement of current infrastructures will require financial 
investment. "). 
sz However, some PCAs do contain hortatory provisions on approximation. For example, the 
Ukrainian PeA provides that: "[t]he parties recognize that an important condition/or strengthening the 
economic links between Ukraine and the Community is the approximation of Ukraine's existing and 
future legislation to that of the Community. Ukraine shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will 
gradually be made compatible with that of the Community." Ukrainian PCA, supra note 22, art. 43(1) 
(emphasis added). The Ukrainian PCA goes on to provide for approximation of laws in all areas 
mentioned by article 68 of the Hungarian EA, supra note 42, and by article 69 of the Polish EA, supra 
note 49, and adds the areas of public procurement and nuclear laws and regulations. Ukrainian PCA, 
supra note 22, art. 43(2). 
With regard to Russia see Strategy on EU-Russia Relations, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 
1995, point 2.2.1, reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs., May 16, 1996 (noting, in the context of economic 
cooperation, that "[s]tudies should be done to identify obstacles to wider flows of trade and investment" 
and to clarify "the impact on our respective economies and the required approximation of legislation, 
both with a view to Russian WTO membership and taking into account the relevant provisions of the 
PCA on the possible establishment of a free trade area between the EU and Russia "). 
S3 Compare Title IV of the Hungarian EA, supra note 42, and of the Polish EA, supra note 49 
(Movement of Workers, Establishment, Supply of Services) with Title IV of the Ukrainian PCA, supra 
note 22 (provisions Affecting Business and Investment). The EAs call for a meeting of the Association 
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significant obligations on the EA countries in terms of competition law.s4 
In some cases, the EAs serve as a framework for further negotiations 
between the EU and the EA countries.55 PCAs, on the other hand, are 
limited mainly to trade in goods, although they do contain a variety of 
provisions that mirror those found in EAs and, for that matter, in the EC 
Treaty itself.56 
Finally, the EU provides considerable financial, technical and other 
Council during the fourth year of association in order to review inter alia these provisions and to 
consider ". . . any possible changes to be brought about as regards measures concerning the 
implementation of the dispositions governing the second [five-year] stage." Hungarian EA, supra note 
42, art. 6(3). See generally Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note 1, at 192-94 (analyzing EA 
provisions on movement of workers, establishment, and supply of services). Notwithstanding the lack 
of liberalization in these fields, CEECs have endeavored to forge ahead. For example, Poland has 
ratified the European Social Charter. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 17, 1997. 
For interesting perspectives on these issues, compare Burgenland Premier Fears Hungary's EU 
Accession, HUNG. REp., supra note 41 (Austrian fear of "economic disaster as Hungarian companies and 
workers would flood Burgenland") with Barta & Richter, supra note 1, at 11-\2 (considl'ring potential 
benefits of migration of workers from the CEECs to the EU). See also infra note 136. 
54 The Hungarian EA, for example, provides that: 
1. The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, insofar 
as they may affect trade between the Community and Hungary: 
(i) all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the territories of the 
Community or of Hungary as a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii) any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2. Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 85, 86 and 92 of the [EC Treaty). 
Hungarian EA, supra note 42, art. 62. Article 63 of the Polish EA is' substantially identical. Polish EA, 
supra note 49, art. 63. Both EAs also require the adoption of rules (within three years of entry into force 
of the association agreement) to implement these substantive obligations. [d. See, e.g., Implementing 
Rules for the Application of the Competition Provisions Applicable to Undertakings provided for in art. 
62, para. 1 (i) and (ii), and para. 2 of the Europe Agreement between the EC and Hungary (on file with 
the author). 
See generally Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I, at 195. See also Otto Heinz, Rules 
on State Aids with Hungary in the Europe Agreement, 2 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 116 (1995); Tamas 
Kende, State Aid under the EC Hungary Association Agreement, 35 AcrA JURlDlCA HUNGARICA 333 
(1993). 
55 For example, the EU has been working towards concluding agreements on air travel with all EA 
countries. See BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.52 (Commission proposal); BULL. EUR. UNION, 
Nov. 1996, point 1.4.70 (negotiating directives adopted on Nov. 11,1996). 
56 For example, the Ukrainian PCA, supra note 22, contains clauses addressed to establishment 
(arts. 23-30); to cross-border supply of services (arts. 31_33bi,); to competition law (art. 41 bi'(1 »; to the 
protection of intellectual property rights (art. 42); and to current payments and movement of capital (art. 
41t . 
Vol. 16, No. 1 Subregional Coalescence 129 
aid ("cooperation") as a part of its association strategy.S7 This cooperation 
is an important feature of both EAs and peAs. Most of the EC's financial 
aid is channeled through the PHARES8 and T ACIS progrant§. A 
57 Within the EAs and PCAs, the tenn "cooperation" refers to the many areas in which the EU will 
endeavor to assist the associated countries. See, e.g., the provisions on economic coc;>peration 
(Hungarian EA, supra note 42, Title VI, at 17-25; Polish EA, supra note 49, Title VI, at 18-24; 
Ukrainian PCA, supra note 22, Title VII); on cultural cooperation (Hungarian EA, supra note 42, Title 
VII, at 25-28; Polish EA, supra note 49, Title VII, at 25-28; Ukrainian PCA, supra note 22, Title VIII); 
and on fmancial cooperation (Hungarian EA, supra note 42, Title VIII; Polish EA, supra note 49, Title 
VIII; Ukrainian PCA, supra note 22, Title IX). The agreements also contain provisions on the 
approximation of laws, which provide that the EC shall provide "technical assistance for the 
implementation of [such] measures which may include inter alia: the exchange of experts; the provision 
of information; organization of seminars; training activities; aid for the translation of Community 
legislation in the relevant sectors." See Hungarian EA, supra note 42, art. 69, at 17; Polish EA, supra 
note 49, art. 70, at 17-18; see also Ukrainian PCA, supra note 22, art. 43(3) (contains a similar 
undertaking by the EC). 
For an overview of some fonns of cooperation, see Written Question 3405/92, 1993 OJ. (C 106) 
44 (concerning cultural, educational and scientific cQopera:ion). With regard to cultur::1 o:ooperation, 
see BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1995, point 1.4.78 (joint meeting of the culture and communications 
ministers of the EU Member States and the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe); Council 
Resolution of 3 April 1995 Concerning Cooperation with the Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe in the Cultura1 Domain, 19950.1. (C 247) 2; Opinion of the Committee of the Regions 
on the Role of Local and Regional Authorities in Education and Training Provided by the EU in the 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Sept. 1995, point 1.4.32; 
EUlEast Europe: Education Ministers Hold CEEC Pupils at Bay, EURO-EAST: EUR. INFO. SERVICE, 
Dec. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eureaus File [hereinafter EIS EURO-EAST REp.] 
(discussing controversy over whether CEECs can get involved in "management" ofEU educational 
programs). With regard to scientific cooperation, see Council Decision Adopting a Specific Programme 
for Research, Technological Development, including Demonstration, in the Field of Cooperation with 
Third Countries and International Organizations (1994-98), 19940.1. (L 334)109; Joint Ministerial 
Meeting of Research Ministers, BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.60. With regard to cooperation 
injustice and home affairs, see Berlin Ministerial Conference on Cooperation in the Fight Against Drug-
related and Organized Crime, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Sept. 1994, point 1.4.1; Joint 
Ministerial Meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, June 
1995, point 1.4.61. With regard to industrial cooperation, see Council Conclusions of7 April 1995 on 
Industrial Cooperation with the Central and East European Countries, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, 
Apr. 1995, point 1.4.62 (reiterating "the importance of dialogue on industrial cooperation with these 
countries in order to foster their integration into the European economy and to promote the harmonious 
development of trade"). 
sa PHARE - which stands for "Poland and Hungary Aid for Restructuring of the Economy - was 
established by Council Regulation 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on Economic Aid to the Republic 
of Hungary and the Polish People's Republic, 1989 OJ. (L 375) 11. It was first extended by Council 
Regulation 2698/90 of 17 September 1990 Amending Regulation 3906/89 in Order to Extend Economic 
Aid to Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 19900.1. (L 257) 1, and has been annually 
extended (and occasionally expanded to include more countries) thereafter. PHARE was extended to 
the former Gennan Democratic Republic in 1990, but this country dropped out after Gennan 
reunification in 1991. PHARE was also extended to Yugoslavia, but assistance to some of the former 
republics was suspended because of conflict. PHARE currently covers Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See generally Commission's General Guidelines for Assistance under 
the PHARE Programme for 1991 and 1992, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1992, point 1.4.9; 
Commission's General Guidelines for Assistance under the PHARE Programme for 1993 to 1997, BULL. 
EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.6. The latest guidelines are reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Mar. 1997, point 1.4.53. 
See also Second Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 'Parliament 
on the Implementation of Community Assistance to the Countries of East and Central Europe (PHARE) 
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in 1991, COM(93)172 final, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1993, point 1.3.7; Third and 
Fourth Annual Reports from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Implementation of Community Assistance to the Countries of East and Central Europe (PHARE) in 
1992 and 1993, COM(95) 13 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1995, point 1.4.82; Fifth 
Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Implementation of Community Assistance to the Countries of East and Central Europe (PHARE) in 
1994, COM(95)366, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.65 [hereinafter Fifth 
Annual PHARE Report]. See also AGENCE EUR. Docs., July 16, 1997, at 8-9 (noting Court of Auditors 
special report on the functioning of the decentralized system for implementation and management of 
PHARE for the period of 1990-95). 
PHARE provided ECU 4.2 billion during the period 1990-1994, and has allocated ECU 6.7 billion 
for the period 1995-1999. New Orientations/or PHARE Programme, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No.1 06, 
Apr. I, 1997 [hereinafter New PHARE Orientations]. 
S9 TACIS -- which stands for Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth ofIndependent States -
was established by Council Regulation 2157/91 Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistance for 
Economic Reform and Recovery in the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and Mongolia, 
1991 OJ. (L 201) 1. Like PHARE, it has been regularly extended .. See, e.g., Council Regulation 
2053/93, 19930.1. (L (87) 1. TACIS currently applies to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, as well 
as to Mongolia. See generally Annual Report from the Commission on the Implementation of 
Cooperation under the T ACIS Programme (1991 and (992), COM(93)362 final, reported in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.16; Commission Decision on Indicative Programmes for 1993 
to 1995 for Technical Assistance to the New Independent States ofthe Former Soviet Union (T ACIS), 
reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1993, point 1.3.17; Second Report from the Commission 
on the Implementation of the Programme of Technical Assistance for the Independent States of the 
Former Soviet Union and for Mongolia (TACIS) (1993), COM(95)57 final, reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.77; Third Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the 
Programme of Technical Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and for 
Mongolia (TACIS) (1994), COM(95)349 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 
1.4.91. 
TACIS aid committed during the program's first four years (Le. 1991-94) amounted to ECU 1.757 
million. BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.91. 
(,0 See Hungarian EA, supra note 42, art. 99; Polish EA, supra note 49, art. 97; Ukrainian PCA, 
supra note 22, art. 74. However, other sources of funding have also been made available. The 
Assembly of the Regions (ARE) has established the "Centurio" program to train officials in the CEECs. 
AGENCE EUR., Feb. 24, 1996, at 5. EC funding also reaches CEECs through various other channels, . 
including: humanitarian aid; the European Training Foundation; the European Bank for Re"onstruction 
and Development; special programs dealing with education (Socrates), vocational training (Leonardo 
da Vinci), the audiovisual industry (Media), the environment (LiFE), and energy (Thermie, Alterner, 
SAVE, and the European Energy Charter); cultural initiatives; and a variety of special programs targeted 
at reconstruction in former Yugoslavia. See Additional Protocols to the EAs Concerning the Opening 
of Community Programmes to the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, reported in 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1995, point 1.4.68 (giving the EA countries access to Community programmes 
in a wide variety of fields, in order to ease their integration into the EU); CEECs Participation in EU's 
Educational Programmes, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 196, Apr.l, 1997 (indicating that only the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Romania are prepared to participate in certain educational programs). See also 
Marta Vrbetic, European Union and its Neighbors in the East and the South: 1995 Budget Lines/or 
Non-member Countries o/Central and Eastern Europe and Mediterranean, EUROSCOPE REp. 11-15 
(Dec. 1995). 
In addition, some EU Member States provide direct aid to associated countries. For example, 
Denmark allocated 35 million Danish kroner ($6 million) to Poland and the Baltic States to help finance 
their efforts to join the EU. OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 7, 1996. Denmark has also agreed to provide 
technical and expert assistance on "how to amend legislation and bring it into line with EU 
requirements" (e.g. to Estonia). OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 29,1996. See also Commission Decision 
of 5 June 1996, Concerning Aid that the Republic of Austria Intends to Grant Pursuant to the Eastern 
Programme, 19970.1. (L 96) 23. 
Last but not least, the associated countries themselves have incurred substantial costs. See, e.g., 
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significant share of funds allocated to the EAs go to activities tb~t relate, 
directly or indirectly, to the adaption of legislation to the acquis 
communautaire.61 Funds provided to EA countries are increasingly tied to 
the pre-accession process.62 
HUNG. REp., supra note 41 (Hungarian State Audit Office study showed that 10.5 billion forints were 
spent on preparations for EU membership in the period 1993-1996, and estimated that the costs would 
amount to 6.4 billion forints in 1997). 
61 The CEEC White Paper, supra note 29, proposed to increase and adapt the assistance provided 
(through PHARE) for the approximation of laws. The Commission proposed "the establishment by each 
country of a national framework programme for harmonizing national legislation with internal market 
legislation, so that all the PHARE programmes aimed at the objectives of the White Paper are 
complementary" and also planned "to set up a technical assistance information office supported by a 
multi-country PHARE programme" to serve other "assistance requirements [that] are common to all the 
associated countries." BULL. EUR. UNION, May 1995, point 1.4.63. See also CEEC White Paper, supra 
note 29, Part 5; White Paper Follow-Up, supra note 29 (Commission "set out practical arrangements 
for setting up the technical assistance information exchange office ... geared to ensuring adequate 
delivery of those services provided jointly to some or all of the associated countries" and introduced 
"the new multi country PHARE programme ... aimed at complementing PHARE technical assistance 
provided under the national framework programmes ... [whose] objectives [are): to provide certain 
support services such as the organization of seminars, establishment of legal glossaries, etc., direct; to 
provide advice to individual associated countries either directly or through a panel of experts; to channel 
requests for assistance to other sources ... ; [and] to assist with the creation of databases and with 
access to information."). The Commission established a new Technical Assistance Information Office 
[T AlEX] in January 1996. CEEC countries requested that the activities ofT AlEX be prolonged beyond 
the end of 1997, and that this office "should have a lot of flexibility as regards the practical assistance 
it provides in the legislative field, and that it should be adapted to the specific needs of each" CEEC. 
Internal Market Meeting, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 106, Apr. 1, 1997. 
Special PHARE funds (in the amount of ECU 18.5 mi11ion) were allocated to prepare the EA 
countries for integration into the internal market of the EU. Commission Decision of 19 October 1995, 
reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.65. Breakdowns showing PHARE funds allocated 
by sector do not adequately reflect the level of funding that actually goes to bringing the EA countries 
in line with the acquis communautaire, since the acquis cuts across practically all sectors. Thus, the 
direct allocation of funds for approximation of legislation is misleading. See New P HARE Orientations, 
supra note 58 (showing PHARE commitments for 1990-1996, broken down by sector and by recipient). 
Relatively little has been committed for approximation of legislation per se (e.g. ECU 0 for the 
Visegrad countries; ECU 19.5 million for other EAs and PCAs; and ECU 10 million for a "horizontal 
programme"; totalling ECU 29.5 million). Id. However, compare this meager sum with the total funds 
committed for administration and public institutions (ECU 317.7 million); civil society and 
democratisation (ECU 59.4 million); and education, training and research (ECU 859.5 million). Id. In 
fact, the only other category receiving fewer funds than approximation of legislation during this period 
was consumer protection (ECU 11 million). Id. Approximation is relevant in nearly every sector listed. 
in the PHARE breakdown, as suggested by the breadth of the approximation provisions in the EAs (and 
PCAs), supra notes 49 and 52. See Buxbaum, supra note 49, at 129-30 (analyzing the "integrated 
programs" whereunder legal reform and assistance are components of sectoral reform programs). 
62 In early 1997 the Commission "approved new orientations" for PHARE which would tum it 
"from a demand driven programme ... into an accession driven programme." New PHARE 
.Orientations, supra note 58. Under the new orientations, which only apply to the ten E,\ countries, 
PHARE "will now concentrate on strengthening the CEECs' democratic institutions and public 
administrations, and supporting investments that improve CEEC enterprises and infrastructures." Id. 
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B. ASSOCIATION STATUS OF CEECS: PCA COUNTRIES 
I.The Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
The "First Generation" trade and cooperation agreement between the 
EC and the USSR was concluded on 18 December 1989, and entered into 
effect on 1 April 1990.63 After the dissolution of the USSR and the creation 
of the CIS in December 1991,64 the EU arranged to extend the benefits of the 
,agreement with the USSR to the successor states,6S but simultaneously 
decided to work towards negotiating separate agreements that would reflect 
their different political, economic, and geographic characteristics.66 The EU 
6) Council Decision 90/116IEEC on the Conclusion of the Agreement Between th~ FEC and the 
ECSC and the USSR on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, 19900.1. (L 68) 3, 1990 
0.1. (L 138) 1. This was a non-preferential agreement covering trade in all products except for those 
covered by specific agreements (i.e. textiles, fisheries products, and products covered by the ECSC 
Treaty). See also Agreement Between the EEC and the USSR on Trade in Textile Products, initialed 
on Dec. 11,1989, implemented by Decision 89/674,19890.1. (L 397) 1; Council Decision 00 June 
1991,19910.1. (L 164) 1. 
64 The Minsk Agreement between Belarus, Russia and Ukraine declared the dissolution of the 
USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth oflndependent States (CIS) in its place. See Agreement 
Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 138 (1992) [hereinafter 
CIS Agreement]. Shortly thereafter, the Alma-Ata Declaration was signed (together with a Protocol to 
the Minsk Agreement) by eleven of the former Soviet Republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,' Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. See Alma-Ata Declaration and Protocol to the Minsk Agreement, Dec. 21, 1991,31 I.L.M. 
147 (1992). Georgia joined the CIS on Oct. 8,1993. See generally Part IV.C.3. The Baltic States (Le. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are the only former republics of the USSR that did not join the CIS. 
6S See, e,g" Draft Agreements in the Form of Exchanges of Letters with Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine Relating to the 
Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation Signed on 18 December 1989 
between the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom and the USSR, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, 
point 1.3.18 (noting that the Council decided on July 19, 1993 to adopt these Agreements). See also 
Council Decision 92/585 on Certain Measures Applicable with Regard to the 12 Republics of the 
Former USSR Concerning Trade in Certain Steel Products Covered by the ECSC Treaty, 19920.1. (L 
396) 48 ; Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreements in the Form of 
Exchanges of Letters with Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine Relating to the Agreement on Trade in Textile Products Initialed 
in Brussels on December II, 1989 between the EEC and the USSR, COM(93)101 final, 19930.1. (C 
110) 8; Council Decision 94/277 of 20 December 1993 on the Provisional Application of Certain 
Agreements and Protocols Between the EEC and Certain Third Countries on Trade in Textile Products, 
19940.1. (L 123) I; BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1997, point 1.4.41 (bilateral agreements on trade in 
textiles renewed until Dec. 31, 1998): 
G6 On July 15, 1992, the Commission called upon the Council to authorize it to negotiate a non-
preferential PCA with each of the independent states of the former USSR. See BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1992, point 1.4.3. See also Commission of the EC, Annotated Summary of 
Agreements Linking the Communities with Non-member Countries (January 1993) [hereinafter 
Commission Annotated Summary], at 4 ("[W]hile establishing that the countries which were contracting 
parties to the Minsk agreement were the successors to all the agreements concluded by the former 
USSR, the Community opted for the renegotiation of separate agreements, particularly in view of the 
fact that the CIS, quite apart from its own varied history, did not comprise all the states which formerly 
belonged to the USSR. , . These [successor states] were recognized by the European Communities in 
January 1992 in accordance with the statement of 16 December 1991 adopted at the special European 
political cooperation meeting of ministers from the Member States, and contacts began immediately 
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has indicated that the CIS countries should not set their hopes on 
accession,67 but has also taken great pains to establish a dialogue with each 
country and to cooperate, in the sense of providing each of them with 
financial and other kinds of support. 
Negotiations with Russia and the Ukraine for new PCAs were 
lengthy68 and controversial.69 In particular, these countries would not agree 
with a view to new agreements, which are most likely to be of a partnership type, though with a 
differentiated approach in each case in accordance with the political, economic and geographic 
characteristics of the relevant country, all the countries concerned being dealt with gradually as and 
when they are recognized by the Member States. "). See also Commission Communication to the 
Council of9 January 1992 on Relations with the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, BULL. 
EUR. COMMUNITIES, Jan.-Feb. 1992, point 1.4.2; Council Conclusions of 10 January 1992, id. at point 
1.4.3; EP Resolution of 15 July 1993 on Relations Between the European Community and the 
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic States), 1993 OJ. (C 255) 188 
(parliament called on the Community inter alia to "conclude partnership and cooperation agreements 
with the independent States, and for the agreements to differ according to the country. . . Certain of 
them should provide for political dialogue."); EP Resolution of7 April 1995 on the Draft Partnership 
Agreements with the New Independent States, 1995 OJ. (C 109) I (parliament called for "stronger 
relations between the European Union and the new independent States in the interests of promoting 
political and economic reform" and "called on the Council and the Commission to set in motion the 
ratification of the agreements ... except in the case of Russia and Kazakhstan"). 
67 See, e.g., COM(95)163 final and COM(95)207 final (Baltic states were the only former Soviet 
republics considered eligible for EAs; partnership agreements carry no promise of eventual 
membership). This fact is also evident from the PCAs themselves which, unlike the EAs, do not contain 
any statement in the preamble contemplating future membership. 
68 The Council authorized the Commission to open negotiations with Russia and Ukraine on Oct. 
5, 1992. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1992, point 1.4.19. The negotiating directives with each 
country were subsequently amended. As to the PCA with Russia, see Council Decision of 5 April 1993, 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1993, point 1.3.18 (amended in order to "provide for the addition ofa 
future developments clause," to alter provisions pertaining the safeguard clause and on establishment 
of firms, and to include rules against distortion of competition and on cooperation in preventing illegal 
activities); and Council Decision of 8 November 1993, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Nov. 1993, point 
1.3.16 (amended in order to "speed up negotiation" and to propose further changes, including "a 
stipulation that 1998 would constitute a deadline for the decision on whether or not to establish 
arrangements for free trade between the parties, the introduction of revised trade-protection provisions 
and the addition of a new section on access to the market in financial services"). As to the PCA with 
Ukraine, see BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1992, point 1.4.19; BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Mar. 1994, 
point I.3.51. 
69 In addition to the debates surrounding the "evolution" clause, described in detail infra in text 
accompanying note 70, there were other zones of friction. For example, Russia objected to the clause 
permitting the EC to suspend benefits in case of human rights violation, AGENCE EUR., June 4, 1993, 
at 9, and to classification as a state-trading country for purposes of trade protection measures, OMRl, 
supra note 13, Nov. 21, 1995. The Council decided in June 1996 to consider Ukraine as an economy 
in transition, rather than a state-trading country. Conclusions of December 9 General Affairs Council, 
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., Dec. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, World library, REUEC Capital 
Library file [hereinafter REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp.]. Russia, meanwhile, is still pressing the EU 
to reclassifY it from a non-market to a market economic. RFEIRL Newsline, supra note 41, Jan. 28, 
1998. For a summary of some ofthe unusual features of the PCA with Russia, see AGENCE EUR., July 
15, 1994, at 8. See generally Economic and Social Committee Opinion of26 January 1995 on Relations 
Between the European Union and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, 1995 OJ. (C 102) 40 [hereinafter 
ECOSOC Opinion on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus]. 
For its part, the EU balked in negotiations with Russia, inter alia because of events in Chechnya 
. and problems surrounding trade in nuclear material. Relations between the EU and Russia have 
remained troubled, not least because of disputes surrounding NATO eastward expansion and trade. For 
example, textile negotiations broke off in November 1995 amidst Russian allegations of protectionism. 
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to accept mere trade normalization, and bargained for inclusion of an 
"evolution" or "future events" clause which permits the agreement to be 
converted to a preferential free trade agreement when circumstances 
warrant.7° Both countries fought hard to have these soft commitments 
included in the text oftheir respective peA. Ultimately, the EU reached an 
agreement with Russia71 and with the 72 Ukraine for 
OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 21,1996. Russia threatened in February 1996 to impose quotas on imports 
ofEU textiles. AOENCE EUR., Feb. 24, 1996, at 8. 
70 Russia was the first to insist that its PCA include a "future developments clause to allow for the 
eventual establishment of a free-trade arrangement ... once Russia is in a position to comply with 
GAIT obligations, with a view to drawing it into a wider area of cooperation in Europe." BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1993, point 1.3.18. 
The Ukrainian PCA provides: "[t]he Parties undertake to consider, in particular when Ukraine has 
further advanced in the process of economic reform, developments of the relevant Titles of this 
Agreement, ... , with a view to the establishment of a free trade area between them." Ukrainian PCA, 
supra note 22, art. 3bi'. This provision goes on to provide that "the Parties shall consult each other in 
the year 1998 whether circumstances, and in particular Ukraine's advances in market oriented economic 
reforms and the economic conditions prevailing there at that time, allow the beginning of negotiations 
on the establishment of a free trade area." ld. 
71 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their 
Member States, of the One Part, and the Russian Federation, of the Other Part, BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, June 1994, point 1.3.30 (signed June 1994) [hereinafter Russian PCA]. The EP gave its 
assent on 30 November 1995. 1995 OJ. (C 339) 45. Trade in sensitive goods is covered by special 
sectoral agreements. See Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Russian 
Federation on Trade in Textile Products, 1994 OJ. (L 123) 528; Agreement Between the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the Russian Federation on Trade in Certain Steel Products, initialed at 
Brussels on Nov. 21, 1995, 1996 OJ. (L 5) 25. New sectoral agreements for textiles were concluded 
on Dec. 22, 1995. Council Decision of 22 December 1995 on Provisional Application of Certain 
Agreements Between the EC and Certain Third Countries on Trade in Textile Products, 1996 OJ. (L 
81) 1, at 170 and 406-07. New sectoral agreements for steel were concluded after lengthy negotiations. 
See BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1997, point 1.4.35 (extending autonomous arrangements, pending 
conclusion of bilateral agreements); BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1997, point 1.4.38 (draft agreement 
between the ECSC and Russia on trade in certain steel products initialed on 5 April 1997); Council 
Decisions of24 July 1997, on the Conclusion of an Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters 
between the EC and the Russian Federation Establishing a Double-Checking System Without 
Quantitative Limits in Respect of the Export of Certain Steel Products Covered by the EC and ECSC 
Treaties from the Russian Federation to the European Community, 1997 OJ. (L 300) 36; Council 
Regulation 2135/97 of 24 July 1997, on Administering the Double-Checking System, 1997 OJ. (L 300) 
I; Commission Decision 2136/97; 12 September 1997 on Administering Certain Restrictions on Imports 
of Certain Steel Products from the Russian Federation, 1997 OJ. (L 300) 15; Commission Decision 
971742 of 12 September 1997 on the Conclusion of Agreements Between the ECSC and the Russian 
Federation on Trade in Certain Steel Products, 1997 OJ. (L 300) 51. 
See generally ECOSOC Opinion on Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, supra note 69; Commission 
Communication of 31 May 1995 to the Council and Parliament on The European Union and Russia: 
The Future Relationship, COM(95)223 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, May 1995, point 1.4.78. 
This, together with the Commission Communications on Central Asia, infra note 79, and on 
Transcaucasia, infra note 80, is the first instance in which the Commission used its right of initiative 
in the area of common foreign and security policy. AOENCE EUR., June 10, 1995, at 9. See also Council 
Conclusions Concerning a Strategy for EU-Russia Relations, BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 
1.4.81; Strategy on EU-Russia Relations, supra note 52, point 2.2.1 (emphasizing Russi;;'~ democratic 
reforms, economic cooperation, cooperation on justice and home affairs, security issues, and foreign 
policy); EP Resolution on Economic and Trade Relations between the European Union and Russia, 
1995 OJ. (C 339) 45 (welcoming the conclusion of the PCA but regretting "that it contained a large 
number. of derogations which were liable to hamper cooperation between members of the CIS"); 
Conclusions of December 6 General Affairs Council, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., supra note 69, 
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an intennediate type ofPCA.73 Pending final ratification of these two PCAs, 
Interim Agreements74 implementing certain provisions of the PCAs were 
signed, first with the Ukraine,7s then with Russia,76 and entered into effect 
on 1 February 1996. The PCA with Russia entered into effect on 1 
Dec. 7, 1996 (regarding development of relations with Russia pursuant to the Action Plan adopted in 
May 1996); Conclusions of EU Council on Implementation of Action Plan for Russia and on Priorities 
for the Next Phase, AGENCE EUR. Docs., Jan. 9, 1997. 
71 The Ukrainian PCA, supra note 22, was signed on June 14, 1994. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 
1994, point 1.3.34. The EP gave its assent in November 1995. 1995 OJ. (C 339) 42. See Common 
Position 94f779/CFSP on the EU's Objectives and Priorities for Ukraine, 1994 OJ. (L 313) I; EU 
Launches New Action Plan, EIS EURo-EAST REp., supra note 57, Dec. 10, 1996 (General Affairs 
Council adopted Action Plan for Ukraine); Action Plan for the Development of Relations Between the 
EU and Ukraine, AGENCE EUR. Docs., Jan. IS, 1997. Trade in sensitive products is covered by special 
sectoral agreements. See Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters Between the European 
Community and Ukraine Concerning the Renewal of the Agreement between the EEC and Ukraine on 
Trade in Textile Products, initialed on May 5. 1993, as last amended by the Agreement in the Form of 
an Exchange of Letters, initialed on Dec. 22. 1994, 1996 OJ. (L 81) 294; Agreement between the 
European Coal and Steel Community and Ukraine on Trade in Certain Steel Products, initialed on Dec. 
22. 1994, Commission Decision of21 December 1996, 1995 OJ. (L 5) 48. New sectoral agreements 
for steel were concluded after lengthy negotiations .. See BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1997, point 1.4.34 
(draft agreement between the ECSC and Ukraine on trade in certain steel products initialed on Mar. 20, 
1997); Council Decision 97/481 of26 July 1997 on the Conclusion of an Agreement in the Form of an 
Exchange of Letters Between the European Community and Ukraine Establishing a Double-Checking 
System Without Quantitative Limits .in Respect of the Export of Certain Steel Products Covered by the 
EC and ECSC Treaties from Ukraine to the European Community, 1997 OJ. (L 210) IS; Council 
Regulation 1526/97 of26 June 1997 on Administering the Double-Checking System, 1997 OJ. (L 210) 
I; Commission Decision 1401/97 of7 July 1997 on Administering Certain Restrictions on Imports of 
Certain Steel Products from Ukraine, 1997 OJ. (L 193) 12; Commission Decision 97/482 of 5-6 June 
1997 on the Conclusion of Agreement Between the ECSC and the Ukraine on Trade in Certain Steel 
Products, 1997 OJ. (L 210)'31. 
73 These agreements have a wider scope than traditional "First Generation" agreements and 
standard PCAs, in that they include the "evolution" clause contemplating conversion to a free trade 
agreement in the future, as well as covering a broader range of trade, economic, and political relations. 
7. Major portions of the PCAs fall within exclusive EC competence in the field of commercial 
policy, and thus can be implemented by a decision of the competent EC organ, without need for formal 
ratification by all EU member states. 
7S The Interim Agreementwith Ukraine was Signed on June I, 1995. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 
1995, point 1.4.93. See Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the European 
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community, 
of the One Part, and the Ukraine, of the Other Part, Council Decision 95/541 of 4 December 1995, 1995 
OJ. (L 311) 2 [hereinafter EC-Ukraine Interim Agreement]. See also AGENCE EUR., June 2, 1995, at 
4. 
76 Implementation of the agreements with Russia was delayed by the conflict in Chechnya. See 
Recommendation of Parliament of IS June 1995 to the Council on the Development of Relations with 
the Russian Federation and the Situation in Chechnya, 1995 OJ. (C 166) 90 (EP called on the Council 
to delay approval of Russia's Interim Agreement and the ratification of the PCA). See also BULL. EUR. 
UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.92 (Russian ministers visited Commission in June to discuss delays). The 
Interim Agreement was signed on July 17, 1995. BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.89. See 
Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the European Community, the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the One Part, 
and the Russian Federation, of the Other Part, Council Decision 95/414 of 17 July 95,1995 OJ. (L 247) 
I [hereinafter EC-Russia Interim Agreement]. See also Resolution of I February 1996 on the Failure 
to Consult Parliament on the EU-Russia Interim Agreement, 1996 OJ. (C 47) 26. 
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December 1997, and with the Ukraine on 1 March 1998.77 
Since conclusion ofthe PCAs with Russia and the Ukraine, the EU 
has moved further in the direction of developing PCA sub-types that 
accommodate the different needs of countries that are not candidates for 
eventual accession. For example, the EU has been working on cieveloping 
a PCA sub-type that falls along the spectrum between the traditional "First 
Generation" type of PC A and the EA, in order to respond to pressure from 
countries that already have a "First Generation" PCA but want to deepen 
their cooperation with the EU.78 The EU has also recognized the need to 
develop special agreements adapted to the needs of countries in particular 
areas (e.g. Central Asia79 and Transcaucasia80). 
The status of the EO's relations with other CIS countries is 
summarized below. 
a. Belarus 
Negotiations with Belarus initially paralleled those the EC 
conducted with Russia and the UkraineY A PCA was signed on 6 March 
77 AGENCE EUR., Nov. 8, 1997, at 6 (Russia); 15 BNA INTERNATIONAL TRADE REpORTER 443 
(Mar. II, 1998)(Ukraine). 
7. The EU has developed guidelines on this new PCA sub-type which, in general, would be as 
much like an EA as possible, but without offering the prospect of a free trade area or of later accession. 
AGENCE EUR., Jan. 31, 1996, at 8. See discussion of negotiations with Albania in text accompanying 
infra notes 115-17. 
79 Commission Communication of9 June 1995 on Relations with the Republics of Central Asia: 
A Strategy for the European Union, COM(95)206 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 
1.4.87 [hereinafter Commission Communication on Central Asia). See also AGENCE EUR., June 10, 
1995, at 10 (summarizing the Commission's recommendations). This document was considered by the 
General Affairs Council on June 12, 1995. See AGENCE EUR., June 9,1995, at 8-10. 
. 80 Commission Communication of 31 May 1995 to the Council and the Parliament on Towards 
a European Union Strategy for Relations with the Transcaucasian Republics (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia), COM(95)205 final, reported in BULL. EUR UNION, May 1995, point 1.4.79 [hereinafter 
Commission Communication on Transcaucasia]. The Commission observed that "despite the cease-fires 
of 1994, the three republics ... continue to be affected by the fighting in Nagomo-Karabakh and 
Abkhazia, and are in a difficult economic position." Id. See also AGENCE EUR., June 10, 1995, at 10 
(summarizing the Commission's recommendations); EP Resolution on Commission Communication, 
1997 OJ. (C 33) 133. 
The General Affairs Council in June 1995 considered the Commission Communication on 
Transcaucasia, supra, and decided to seek to strengthen contractual relations with these three countries. 
AGENCEEuR.,June 10, 1995, at 10. 
'1 The Council approved the Commission's proposal to open negotiations with Belarus for a PCA 
in October 1992. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1992, point 1.4.19. The negotiating directives were 
amended in late 1994. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Nov. 1994, point 1.3.33. The PCA was initialed in 
December 1994. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1994, point 1.3.48. 
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199582 and an Interim Agreement shortly thereafterB? In early 1996, the 
Commission was optimistic about the reform process in Belarus, and 
proposed rapid conclusion of the Interim Agreement.84 However, the 
situation in Belarus has deteriorated since then and neither Agreement has 
entered into effect because of lack of democratic and economic teforms.85 
b. Moldova 
A PCA was concluded on 28 November 1994. In light of Moldova's 
"good progress towards democracy," the EU and its member states started 
the process of ratifying the PCA,86 but this process has not yet been 
completed.87 In the meantime, certain provisions of the PCA have been 
82 BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.70. See Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Between the European Community and Belarus, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1995, point 
1.4.96, and in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.83. This PCA, Eke those wi!l> Russia and 
Ukraine, contains a "future developments" clause. 
8) The Interim Agreement was initialed in April 1995. The Belarussian Foreign Minister 
emphasized in June 1995 the importance of quick conclusion of the Interim Agreement. BULL. EUR. 
UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.88. 
84 Commission Proposal of28 February 1996, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, 
point 1.4.126 (considering the "domestic political situation ... and the fact that [Belarus] now had a 
. democratically elected parliament, ... the time [has) come to conclude and sign the interim Agreement 
in order to bring it into force as quickly as possible"). The Commission argued that any delay in 
implementation would have the effect of isolating Belarus and strengthening the pOSition of internal 
opponents of reform. AGENCEEUR., Feb. 29, 1996, at 6-7. The Interim Agreement was finally signed 
on Mar. 25,1996, BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1996, point 1.4.65, just days before the conclusion of the 
Belarus-Russia Union Treaty, infra notes 370-75. See OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 26, 1996 
(Commissioner van den Broek hoped that the Signing of the agreement would "contribute to the 
preservation of Belarus's independence and sovereignty"). 
as EP Resolution of23 May 1996 on Freedom of Opinion in Albania and Belarus, BULL. EUR. 
UNION, May 1996, point 1.2.4 (noting that respect for basic democratic principles is a precondition for 
signing the PCA). President Lukashenko suspended the Belarusian parliament after a controversial 
referendum on Nov. 24,1996. See OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 20, 1996; id .. Nov. 25, 1996; id., Nov. 
26,1996; id., Nov. 27,1996; id., Dec. 2, 1996 ("No diplomats from European embassies" in Minsk 
accepted invitation to attend 28 November ceremony signing new constitution); RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, Apr. 18, 1997 (EP warned that it would withhold its assent to the PCA); id., June 10, 
1997. It is safe to conclude that these and subsequent Commissioner van den Broek's prediction that 
Belarus was "on the farthest approaches from being admitted into EU." OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 3, 
1995. The Council of Europe (CE) Parliamentary Assembly suspended Belarus's special guest status, 
but the CE itself indicated that it would "continue assisting Belarus in the development of a civil 
society." Id., Jan. 17,1997. See also Proposal for a Council Decision on a TACIS Civil Society 
Development Programme for Belarus for 1997, COM(97)441 final. 
86 OMRJ, supra note 13, Nov. 3, 1995 (quoting Commissioner van den Broek). The EP gave its 
assent on Nov. 30,1995. 1995 OJ. (C 339) 13. See also EP Resolution on the Economic and Trade 
Aspects of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the EU and the Republic of Moldova, 
1995 OJ. (C 339) 49. 
87 AGENCE EUR., Feb.l7, 1996, at 10 (meeting between Commissioner van den Broek and the 
foreign minister of Moldova); AGENCE EUR., May 14, 1997, at 10 (additional protocol to PCA signed; 
EU proposes draft declaration allowing for provisional application of all provisions while awaiting 
formal entry into force). Moldova is pushing for further integration in the form of an EA. RFEIRL 
Newsline, supra note 41, Dec. 15, 1997. 
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implemented by an Interim Agreement.88 
c. Transcaucasia 
The Commission proposed in May 1995 "an overall strategy 
including provision for partnership and cooperation Agreements with each 
of" Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.89 At its meeting in June 1995, the 
General Affairs Council called upon the Commission to begin negotiations 
for a PCA adapted to the special situation in all three Transcaucasian 
countries.90 Commissioner van den Broek visited the Transcaucasian 
countries in early October 1995 to discuss, inter alia, the negotiation of the 
planned PCAs.91 
. PCAs were concluded with Armenia,92 Azerbaijan93 and Georgia94 
on 22 April 1996,95 but none of them have yet entered into e'ffect. 
88 Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the European Community, the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the One Part, 
and the Republic of Moldova, of the Other Part, Council Decision 96/161 of29 January 1996, 19960.1. 
(L 40) 11. The Interim Agreement entered into force on May 1, 1996. 19960.1. (L 90) 37. See also 
Council Decision 97/550 of21 March 1996 on the Conclusion of the Agreement Between the European 
Community and the Republic of Moldova on Trade in Textile Products, 1997 OJ. (L 227) 1. 
89 Commission Communication on Transcaucasia, supra note 80 (noting the geopolitical 
importance of Transcaucasia to the EU, which "has energy interests there"). See also AGENCE EUR., 
June 10, 1995, at 10. 
90 AGENCE EUR., June 14, 1995, at 8. It was understood that the Commission should seek to 
develop formulas adapted to the special situation in the Transcaucasus countries. [d. See also 
Commission Communication on Transcaucasia, supra note 80. • 
91 BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.94. As a matter of fact, negotiations with Georgia had 
already commenced by that date, and those with Armenia and Azerbaijan were due to start later that 
month. 
92 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their 
Member States on the One Part, and the Republic of Armenia on the Other Part, reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Mar. 1997, point 1.4.73. 
For an earlier sectoral agreement, see Agreement of 20 July 1993 in the Form of an Exchange of 
Letters Between the EC and the Republic of Armenia Maintaining in Force the Agreement Between the 
EEC and the Republic of Armenia on Trade in Textile Products, July 20, 1993, as amended by the 
Agreement of23 February 1995 in the Form ofan Exchange of Letters, 1996 OJ. (L 263) 3. 
9J Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their 
Member States on the One Part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Other Part, reported in BULL. 
EUR. UNION, Apr. 1996, point 1.4.72, and in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1997, point 1.4.76. 
94 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their 
Member States on the One Part, and the Republic of Georgia on the Other Part, reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Apr. 1996, point 1.4.72, and in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1997, point 1.4.79. 
9S BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1996, point 1.4.72. See also Commission Proposal for a Council 
Decision on Conclusion of the Agreements, BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1996, point 1.4.64. The PCAs 
with all three Transcaucasus countries were also initialed on the same day in Dec. 1995. BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Dec. 1995, point 1.4.98. 
96 The EP gave its assent to all three PCAs on March 13, 1997. See EP Resolution on the 
Economic and Trade Aspects of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements Between the EU and the 
Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 19970.1. (C 115) 124. 
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Meanwhile, Interim Agreements with Armenia97 and GeorgY! were 
concluded in April 1997, while the Interim Agreement with Azerbaijan has 
lagged behind.99 
d. Central Asia 
Discussions aimed at preparing new bilateral agreements to replace 
the 1989 "First Generation" agreement with the USSR started as early as 
1992.100 However, negotiations were delayed by political instability in the 
region. 
peAs with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were initialed in May 1994, 
but no final agreements were concluded until early 1995. The ratification 
process for the peA with Kazakhstan lOI was held up due to lack of 
democratic reforms. lo2 The peA with Kyrgyzstarl~3 on the other hand, 
encountered fewer obstacles.104 Neither peA had entered into effect as of 
April 1998. However, Interim Agreements implementing certain provisions 
'T1 Council Decision of29 April 1997 on the Conclusion of the Interim Agreement on Trade and 
Trade-related Matters Between the EC, ECSC and EURATOM, of the One Part, and the Republic of 
Armenia, of the Other Part, 1997 OJ. (L 129) 1. The Interim Agreement entered into effect on Dec. 1, 
1997. 1997 OJ. (L 316) 11. 
98 Council Decision of29 April 1997 on the Conclusion of the Interim Agreement on Trade and 
Trade-related Matters Between the EC, ECSC and EURATOM, of the One Part, and Georgia, of the 
Other Part, 1997 OJ. (L 129) 22. The Interim Agreement entered into effect on Sept. I, 1997. 1997 
OJ. (L 206) 64. 
99 The Interim Agreement was initialed on Sept. 20,1996. BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1996, point 
1.4.89. See Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Interim Agreement Between the 
EC, ECSC and EURATOM, of the One Part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan of the Other Part, 
COM(96)613 final. 
100 The Commission proposed opening PCA negotiations with all independent States of the former 
Soviet Union in 1992. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Jan.-Feb. 1992, points 1.4.2-.3. The Council adopted 
this proposal with respect to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in October 1992. BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES, 
Oct. 1992, point 1.4.19. As for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, see BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES, Apr. 1994, 
point 1.4.5. 
101 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their 
Member States, of the One Part, and Kazakhstan, of the Other Part, reported in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNmES, May 1994, poirit 1.3.35, and in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1997, point 1.4.82. The PCA 
with Kazakhstan was concluded on Jan. 23,1995. BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1995, point 1.4.97. 
102 PCA was submitted to the European Parliament for its approval on June 12, 1995. 1995 OJ. 
(C 166) 6. See EP Resolution on the Draft Partnership Agreements with the New Independent States, 
1995 OJ. (C 109) 298 (holding up the process of ratifying the agreement with Kazakhstan); 
Commission Commun:cation on Central Asia, supra note 79 ("In the case of Kazakhstan, the fact that 
the suspension of its parliament has led to ratification of the [PCA] being postponed should not prevent 
sectoral agreements ... from being negotiated."). The EP finally gave its assent on Mar. 13, 1997. 
1997 OJ. (C 115) 196. 
103 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their 
Member States, of the One Part, and Kyrgyzstan, of the Other Part, reported in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, May 1994, point 1.3.36. The PCA was concluded on Feb. 9, 1995. BULL. EUR. UNION, 
Jan.-Feb. 1995, point 1.4.99. 
104 The European Parliament gave its assentto the PCA on Nov. 30, 1995. 1995 OJ. (C 339) 39. 
See Commission Communication on Central Asia, supra note 79 ("Kyrgyzstan's [PCA] should be 
ratified and its Interim Agreement signed as soon as possible. "). 
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ofthe PCAs with Kazakhstan lOS and Kyrgyzstan lO6 were concluded in 1996. 
Relations between the EU and other Central Asian republics 
progressed even more slowly. Negotiations with Tajikistan l07 and 
Turkmenistanl08 started early but were stalled by political instability in those 
countries, whereas relations with Uzbekistan did not even get off the ground 
until considerably later. The Council in June 1995 called upon the 
Commission to begin exploratory talks with all three countries. I09 Relations 
have progressed with Uzbekistan,IIO culminating in the conclusion of a 
PCNII and an Interim Agreement. 112However, little progress has been made 
with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.1I3 
lOS The Commission initialed a draft Interim Agreement in December 1994, BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1994, point 1.3.50, and proposed that it be concluded in early 1995. BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1995, point 1.4.98. The EP's approval was not forthcoming until Apr. 19, 1996. EP 
Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conc!usion by the EC of lite Interi'!l Agreement, 
1996 OJ. (C 141) 248. See Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the EC, 
ECSC and EURATOM, of the One Part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the Other Part, Council 
Decision of 13 May 1996, 1996 OJ. (L 147) 1 and 1996 0.1. (L 306) 49. The Interim Agreement 
entered into effect on April I, 1997. 1997 0.1. (L 64) 16. 
106 The Commission proposed conclusion of the Interim Agreement on Mar. I, 1995, BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.72, but it was not actually signed until Nov. 28, 1996. Kyrgyzstan Signs 
Interim Agreement with EU, EUR. REp.: EURO.INfO. SERVICE, Dec. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, AIW File [hereinafter EIS EUR. REP.]; AGENCE EUR., July 25, 1997, at 11. See Interim 
Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters between the EC, ECSC and EURATOM, of the One 
Part, and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, of the Other Part, 19970.1. (L 235) 3. 
107 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1994, point 1.4.5. The EU suspended TACIS aid to Tajikistan 
in 1992, which by September 1992 was in the first stages of a civil war that has lasted for more than five 
years. See also AGENCE EUR., June 10, 1995, at 10 (Commission noted that the "situation ... is such 
that the option of a partnership agreement must be avoided at the moment"). 
108 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Sept. 1993, point 1.3.15; BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1994, 
point 1.4.5. 
109 AGENCE EUR., June 12-13, 1995, at 5-7. See also Commission Communication on Central Asia, 
supra note 79 (noting that no negotiations for a PCA can be undertaken until such time as "the political 
conditions which the [EU] has attached to the negotiation of [PCAs] ... have been fulfilled" but that 
"sectoral agreements in areas such as textiles, trade in nuclear materials and ... hazardous waste" could 
be explored in the meantime). 
110 After the Commission conducted exploratory talks, BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 
1.4.89, and reported on the progress of democratic reforms, the Council in February 1996 approved 
opening negotiations for a PCA with Uzbekistan. BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, point 1.4.128; 
AGENCE EUR. Feb. 28, 1996, at 6. 
III Draft Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Community and Their 
Member States, of the One Part, and Uzbekistan, of the Other Part, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-
Feb. 1996, point 1.4.128. The PCA was concluded on June 21,1996, BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1996, 
point 1.4.81, but had not entered into force as of April 1998. 
112 Draft Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters, COM(96)466 final, reported 
in BULL. EUR. UNION, Sept. 1996. The IA was signed on Nov. 14, 1996. BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1996, 
point 1.4.91. 
113 The Commission conducted exploratory negotiations with Turkmenistan in 1996, and 
recommended that negotiations towards a PCA could begin if the "current momentum of political and 
economic reform were maintained." BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1996, point 1.4.77. See also 
EUfTurkmenistan: Time to Build New Links?, EIS EURO-EAST REp., supra note 57, Dec. 10, 1996. The 
EU welcomed the June 1997 peace agreement between the Tajik Government and the United Tajik 
Opposition. AGENCE EUR., July 3, 1997, at 4. However, fighting was still ongoing in early 1998. 
OMRl supra note 13, March 30, 1998. 
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2. Balkan Countries ll4 
Negotiations between the EC and Albania commenced in late 
1991.115 The PCA between Albania and the EC was concluded on 11 May 
1992 and entered into effect on 1 December 1992.116 Albania has been 
pushing for closer integration with the ED, and has met with limited 
success. 117 
The EC concluded a series of agreements with the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1980s. 118 Negotiations of any kind 
with successor states to the former Yugoslavia were severely restricted by 
the war (including the EC embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
114 Excluding Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia, all of which are EA countries and which, in any 
case, prefer to be considered Central European rather than Balkan countries. See supra note 32. 
liS The Council authorized the Commission to open negotiations in September 1991. BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Sept. 1991, point 1.3.19. 
116 Agreement Between the EEC and Albania on Trade and Commercial and Economic 
Cooperation, 1992 OJ. (L 343) 2, implemented by Council Decision 92/535 of26 October 1992, 1992 
OJ. (L 343) 1. "The aim of the Agreement ... is the harmonious development and diversification of 
trade, and the development of various types of commercial and economic cooperation." Commission 
Annotated Summary, supra note 66, at 101. See generally Economic and Social Committee Opinion 
of 31 May 1995 on Relations Between the European Union and Albania, 1995 OJ. (C 236) 65 
[hereinafter ECOSOC Opinion on Albania]. 
117 In response to Albanian pressure for further integration, the EU has moved to develop a PCA 
sub-type that falls mid-way between the current association agreement and an EA. The ECOSOC 
Opinion on Albania, supra note 116, observed that since Albania is both a Central European and a 
Mediterranean country, it should also be covered by the EU's Mediterranean policy, and called for 
acceleration of "the procedures for establishing an association." Id. The Commission presented a draft 
mandate for negotiation of a sui generis agreement with Albania. AGENCE EUR., Jan. 31, 1996, at 8. 
The new agreement was expected to look very much like an EA, except that it would not contemplate 
either creation of a free trade area or eventual accession; in addition, the new agreement with Albania 
was expected to provide more lenient trade terms to Albania, in view of its difficult economic situation. 
Id. At one point it appeared that Albania might manage to cross-over from being a PCA country to an 
EA country, see Maresceau, supra note 1, at 1330 n.lO, but this is unlikely in the light of the events of 
early 1997. 
118 Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
1983 OJ. (L 41) 2; Trade Agreement, 19870.1. (L 318) 51. In response to the disintegration of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, the EC terminated its agreements with that state. 
Council Decision 911602IEEC Denouncing the Cooperation Agreement Between the EEC and the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1991 OJ. (L 325) 23. The benefits of these earlier trading 
arrangements were partially extended to some of the successor states by Council Regulation 3567/91 
Concerning the Arrangements Applicable to Imports into the Community of Products Originating in the 
Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, 1991 OJ. (L 342) 1, and later fully 
restored to all republics which were cooperating in the peace process by Council Regulation 545192 
Concerning the Arrangements Applicable to the Import into the Community of Products Originating 
in the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia and the Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Montenegro, 1992 OJ. (L 63) I. See a/so Council Regulation 546/92 Establishing 
Ceilings and Community Surveillance for Imports of Certain Products Originating in Croatia, Slovenia 
and the Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, 1992 OJ. (L 63) 39; 
Council Regulation 547/92 Opening and Providing for the Administration of Community Tariff Quotas 
for Certain Products Originating in Croatia, Slovenia and the Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, 1992 0.1. (L 63) 41. See generally BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Jan.-Feb. 1992, point 1.4.18. 
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which comprises Serbia and Montenegro1l9), by a land dispute between 
Slovenia and Italy,120 and by the Greek embargo on the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. 121 However, progress towards settling these 
disputes has allowed some steps to be taken towards normalization. The EU 
concluded a preferential peA with Macedonia in April 1997.122 Association 
119 Serbia and Montenegro formed a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on Apr. 27,1992. On 
May 27, 1992, the Commission proposed removing Montenegro from the list of former Yugoslav 
republics which were cooperating in the peace process and thus entitled to benefits accorded earlier that 
year by Regulation 545/92 (discussed supra at note 118), since Montenegro had joined Serbia in the 
new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and imposing trade embargoes against Serbia and Montenegro. 
COM(92)244 final; COM(92)245 final. Specifically, the Commission proposed to "prohibit the import 
into the territory of the Community of all products originating in or coming from the Republics of 
Serbia and Montenegro, the export to these republics of all products originating in or coming from the 
Community, and any activity whose object or effect is to promote, directly or indirectly, trade-related 
transactions" (with the exception of "products intended for strictly medical purposes, foodstuffs or 
materials and supplies for essential civilian needs"). BULL. EUR. COMMUNlTIES, May 1992, point 1.2.20. 
The Council broadened the Commission's proposals. See Regulation 1432/92 Prohibiting Trade 
Between the EEC and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, amended by Council Regulation 
1433/92IECSC, 19920.1. (L 151) 4. See generally BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, points 1.2.19-
.21; BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES, 1une 1992, points 1.4.12-.13. The embargo was tightened in Sept. 1992, 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES, Sept. 1992, points 1.3.20-.22, and again in Apr. 1993, Council Regulation 
990/93 Concerning Trade Between the EEA and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), 19930.1. (L 102) 14, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES, Apr. 1993, point 1.3.27. See 
also Commission Regulation 2068/93 repealing Commission Regulation 2725192 Concerning the 
Prohibition of Trade Between the EEC and the ECSC on the One Hand, and the Republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro on the Other, 19930.1. (L 187) 37. Some of the restrictions were lifted in 1994. See 
Council Decision 94/673/CFSP Conceming the Common Position, Defined on the Basis of Article 1.2 
of the Treaty on European Union, and Regarding the Suspension of Certain Restrictions on Trade with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 19940.1. (L 266) 11; Council Regulation 
2472194 Suspending Certain Elements of the Embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro), 19940.1. (L 266) 8. These measures were extended repeatedly. See, e.g., Council 
Decision 95/11/CFSP Concerning the Common Position, Defined on the Basis of Article 1.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union, and Regarding the Extension of the Suspension of Certain Restrictions on 
Trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 19950.1. (L 20) 2, extended 
by Council Decision 951150/CFSP, 19950.1. (L 99) 2; Council Regulation 109/95 Amending Council 
Regulation 2472/94 Suspending Certain Elements of the Embargo on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 19950.1. (L 20) 1, extended by Council Regulation 984/95, 1995 
0.1. (L 99) 1. 
The Commission proposed to repeal the sanctions in the aftermath of the Nov. 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement. COM(95)610 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.66. 
120 See text accompanying infra note 141. 
121 Greece imposed an economic embargo on Macedonia in February 1994, in response to the U.S. 
decision to grant diplomatic recognition to the so-called Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See 
generally, CONSTANTIN STEFANOU & HELEN XANTHAKI, A LEGAL AND POLmCAL INTERPRET A TlON OF 
ARTICLES 224 AND 225 OF THE TREATY OF ROME (1997). 
III Draft Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EC and the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.64; Commission Proposal for a 
Council Decision, COM(96)0533 final; 19970.1. (C 79) I. The PCA (accompanied by a financial 
protocol) was signed on Apr.29, 1997. BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1997, point 1.4.73; RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, Apr. 30,1997. The EP gave its assent in Oct. 1997. AGENCE EUR., Oct. 30, 1997, at 6. 
See also Proposal of 25 November 1996 for a Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion of an 
Agreement in the Field of Transport Between the European Community and the FOI~n;;r Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 19970.1. (C 79) 159; Council Decision of24 July 1997 on the Provisional 
Application of the Agreement on Trade in Textile Products Between the European Community and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1997 0.1. (L 233) 32. 
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is still a remote possibility for the other countries. The EU has taken 
preliminary steps to define its approach l23 towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, 124 
Croatia,125 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 126 
C. ASSOCIATION STATUS OF CEECS: EA COUNTRIES 
1. The Visegnid Group 
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Republics (then 
Czechoslovakia) began coordinating their positions at a meeting in 
Visegnid, Hungary, in February 1991. 127 At that time, each of them was 
m Council Conclusions of26 February 1996 on Fonner Yugoslavia, reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, point 1.4.108 (calling for a "broad approach" including PCAs); Commission 
Report of2 October 1996 to the Council and the European Parliament on Common Principles for Future 
Contractual Relations with Certain Countries in South-Eastern Europe, COM(96)476 final, reported in 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct 1996, points 1.4.65 and 2.3.1 (defining the objectives, conditions and principles 
to be applied in relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1997 points 1.4.67 and 2.2.1 (noting Council Conclusions of29 April 1997 on 
the principle of conditionality governing the development of the EU's relations with certain countries 
in south-east Europe). 
124 During the Cannes Summit, members of the European Parliament organized a demonstration 
in support of immediate accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina. AGENCE EUR., June 28, 1995, at 8. Bosnia-
Herzegovina requested associate member status in early 1997. EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 
(May/June 1997). 
125 The Commission proposed opening negotiations for a PCA with Croatia on Feb. 24, 1995. 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1995, point 1.4.85. The Council adopted negotiating directives on March 
6, 1995, but did not authorize the Commission to commence negotiations at that time, pending Croatian 
agreement to the maintenance of a United Nations force on its territory. BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, 
point 1.4.61. The Council authorized the opening of negotiations with Croatia on April 10, 1995. 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1995, points 1.4.73 and 1.4.75. Negotiations actually commenced in June 
1995. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.78; AGENCE EUR., June 21, 1995, at 10. In December 
1996, the EP passed a resolution "expressing deep concern at the government's treatment of the 
independent Zagreb radio station Radio 101." OMRI, supra note 13, Dec. 16, 1996. No PCA had been 
concluded between the EU and Croatia as of April 1998. Croatia has made it clear that it does not want 
to participate in subregional groupings "that smack of Yugoslavia," that it wants direct relations with 
the EU, OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 15, 1996, and that it opposes the "EU's group approach to bids for 
membership by the countries offonner Yugoslavia." OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 6, 1996. 
126 Commercial privileges were finally restored to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 
1997. Council Regulation Amending Regulation 70/97 Concerning the Arrangements Applicable to 
Imports into the Community, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1997, points 1.4.11 and 1.4.68 (noting 
Council Regulation of 29 April 1997 which included the FRY in the autonomous preferential 
arrangements granted to imports from Bosnia-Herzegovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia).' 
However, this was shortlived. The EU announced in December 1997 that it would no longer extend 
trade benefits to Yugoslavia. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Dec. 30, 1997. 
127 In fact, the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish leaders first met in Bratislava in April 1990 
to discuss security concerns, and it was not until later that the "emphasis [shifted] from disassociation 
from the East to integration with the West." See Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 483. See also Milada 
A. Vachudova, The Visegrad Four: No Alternative to Cooperation?, RFEIRL REsEARCH REpORT, Vol. 
2, No. 34, Aug. 27, 1993; 38, at 38-39. At the conclusion of the Visegrad Summit in February 1991, 
the leaders of these (then three) countries stated that "the similarity of the situation that arose in the 
course of the last decades compels the three states to work toward the achievement of essentially 
identical goals." Visegrad Summit Declaration, quoted in Vachudova at id. The arenas of cooperation 
144 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
engaged in negotiations with the EC for a new bilateral association 
agreement to replace those concluded in the late 1980s during the last days 
of COMECON. They perceived their cooperation as "a new pattern of 
relations in Central Europe."128 Since then, these countries have been known 
as the Visegnid Group,129 although they do not consistently act as a unit.I3O 
Each of these four countries has concluded an EA which is currently in 
force. 131 In addition, each of them has formally applied for accession to the 
have shifted gradually away from security concems and "dealing with the East towards dealing with the 
West." Id. at 40. Subsequent summits in Cracow (October 1991) and Prague (April 1992) cemented the 
new orientation of Visegn\d cooperation. [d. In particular, the Visegnid countries commenced their 
discussions on the creation of what became the Central European Free Trade Association at the Cracow 
Summit in October 1991. Cracow Summit Declaration (Oct. 6, 1991), quoted in Vachudova, supra. 
See discussion infra of CEFT A in Part IV.C.1. On the whole, cooperation among the Visegrad countries 
in the field of foreign affairs has "been utilized to a much greater extent than in the strictly regional or 
civic spheres." Id. at 38. See a/so George Kolankiewicz, The Other Europe: Different Roads to 
Modernity in Eastern and Central Europe, in EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY 
115-123 (Soledad Garciaed., 1993). 
128 Prague Summit Declaration (May 6, 1992), quoted in Vachudova, supra note 127, at 38. 
129 In fact, they were called the Visegrad Triangle prior to the break-up of Czechoslovakia. See, 
e.g., BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, point 1.2.17 (describing a meeting between EC officials and 
the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to discuss "future relations among ... 
the 'Visegrad Triangle' countries"), and later the Visegrad Four. See Vachudova, supra note 127. 
130 One of their early significant acts as a group was the Joint Memorandum of September 1992 
On Strengthening their Integration with the European Communities and on the Perspective of Accession 
(1992) (unpublished memorandum) [hereinafter Visegrad Memorandum]. The Visegrad Memorandum 
set forth proposals for improvements in the association strategy (e.g. establish specific criteria and a 
timetable for accession; "speed up the process" by strengthening political and financial cooperation, as 
well as by accelerating economic integration). This memorandum was prepared in connection with the 
October 1992 meetings of the EC and Visegrad countries' foreign ministers (in Luxembourg on October 
5 and in London on October 28). See BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1992, points 1.4.6.-.7 and 2.3.1. 
See a/so Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note 1, at 201-06. 
Since the Visegrnd Group established the Central European Free Trade Association in 1993, this 
organization has become the primary vehicle for cooperation between these countries (even though they 
are no longer the sole members). See discussion infra accompanying notes 289-326. 
III Czech and Slovak Republics: An EA was signed between the EC and the (then) Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic on Dec. 16, 1991. Certain portions of this EA were implemented (effective 
Mar. I, 1992) by the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the EEC and the 
ECSC, of the One Part, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, of the Other Part, 19920.1. (L lIS) 
2. These agreements replaced an earlier "First Generation" PCA between the EC and Czechoslovakia, 
1990 OJ. (L 291) 28, which in tum replaced an even earlier one, 1989 OJ. (L 88) 2. After the break-up 
of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the EC negotiated and eventually concluded separate EAs 
with both successor states. See Council Decision of 5 April 1993 Authorizing the Commission to 
Negotiate Two Separate Europe Agreements, Between the Community and the Czech Republic, and 
Between the Community and Slovakia, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1993, point 1.3.16; 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, June 1993, point 1.3.17 (new EAs initialed); BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Sept. 
1993, points 1.3.11-.12 (regarding measures relating to the break-up of Czechoslovakia). See a/so 
Commission Decision of4 October 1993 on the Signature of the Europe Agreements, reported in BULL. 
EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1993, point 1.3.14. The new EAs between the EC and the Czech and Slovak 
Republics were signed on Oct. 4,1993, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1993, point 1.3.14, and entered 
into force on Feb. 1, 1995. Europe Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European 
Communities and Their Member States and the Czech Republic, 1994 OJ. (L 360) 2; Europe 
Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and Their Member States 
and the Slovak Republic, 1994 OJ. (L 359) 2. 
Hungary: The EA between the EC and Hungary was signed on Dec. 16, 1991, and entered into 
force on Feb. 1, 1994. Hungarian EA, supra note 42. Certain portions of the EA were implemented 
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EU. 132 
2. Balkan Countries 
Bulgaria133 and Romanial34 were the next countries to conclude EAs 
after the Visegrlid Group. 135 Overall, the EU has extended the same 
treatment to Bulgaria and Romania as it had already extended to the 
Visegrlid Group, much to the dismay of the latter countries, which feared 
being held back on the road to accession by their "slower" Balkan 
neighbors. 136 Both Bulgaria and Romania have fonnally applied for 
(effective Mar. 1, 1992) by the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the 
EEC and ECSC, of the One Part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the Other Part, 1992 OJ. (L 116) 1. 
These agreements replaced the earlier "First Generation" PCA, 1988 OJ. (L 327) I. 
Poland: The EA between the EC and Poland was signed on Dec. 16, 1991, and entered into force 
on Feb. I, 1994. Polish EA, supra note 49. Certain provisions of the EA were implemented (effective 
Mar. 1, 1992) by the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the EEC and the 
ECSE, of the One Part, and the Republic of Poland, of the Other Part, 1992 OJ. (L 114) I. These 
agreements replaced the earlier "First Generation" PCA, 1989 OJ. (L 339) I. 
13l Hungary applied on Mar. 31,1994, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1994, point 1.3.18; Poland 
applied on Apr. 5, 1994, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1994, point 1.3.19; Slovakia applied on June 
27,1995, BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.58; and the Czech Republic applied on Jan. 17, 1996, 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, point 1.4.75. 
III The Council authorized the Commission to open negotiations with Bulgaria on May 11, 1992. 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, point 1.2.12. The EA between Bulgaria and the EC was signed 
on Mar. 8, 1993, and received the assent of the European Parliament on Oct. 27, 1993. BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1993, point 1.3.12. The EA finally entered into force on Feb. 1,1995. Europe 
Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and Their Member States, 
of the One Part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the Other Part, 1994 OJ. (L 358) 3. However, certain 
provisions of the EA were implemented (effective Dec. 31, 1993) by the Interim Agreement on Trade 
and Trade-related Matters Between the EEC and the ECSC, of the One Part, and the Republic of 
Bulgaria, of the Other Part, 1993 OJ. (L 323) 2. These agreements replaced an earlier "First 
Generation" PCA, 1990 OJ. (L 291) 9. See generally Commission Opinion of23 November 1995 on 
Relations with Bulgaria, COM(95)528 final. 
134 The Council authorized the Commission to open negotiations with Romania on May 11, 1992. 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, point 1.2.12. The EA between Romania and the EC was signed 
on Feb.1, 1993, and received the assent of the European Parliament on Oct. 27,1993. BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1993, point 1.3 16. The EA finally entered into force on Feb. 1, 1995. Europe 
Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and Their Member States, 
of the One Part, and Romania, of the Other Part, 1994 OJ. (L 357) 2. However, certain provisions of 
the EA were implemented (effective May 1, 1993) by the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related 
Matters Between the EEC and the ECSC, of the one Part, and the Republic of Romania, of the other 
Part, 1993 OJ. (L 81) I. These agreements replaced an earlier "First Generation" PCA, 1991 OJ. (L 
79) 13, which in tum replaced an even earlier one, 1990 OJ. (L 352).1. 
135 See generally Economic and Social Committee Opinion on EC Relations with the Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe -- Bulgaria and Romania, 1993 OJ. (C 19) 74. 
136 This fear was particularly acute during the first halfofthe 1990s, hut has fade<i ~I)mewhat as 
the gap between the Visegnid Group and these two Balkan EA countries has widened. The EU availed 
itself of the opportunity presented by its second Association Council meetings with Bulgaria and with 
Romania to register its displeasure with the pace of economic reform (among other troubling issues). 
See, e.g., Second Meeting ofEU-Bulgarian Association Council, AGENCE EUR., Jan. 31, 1996, at 9 (EU 
welcomed the improvement in Bulgaria's economic situation in 1995, but urged improved trade flows 
and stressed that "recovery and economic stabilization is not yet based on a sufficient number of 
industrial sectors; ... invited Bulgarian authorities to develop 'a coherent policy oriented towards a 
market economy,' to accelerate the privatization of companies and to improve the country's finances, 
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accession to the EU,I37 
Slovenia -- the late-comer to the "pre-accession" ranks -- was, until 
1997, the only country in former Yugoslavia to have concluded an 
association agreement with the EC,I38 A dispute with Italy over lanH9 
delayed negotiations for an EA,140 but once this problem was overcome, 
agreement was concluded in "record time,"141 The EA has not yet entered 
,. notably through a refonn of the public sector in order to lower the public deficit to acceptable 
proportions"). See also Second Meeting of EU-Romania Association Council, AGENCE EUR., Feb. 28, 
1996, at 8-9.(EU urged Romania to speed up the process of "developing a genuine market economy, 
... especially with regard to structural adjustment, privatization, the restructuring of public enterprises 
and adaptation of the financial sector"). 
The EU imposed compulsory visa requirements on travelers from Bulgaria and Romania in 1994, 
but not on nationals of other EA countries. Both Balkan EA countries have objected repeatedly to this 
discriminatory treatment, but to no avail. See, e.g., BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, points 1.4.82 
(EU-Bulgaria Association Council) and 1.4.87 (EU-Romania Association Council); Association 
Councils, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No.1 04, Mar. 1 , 1997 (Bulgaria reiterated its concern); EUIRomania 
Association Council, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 107, Apr. 15, 1997 (Romania repeated its criticism); 
Politics and Current Affairs, EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (July! Aug. 1997) (Bulgaria abolished its 
visa requirements for West Europeans). 
137 Romania applied on June 22, 1995, BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.57, and Bulgaria 
on December 16, 1995, BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1995, point 1.4.61. 
138 Soon after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Commission 
requested the Council to authorize it to open negotiations for an association agreement with Slovenia. 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, June 1992, point 1.4.13. The Council granted this authorization in 
September 1992. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Sept. 1992, point 1.3.23. The Cooperation Agreement 
Between the EEC and the Republic of Slovenia was signed on 5 April 1993, implemented by Council 
Decision 93!4071EEC of 19 July 1993, 19930.1. (L 189) 1, and entered into effect on Sept. 1, 1993. 
The Cooperation Agreement included a future developments clause, which held open the possibility of 
concluding an EA at a later date. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1993, point 1.3.22. See also Protocol 
on Financial Cooperation Between the EEC and the Republic of Slovenia, 1993 0.1. (L 189) 153; 
Agreement Between the Member States of the European Economic Community and of the ECSC, of 
the One Part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the Other Part, 19930.1. (C 210) 17; Agreement Between 
the EEC and the Republic of Slovenia in the Field of Transport, 19930.1. (L 189) 161. 
139 The dispute concerned Slovene property owned by Italians "when the communists marched in." 
Caren Chesler, Italy Faces offwith Slovenia on Land Question, BUDAPEST SUN, May 26-June 1, 1994, 
at 1. Italy thus blocked conclusion of the EA until such time as Slovenia agreed (in June 1995) to 
change its laws to pennit EU nationals to own real estate in Slovenia. AGENCE EUR., Jur.e 14, 1995, at 
10; AGENCEEuR., June 16, 1995, at S. 
140 Talk of moving to "the next stage ... to negotiate a European ... Agreement" began right after 
the Cooperation Agreement entered into effect on September 1,1993. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Sept. 
1993, point 1.3.28. However, negotiating directives were not adopted until March 6, 1995. BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.64. The EA was initialed on June 15, 1995. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 
1995, point 1.4.62. The EP gave its assent on November 30, 1995. 19950.1. (C 339) 40 (noting that 
"the dispute between Slovenia and Italy should not prevent [conclusion of the EA] or moves to anchor . 
Slovenia in Europe" and urging Slovenia "to meet the conditions laid down by the Council and 
Commission so the [EA] could be signed as soon as possible"). 
141 AGENCEEUR., June 16, 1995, at 5. The EA was signed on June 10, 1996, BULL. EUR. UNION, 
June 1996, point 1.4.52, and ratified by the Slovene parliament on July 15,1997, AGENCE EUR., July 
17, 1997, at 7. See Europe Agreement Between the European Communities and their Member States 
and the Republic of Slovenia. The Slovene EA provides for introduction of a free trade area at the end 
ofa (relatively short) six-year transitional period. BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.64. 
It also includes a commitment by Slovenia to take whatever steps are needed in order to pennit citizens 
of EU Member States, on a reciprocal basis, to acquire real estate in Slovenia on non-discriminatory 
tenns, as of the end of the fourth year following the entry into force of the EA. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 
1996, point 1.4.49. 
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into effect. 142 However, an Interim Agreement implementing certain of its 
provisions has been concluded. 143 Slovenia is included in the Structured 
Dialogue and covered by the Pre-accession Strategy and CEEC \\-bite Paper 
that were prepared with earlier EA countries in mind. Slovenia has applied 
for accession to the EU. 144 
3. Baltic States 145 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the only former republics of the 
USSR that did not join the CIS. Instead, they have focused their efforts On 
establishing strong relations with the EU and with other East and West 
European countries. The Baltic States are also the only former Soviet 
republics considered eligible for EAs and thus, a promise of eventual 
membership. 146 
Each of the Baltic States moved rapidly along the association 
continuum, though some advanced faster than others. 147 In fact, all three 
.1'2 EP Resolution on the Economic and Trade Aspects of the Europe Agreement Between the EU 
and the Republic of Slovenia, 1996 OJ. (C 347) 146. Ratification of the EA was held up because 
Slovenia delayed changing its laws. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 6, 1997. However, the 
Slovene parliament voted on July 14, 1997 to amend the constitution to allow foreigners to own 
property, thus opening the way for ratification of the EA. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra noce 41, July IS, 
1997. 
14) The Interim Agreement was initialed on Sept. 19, 1996, BULL. EUR. UNION, Sept. 1996, point 
1.4.34; signed by the Commission on Nov. II, 1996; and endorsed by the EP on Nov. IS, 1996, BULL. 
EUR. UNION, Nov. 1996, point 1.4.69; and adopted by the Council on December 20,1996, BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Dec. 1996, point 1.4.52. See Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between 
the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, of the One Part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the Other Part, 1996 OJ. (L 344) 2. The 
Interim Agreement entered into effect on July I, 1997, but has been applied provisionally since Jan. 
1,1997. 19970.1. (L lSI) I. 
144 Slovenia applied for membership on June 10, 1996. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1996, point 
1.4.49. 
I'S See generally Economic and Social Committee Opinion of 25 March 1993 on Relations 
Between the European Community and the Baltic States, 1993 OJ. (C 129) 31; Commission 
Communication to the Council of25 October 1994 on Orientations for a Union Approach Towards the 
Baltic Sea Region, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1994, point 1.3.21; EP Resolution of 14 July 1995 
on the Commission Communication, 19950.1. (C 249) 215 [hereinafter EP Baltic Sea Resolution]; 
Council Conclusions of29 May 1995 on EU Policy Towards the Baltic Sea Region,· reported in BULL. 
EUR. UNION, May 1995, point 1.4.70 (observing that the EU is "uniquely placed to contribute to the 
development and stability of this region" and setting forth guidelines for political cooperation and 
dialogue as well as economic cooperation) [hereinafter Council Conclusions on Baltic Sea Region]; 
Commission Report of29 November 1995 on the Current State of and Perspectives for Cooperation in 
the Baltic Sea Region, COM(95)609 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.43 
[hereinafter Commission Report on Baltic Sea Region). 
146 COM(95) 163 final; COM(95)207 final. 
147 Estonia presents the unique case of a country that accelerated its association with the EU by 
omitting the usual transition period and removing trade barriers quickly, despite pressure from its 
neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, which opted for a more gradual approach to liberalization. See infra 
note 278. 
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Baltics quickly progressed beyond the trade normalization stage,148 and 
concluded free trade agreements with the EC in 1994.149 By the time this 
first round of agreements entered into effect on 1 January 1995, negotiations 
towards conclusion ofEAs were already well underway. ISO The EAs were 
concluded on 12 June 19951S1 but final ratification was delayed until 1 
February 1998.152 The Baltic States have been included in the Structured 
Dialogue, and covered by the Pre-accession Strategy and the CEEC White 
Paper that were prepared with earlier EA countries in mind. ls3 
The Baltic States have all formally applied for accession to the 
". The EC concluded non-preferential PCAs with each of the three Baltic States on May II, 1992. 
Agreement Between the EEC and the Republic of Estonia on Trade and Commercial and Economic 
Cooperation, 1992 OJ. (L 403) 2; Agreement Between the EEC and the Republic of Latvia on Trade 
and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, 1992 OJ. (L 403) II; Agreement Between theEEC and 
the European Atomic Energy Community and the Republic of Lithuania on Trade and Cun.mercial and 
Economic Cooperation, 1992 OJ. (L 403) 20. The PCAs with Latvia and Lithuania entered into force 
on Feb. I, 1993, and the PCA with Estonia on Mar. 1, 1993. See BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, 
point 1.2.11 ("The objectives common to these agreements are the development and diversification of 
commercial relations, and the promotion of economic and commercial cooperation on a basis of 
equality, non-discrimination, mutual advantage and reciprocity."). 
The European Parliament "considered it necessary to convert the recently concluded trade and 
cooperation agreements into association agreements as rapidly as possible." EP Resolution on the 
Situation in the Baltic Republics, 1993 OJ. (C 150) 330. In June 1993, "the European Council invited 
the Commission to submit proposals for developing the EC's existing cooperation agreements with the 
Baltic States into free trade agreements," and to conclude EAs with these countries "as soon as the 
necessary conditions [could be] met." Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31, at point 1.14. 
1'9 The Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the EC and each of the three Baltic States were 
signed on July 18, 1994, and entered into force on Jan. 1, 1995. Agreement on Free Trade and Trade-
related Matters Between the European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the 
European Coal and Steel Community, of the One Part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the Other Part, 
19940.1. (L 373) 2; Agreement on Free Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the European 
Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Coal and Steel Community, 
of the One Part, and the Republic of Latvia, of the Other Part, 1994 OJ. (L 374) 2; Agreement on Free 
Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the European Community, the European Atomic Energy 
Community, and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the One Part, and the Republic of 
Lithuania, of the Other Part, 1994 OJ. (L 375) 2. See generally BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1994, 
points 1.3.37, 1.3.40 and 1.3.43. 
IlO Negotiating directives for conclusion of EAs were adopted in Nov. 1994, BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNlTlES, Nov. 1994, point 1.3.25, and the EAs were initialed on Apr. 12, 1995. BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Apr. 1995, point 1.4.64. 
Il' BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.63. See also Proposals for Council Regulations on 
Certain Procedures for Applying the Agreements on Free Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the 
European Communities and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, COM(94)658 final and COM(95)76 final, 
reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1995, point 1.4.65 (providing for quick implementation of the 
agriculture provisions of the trade liberalization agreements). The European Parliament gave its assent 
on Nov. 15, 1995. See Legislative Resolutions on the Proposal for a Council and Commission Decision 
on the Conclusion of a Europe Agreement: EP 95/0128 (Lithuania), EP 95/0129 (Latvia), and 
EP/95/0130 (Estonia); 1995 OJ. (C 323) 41. 
112 RFEIFL Newsline, supra note 41, February 2, 1998. 
m See Council Conclusions on Baltic Sea Region, supra note 145 (noting that the Baltic States 
will participate in the Structured Dialogue); BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.63 (noting that the 
political dialogue between the EU and the Baltic States will take place within the multilateral framework 
set up with the other associated countries, as well as within the bilateral framework of the Association 
Councils). 
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EU. IS4 In view of various unique aspects of its relations with the Baltics, the 
Commission proposed, in late 1995, a "new approach" towards the Baltic 
Sea Region which includes both a political and an economic agenda. ISS 
D. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the EU's association strategy combines bilateral and 
multilateral approaches to the CEECs. On the one hand, the EU has 
negotiated separate bilateral association treaties with nearly all countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, while on the other, it often treats the associated 
CEECs as a bloc and encourages them to develop relationships among 
themselves on a subregional basis.ls6 This multifarious approach may well 
IS< Latvia applied on Oct. 27, 1995, BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.60; Estonia applied 
on Nov. 28,1995, BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.42; and Lithuania applied on Dec. 8, 1995, 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1995, point 1.4.60. 
ISS Commission Report on the Baltic Sea Region, supra note 145. See also EP Resolution A4-
0158/95 on the Commission Communication to the Council "Orientations for a Union Approach 
Towards the Baltic Sea Region," 19950.1. (C 249) 215. See also discussion infra of the Council of 
Baltic Sea States in Part IV.D.1. 
ISO See Commission Enlargement Report, supra note 31, at 19 (Commission "hopes that a free 
trade area can soon be established. The Community should encourage all suitable forms of regional and 
inter-regional cooperation in Europe, with a view to the eventual creation of a pan-European free trade 
area"); Commission Communication on Closer Association, supra note 29 (focusing on the process of 
regional economic integration); EP Resolution of 23 April 1993 on Relations between the EC and 
Bulgaria, 1993 0.1. (C 150) 324 (EPnoted "the need to strengthen links between" the EC and all CEECs 
and "urged the countries of south-eastem Europe, including Bulgaria, to establish closer relations· and 
work together with the Visegrad group of countries"); EP Resolution of 23 April 1993 on Relations 
Between the EC and Romania, 19930.1. (C 150) 325; BULL. EUR. COMMUNmEs, May 1993, point 
1.3.15 (Commissioner van den Broek "stressed the need for regional cooperation among the countries 
... to be stepped up" during his May 1993 meetings with leaders from the Visegrad countries); Meeting 
of the EU-Czech Republic Association Council, BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1995, point 1.4.66 
(Association Council stressed that intra-regional cooperation "was an important :nea.1S c! promoting 
European integration and economic development in the region"); Fifth Annual PHARE Report, supra 
note 58 (noting that funds provided under the PHARE program have increasingly been made available 
to "support ... closer cross"border cooperation - among Central and East European countries 
themselves, as well as between them and the EU"); EP Baltic Sea Resolution, supra note 145, at 216 
(emphasizing that "supporting regional cooperation has a multiplier effect on the scope and 
effectiveness of Union programmes"); EU Launches New Action Plan, EIS EURo-EAST REp., supra note 
57, December 10, 1996 (Action Plan for Ukraine aims to help regional cooperation, including 
encouraging Ukraine's accession to CEFT A and strengthening Black Sea Economic Cooperation). 
It is interesting to note that the EC is promoting subregional cooperation in other places as well. 
See generally COM(95)219 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.44 (Commission 
report on EC support for regional economic integration efforts among developing countries); EP 
Resolution on the Commission Communication on EC Support for Regional Economic Integration 
Efforts Among Developing Countries, 19970.1. (C 132) 316. In the Middle East, for example, the 
Commission has stated that that subregional cooperation, in view of "the importance of economic 
integration and the development of interdependence between various parties in promoting political 
stability" would "help make the peace process irreversible" and "reduce the disparities between the 
countries concemed." Commission Communication to the Council on Future Relations and Cooperation 
Between the Community and the Middle East, COM(93)375 final, reported in BULL. fUR. 
COMMUNmES, Sept. 1993, point 1.3.18. More concretely, the Commission suggested "that these 
countries adopt habits of cooperation leading to the development of appropriate institutions and a free 
trade area in the region." Id. See also Commission Communication of 8 March 1995 to the Council 
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be necessary to strike a balance between the optimal and the possible. 
However, this complex strategy often vexes the associated countries, which 
are especially eager to be treated as autonomous, sovereign states, and thus 
resent being forced into a collective. ls7 
Another feature of the EU's association strategy is the gradual 
differentiation of agreement types. While the EA format has been nearly 
constant, 158 the peA format has continued to evolve in order to 
and the EP on Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for 
Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, COM(95)72 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 
1995, point 1.4.57 ("Support for regional integration will be based on a major integration drive among 
the Mediterranean countries themselves and the improvement of communication and cooperation links 
between border regions ... Thus, the association agreements concluded with the Community should 
be followed by similar agreements on free trade and cooperation among the countries concerned. The 
Community will support this process by providing assistance and encouragement as appropriate for the 
creation of regional cooperation structure's and by providing financial assistance ... to finance the 
economic infrastructure that is essential if regional trade is to be stepped up, especially in the field of 
transport, communications and energy."); EU-Rio Group Ministerial Conference on Mar. 17, 1995, 
reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.86 (the ministers "welcomed the movement towards 
regional and subregional integration in Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe and reaffirmed their 
conviction that regional integration was a preferred route for securing political understanding, social 
and economic development, enhanced competitiveness and integration into the world economy" and 
"expressed their determination to intensify dialogue and cooperation between the European Union, the 
Rio Group, Central America, Mercosur and the Andean Pact"); Barcelona Declaration and Work 
Programme, Conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in No". i 995, BULL. 
EUR. UNION, Nov, 1995, point 2.3.1 [hereinafter Barcelona Declaration] (stating the objective to 
encourage "regional cooperation and integration" and affirming that "regional cooperation on a 
voluntary basis, particularly with a view to developing trade between the partners themselves, is a key 
factor in promoting the creation of a free-trade area"). 
157 See, e.g, AGENCE EUR., May 1, 1997, at 19 (Macedonian Prime Minister Crvenkovski stated, 
upon signing PCA with EU, that his country "is open to all forms of cooperation and functional links 
but not those that involve a form of region ali sat ion or extorsion [sic]" because Macedonia "does not 
wish [its ] level of relations with the [EU] to depend upon [its] neighbours' political process, upon what 
they do, but upon what" Macedonia itself has done). 
Ironically, it was the EC that insisted, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, that it be allowed to 
negotiate bilateral trade and cooperation treaties directly with the CEECs, while Mr. Brezhnev insisted 
that the CMEA act as intermediary and supervise the EC's negotiations with individual CMEA member 
states. The CMEA, unlike the EC, had no competence to sign international agreements and bind its 
member states. Attempts to establish a framework agreement between the EC and the CMEA were 
ongoing in the 1970s, but broke down in 1980. See Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note 1, 
at 180. After Mr. Gorbachev came to power in 1995, the dialogue between the EC and CMEA resumed, 
and eventually led to the establishment of official relations between the EC and the CMEA. See Joint 
Declaration of 24 June 1988, 1988 OJ. (L 157) 35. The CMEA finally yielded to EC pressure and 
agreed to a "parallel approach" under which the EC would be allowed to conduct detailed trade 
negotiations with CMEA countries on a bilateral basis, within the framework established by the Joint 
Declaration. Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note 1, at 182. 
1S8 The most significant change made in the standard EA format was the inclusion of the human 
rights conditionality clause. The agreements with Bulgaria and Romania were the first to include "an 
explicit reference to regard for democratic principles and human rights, which are seen as essential to 
the association." BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES, May 1992, point 1.2.12. However, such provisions already 
appeared in earlier PCAs (e.g. with Albania and the Baltic States). On May 11, 1992, the Council 
adopted the following statement: 
The Council stresses that respect for democratic principles and human rights, as defined in 
the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, and the principles of the 
market economy are essential components of cooperation or association agreements between 
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accommodate both the demands and the special needs of second-tier CEECs 
that are not candidates for eventual accession to the EU. 1S9 
The EU has made it clear that its global free-trade association 
strategy is designed to serve a variety of economic and political purposes. 
Economically, it is meant to open markets for EU exports160 and to further 
the EU's general economic interests (including those pertaining to the 
sensitive nature of certain products}. 161 Politically, the EU is guided by the 
following principles when entering into such arrangements: its attachment 
to multiIateralism; implementation of its political priorities; and the impact 
on European identity.162 
III. CRITIQUE OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The EU's association strategy, analyzed below in greater detail, has 
gradually become more responsive to the needs articulated by the EA 
the Community and its CSCE partners. 
The Commission is requested to act accordingly to ensure that agreements to be concluded 
by the Community contain an appropriate mechanism which is operational in emergencies, 
including provisions relating to non-fulfillment of obligations. 
In the context of a political dialogue with the ... countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Community and its Member States will inform their partners of the importance they 
attach to the principles referred to above. 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, point 1.2.13. See also AGENCE EUR., May 29-30, 1995, at 3 
(General Affairs Council adopted uniform clause allowing the EU "to suspend agreements concluded 
with third countries as soon as these countries violate human rights ... [and] for market economy 
principles ... " and an interpretative declaration pertaining thereto). 
While the original EA between the EC and Czechoslovakia did not contain a human rights clause, 
each of the renegotiated EAs (following the break-up of that country) does. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, 
Oct. 1993, point 1.3.14. The EP invoked this clause in its Dec. 12, 1996 resolution warning Slovakia 
that its EA "could be canceled and visa requirements renewed if [Slovakia] does not follow general 
democratic standards." OMRI, supra note 13, Dec. 13, 1996 (pertaining to the case of Deputy Gaulieder 
who was stripped of his mandate). 
A further innovation may be found in the EAs with the Baltic States, which contain a new heading 
on cooperation in crime prevention. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.63. See generally text 
accompanying infra note 228. 
159 See Commission Annotated Summary, supra note 66, at 4; AGENCE EUR., June 14, 1995, at 6 
(seek formulas adapted to the specific situations of [the Transcaucasus] countries"). 
160 Commission Communication of 14 February 1996 to the Council, European Parliament, 
ECOSOC and Committee of the Regions on The Global Challenge of International Trade: A Market 
Access Strategy for the EU, COM(96)53 final, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, point 
1.4.25, and reprinted in AGENCE EUR. Docs., Feb. 21, 1996 [hereinafter Commission Market Access 
Strategy]; ECOSOC Opinion, BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1996, point 1.4.20. See also AGENCEEuR., Aug. 
30, 1997, at 5 (report of the Special Article 113 Committee on practical implementation of the EU's 
"offensive" trade strategy launched in Feb. 1996). 
161 AGENCE EUR., June 10, 1995, at 8 (agenda for General Affairs Council of June 12, 1995). 
162 ld. 
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countries. 163 Still, it is hard to belie the impression that the EU is diligently 
superimposing its technocratic regime on some of its neighbors in Central 
and Eastern Europe. This can easily be verified by comparing the 
association agreements (and especially the EAs) with the EC Treaty itself, 
which serves as a template for the various types of association agreement. 
EAs (and, to a lesser degree, PCAs) are structurally similar to and contain 
many provisions identical to those found in the EC Treaty,l64 although the 
association agreements are both narrower in scope and shallower than the 
EC Treaty. The differences between them provide a valuable set of markers 
for the imbalance of rights and obligations. 
Before hastening to criticize the EU for assuming a neocolonial 
posture towards its neighbors, one must ascertain what part of the 
responsibility for the current imbalances in the East-West relationship rests 
with the CEECs themselves. 165 It is fair to say that the EA countries have 
harbored unrealistic expectations of their relations with the EU, and 
consequently have been willing to follow the EU's agenda, even when doing 
so was contrary to their own best interests. l66 In fact, the EA countries have 
already "given up the store" as a consequence of their early trusting 
behavior. The EAs, despite their many advantages: 
paradoxically ... seriously weakened the [EA countries'] 
bargaining position, because the main and perhaps only 
relevant asset that [the EA countries] were able to offer was 
free access for EU exporters to domestic CEEC markets. 167 
The changing dynamics of East-West European integration can be partly 
16) See Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I, at 199-209, and Hartnell, Association 
Agreements, supra note 1, at 230-35, for a discussion of the early stages of this process. 
164 Thus, for example, the EA provisions concerning movement of goods are virtually identical 
to the corresponding provisions in the EC Treaty. In addition, the EA countries must adopt rules nearly 
identical to the EC's rules governing anti-competitive behavior. See examples cited supra in notes 53-
54 and 56. 
It should be noted, however, that identical language does not always lead to identical interpretation 
by the European Court of Justice. See Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 
E.C.R. 329 (provisions in EC-Portuguese free trade agreement interpreted differently from 
corresponding articles ofEC Treaty - articles 30 and 36 - since objectives of free trade agreement are 
not the same as those of common market). The role of ECJ case law in the context of association 
agreements with CEECs has not been clearly addressed. 
16S See, e.g., Kennedy & Webb, supra note 1, at 1116 ("[I]n contrast to some EFTA countries 
whose complex respollse to integration with the EC has been developed over many years of internal 
political debate, each country has largely accepted the EC's framework for institutional relations."). 
166 "Some unreasonable hopes in the emerging democracies are going to be frustrated, which may 
tum into a bitter and possibly aggressive response." Wojtek Lamentowicz, National Interests and 
Prospects for Integration. in THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE EAST-WEST 
ORDER 383, 383 (Armand Clesse et al. eds. 1994). 
167 Barta & Richter, supra note 1, at 24. See discussion infra in notes 492-500 and accompanying 
text. 
Vol. 16, No.1 Subregional Coalescence 153 
understood as a function of altered appraisals as to what is in the short- and 
long-term interest of the EA countries. Post-1989, people in Central and 
Eastern Europe were quite willing to make short-term sacrifices vis-a-vis the 
EU, because they believed that these sacrifices would lead to quick 
accession. With the passage of time, however, it has become increasingly 
apparent that accession will neither be quick, nor will it necessarily provide 
a panacea for existing problems. 168 The stick holding up the carrot of 
membership grows ever longer, and the carrot looks smaller across the 
greater distance. 169 It thus should come as no surprise that the motivational 
force created by this arrangement has become attenuated, and that the 
CentrallEast European donkey -- hitched up to pull the cart of economic 
growth -- has been getting some ideas of its own. 
Central and East European countries, and particularly those which 
have concluded EAs with the EO, are showing si~ns of reorientation. They 
know that the current vertical East:' West European integration model is 
imbalanced in the EU's favor, but have discovered that they are not 
powerless to change (or at least influence) direction. Some of their steps are 
explored in Part IV below. 
The imbalance is undergoing a welcome correction. Full 
appreciation of the changes in Central and East European countries, 
however, presupposes a deeper understanding of the tensions in their 
relations with the EU and with each other. Five paradoxes beset the current 
vertical integration model: the trade paradox, the aspirational paradox, the 
participation _ paradox, the sovereignty paradox, and the competition-
cooperation paradox. These paradoxes illustrate various axes along which 
168 See generally Peter Bugge, Home at last? Czech views of joining the EU 3 (1997) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author) (noting the "realism or even 'disillusionment' that has spread in Czech 
media and political circles in recent years as hopes of a fast and warm embrace into western European 
institutions have withered"); Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 478 ("entry into the EU for the Visegrad 
countries is now neither as imminent nor as certain, nor is popular support for the European idea as 
strong as formerly"). See also infra notes 182 and 268. 
16. It is virtually certain that the carrot wiII shrink in real terms. Consider, for example, the 
persistent references to the need to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural 
Funds before accepting new members from Central and Eastern Europe, infra notes 234-35. In its 
CEEC Agricultural Study, supra note 29, the Commission estimates that enlargement would "add a 
further ECU 9 billion to an unchanged CAP by the year 2000 if all ten .. _ [EA countries] joined the EU 
and ECU 12 billion by 2010 (compared to ECU 42 billion for the current 15 member Union)" and 
"stresses the need for the CAP to adapt in time to the future changes brought about by enlargement to 
the East." See also Barta & Richter, supra note 1, at 32 ("[E]nlargement ... is unlikely under the 
prevailing 'rules of the game'. Precondition ... wiII be either a far reaching reform of the EU 
redistribution system which will then provide much less immediate advantages to new entrants than they 
hope for, or, the present rules wiIl, for incumbents, prevail but new entrants will have to accept 
unprecedented unfavourable derogations in order to keep the EU's budget drain within acceptable limits. 
In both cases actual gains after accession wiII be substantially smaller than they are thought to be 
today."). But see Ana Nicholls, Subsidised SubSistence, Bus. CENT. EUR., Feb. 1997, at 29 ("IfEU 
membership is to mean anything, some elements of the [CAP] will have to be extended to Central 
Europe ... "). 
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EU and CEEC interests can be measured, and offer a framework for 
understanding the forces working for and against European integration. 
B. THE FIVE PARADOXES 
1. The Trade Paradox 
On the surface one can perceive a common interest -- shared by both 
the EU and the associated countries -- in increasing their bilateral trade. 
But, behind this apparent congruence of interest lies an incongruity: The 
desire for more trade can be translated into each country's unilateral wish to 
expand its exports to the other's market. CEEC countries, many of which 
have high external debt, are striving to achieve a positive balance of trade. 
For its part, the EU has constructed an extraordinarily intricate 
network of external trade treaties, including those with the CEECs.170 The 
170 A full exposition of the EU's complex external relations is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, it is worth noting that the EC has entered into various types of association agreements with 
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Most of these agreements are of the PCA type. See, e.g., 
Cooperation Agreement Between the EC and the Yemen Arab Republic, amended on Mar. 6, 1995, 
1995 0.1. (L 26) I; Cooperation Agreement Between the EC and the Republic of India on Partnership 
and Development, 19940.1. (L 223) 23; Draft Framework Trade and Cooperation Agreement with 
Korea, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.81; Framework Cooperation Agreement 
of 17 July 1995 Between the EC and Viet Nam, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 
1.4.100; Economic Partnership and Political Consultation Agreement Between the EC and Mexico, 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.109, initialed on July 23,1997, AGENCEEuR., July 24,1997, 
at 9; Framework Cooperation Agreement of21 June 1996 Between the EC and Chile, reported in BULL. 
EUR. UNION, June 1996, point 1.4.105. 
The EC has developed a special Euro-Mediterranean type of association agreement which has far-
reaching provisions like the EAs but does not contemplate eventual accession of the associated country. 
See Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Between the EC and Egypt, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, 
Dec. 1994, point 1.3.67; Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement Between the EC and Israel, 
reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.69; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Between the 
EC and Jordan, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, May 1995, point 1.4.75; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
Between the EC and Tunisia, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.84; Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement Between the EC and Morocco, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 
1996, point 1.4.114; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Between the EC and the PLO, 19970.1. (L 187) 
1. The Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in November 1995 adopted a work program 
that called for the progressive establishment of a free-trade area. BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, points 
1.4.56 and 2.3.1. See also EP Resolution on Economic and Trade Relations Between the EU and the 
Countries of the Mediterranean Basin, 19950.1. (C 323) 159. 
However, some of the EC's bilateral association agreements with countries outside Europe and the 
Mediterranean area surpass the PCA structure. For example, the Commission proposed to convert the 
PCA that the EC was already in the process of negotiating with South Africa into a free trade agreement. 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.126. Negotiations are still underway, and both parties remain 
committed to the conclusion of a free trade agreement. The proliferation of free trade agreements, and 
particularly the proposal to conclude a free trade agreement with South Africa, set off a storm of 
controversy within the EU. See AGENCE EUR., June 14, 1995, at 9 (Commission Communication on 
Free Trade Areas); AGENCE EUR., Jan. 31, 1996, at 6-7 (Commission must present studies on the 
compatibility of such a free trade agreement with WTO rules and its impact on the Common 
Agricultural Policy). See also AGENCE EUR., Feb. 16, 1996, at 11 ("It is not possible [for the EU] to go 
in all four cardinal directions at once" and predicting a "big bang in trade that will ential a big social 
crunch"). 
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reasons behind the EU external trade policies are many and complex, and 
the agreements with those few associated countries that enjoy the prospect 
of future accession to the EU are unique. Overall; however, the EU's entire 
network of external trade treaties manifests the Commission's policy of 
using free trade agreements as tools to promote market access for EU 
exporters. l7l This is equally, if not especially true, in the case of the 
CEECs.172 Thus, the mutual desire to increase bilateral trade may be viewed 
as a zero-sum game. 
The free trade provisions of the EAs illustrate this partially 
incompatible set of urges. At first, the EAs were touted for the asymmetric 
nature of their transitional provisions. On paper, the EAs require the EU to 
open up its market to imports from each EA country faster than the 
associated country must open up to imports from the EU.173 This paper 
sacrifice, however, masked a structural imbalance. The EA regime 
inherently favors the EU, since it provides for unlimited trade of industrial 
goods, which the EU tends to export. Simultaneously, the EAs restrict trade 
of sensitive goods, such as agricultural products, textiles, coal and steel, 
which EA countries wish to export to the EU!74 Thus, implementation of 
the EAs tended to be accompanied by a dramatic rise in EU exports to the 
EA countries, without an offsetting rise in EU imports from Central and 
Eastern Europe. I7s According to former Polish Prime Minister Olesky, "the 
The EC has also concluded customs union agreements with a very few countries, e.g. Malta and 
Turkey. See infra notes 192 and 194. In addition, it has concluded the Agreement of 2 May 1992 on 
the European Economic Area [hereinafter EEA Agreement) (current members of the EEA are Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway). 
Last but not least is the trend towards conclusion of interregional agreements. See, e.g.. 
Framework Cooperation Agreement Between the European Community and the Countries Party to the 
General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (Costa Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua) and Panama, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 
1.3.49; Interregional Agreement on Commercial and Economic Cooperation Between the European 
Community and MERCOSUR, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1995, point 1.4.111. 
171 Commission Market Access Strategy, supra note 160. 
m See, e.g., Barta & Richter, supra note I, at II (noting that "this real world trade asymmetry, 
accompanied by stubborn ongoing EU resistance to competing CEECs' exports ... combined with the 
relatively low level offoreign direct investment flowing into CEECs seem to indicate that the main 
interest of the EU lies in market expansion rather than in a long-term industrial cooperation"). 
173 See discussion in Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I at 187-189. Thus, the EAs 
are premised on the idea that "free access to western markets is one of the basic preconditions for 
vigorous and sustainable growth of the CEECs." Barta & Richter, supra note I, at 13. 
m See, e.g., Vachudova, supra note 127, at 47 ("Owing to the provisions of the [EAs), which 
protect sensitive sectors in the [EC), exports to the Visegrad group are [in 1993) growing faster than the 
group's exports to the [EC)"); Andrzej Skowronski, Bus. CENT. EUR., Dec. 1996, at 22 (according to 
a leading Polish industrialist, "[t)he opening of Western Europe to Central and East European companies 
... was theoretical rather than real. In some ways, Western Europe was more open before 1989 than 
afterwards. With the fall of communism, the ideal of broad co-operation and a common Europe without 
an East-West divide took a back seat to the priority oflimiting competition."). 
I7S In 1994 and 1995, the first six CEECs (i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia) "converted from being net exporters of agricultural products to net importers." 
Barta & Richter, supra note I, at 7. Further, "EU exports to [these] countries increased by I 02.8 percent 
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European Commission did not take into consideration our postulates to base 
commodity exchange on mutually beneficial terms. The Union is taking 
advantage of its economic potential .... "176 
2. The Aspirational Paradox 
The contradictions inherent in the aspirations of theEU and EA 
countries exist at two different levels. The first level of inquiry is whether 
East-West union is truly a shared goal. Second, even if that goal is a shared 
one, there are incongruent notions as to when and why union should occur. 
As for the mutuality of the goal itself, much was made early on in 
the association process of the fact that the EAs themselves merely 
acknowledged that membership was the ultimate goal of the associated 
countries.177 This glaring imbalance was formally rectified in June 1993, 
when the Copenhagen European Council established "the objectives of 
membership" and affirmed that "the associated countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members" of the EU. 178 All EA 
countries have formally applied for membership since 1993. In particular 
during 1990-1993, [while EU] imports in fact declined by 8 percent." Id. The EO's balance of trade with 
these countries went from a deficit of nearly 1 billion ECU in 1990, to a surplus of 451 million in 1993. 
Id. From the CEEC perspective, "total imports from the EU increased by 114 percent during 1990-
1993, while total exports ... to the EU increased by 55 percent during the same period. While the 
expansion of EU imports was substantially promoted by rather liberal trade regimes in the CEECs, the 
similar expansion of CEECs' exports was effectively undermined by maintenance of import barriers, 
especially in case of'sensitive' items which constitute the main 'hope' of CEECs' export industries." Id. 
at 11. See also HUNG. REp., supra note 41, No. 1.02, April 9, 1995 (Hungarian and Polish agricultural 
ministers attack EU protectionism); Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Eastern Enlargement - What Economics Can 
Tell Us at 2 (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (Polish agricultural trade with EU went 
from $861 million surplus in 1990 to $111 million deficit in 1995, "due mostly to the decrease in Polish 
exports to the EU, despite the presumed asymmetry stipulated" by the EA); Skowronski, supra note 174 
("sudden and one-sided opening of the Polish economy and market to foreign competition"); RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, May 6,1997 (Slovak Agriculture Minister Baco called EU agricultural trade 
policy towards EA countries "shameful"). 
Other factors contributed to these negative trade results, including the post-1989 shopping spree 
mentality in Central and Eastern Europe. See, e.g., Robert Frank, Poland's Trade Gap Widens, Fed by 
Buying Frenzy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1997, at A18. However, the structural imbalance has persisted, 
even after the reckless optimism faded. But see RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, Dcc. 11, 1997 
(Hungary achieved "unprecedented" trade surplus with EU during first ten months of 1997). 
176 Statement of Prime Minister Olesky, Polish Government Website, 
<http://plwww.fuw.edu.pl/englcategory/government> [hereinafter Polish Gov't Website]. 
177 The preamble of each EA acknowledges that "the final objective [of each associated country] 
is to become a member of the Community." See also BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1992, point 1.4.6 
Goint statement issued at the close of the first official meeting of the foreign ministers of the EC and 
Visegrfld countries "stating their belief that the [EAs] would help the Visegrfld countries to attain their 
ultimate goal"). The Visegrfld countries bemoaned the EO's apparent lack of reciprocity vis-a-vis this 
goal in the early 1990s. See generally Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note 1, at 199. 
178 Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31, at point 1.13.· The Commission 
Communication on Closer Association, supra note 29, recommended that the European Council" ... 
confirm that it accepts the goal of eventual membership in the [EU] for the [CEECs] when they are able 
to satisfy the conditions required." 
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the Structured Dialogue,179 Pre-accession Strategy,80 and CEEC White 
Paper181 manifest the EU's ongoing commitment to this goal. 
At this point in time, there is fonnal agreement -- at least at the 
governmentallevel-- that East-West union is a shared goal. 182 There is also 
a perception that some of the EA countries will in fact become members 
after the year 2000. 183 Yet once more, the apparent congruities mask deep 
179 See infra text accompanying notes 257-63. 
ISO See supra note 29. 
181 Id. 
182 The seventh issue of Eurobarometer devoted to opinions in the Central and Eastern European 
countries shows inter alia that de«ision-makers and opinion formers have a more positive image about 
the EU than ordinary citizens (80% vs. 49%), and also place higher value on the state of EU relations 
with their country (78% vs. 37%). Romania (80%) and Poland (70%) place the highest value on EU 
membership, and also have the most positive image of the EU (65% and 58% respectively). "The image 
of the EU has improved [vis-a-vis earlier Eurobarometer polls] in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, 
declined in the Czech Republic, and is stable in Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia." Eurobarometer, in 
TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 107, Apr. 15, 1997. On the whole, this issue of Eurobarometer "shows that 
people have revised their thoughts in the past year." EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (May/June 1997). 
In the Baltic States there has been a Significant drop in the number of citizens who would vote for EU 
membership. Id. See also OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 28, 1997 (poll of Hungarian agricultural workers 
shows drop of support for EU accession from 40% to 12%). 
Compare EUROPlNION Results, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 106, Apr. 1, 1997 (surveys ofEU 
citizens reveal that "61% of the respondents believe that EU enlargement would be a good thing - 76% 
in Greece, 75% in Italy, 71% in Ireland and 69% in the Netherlands. However, despite their 
governments' support for enlargement, this percentage is only 57% in Germany, 55% in the United 
Kingdom and 51 % in Austria. "). These same surveys also reveal that "the number of [EU citizens] who 
regard EU membership as a 'good thing' fell in the last few months of 1996 to reach an all-time low of 
55%." Id. 
183 There has been considerable dispute over whether the EA countries would all commence 
accession negotiations at the same time, or whether some would manage to leap ahead )f others. See 
infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text. Initial estimates of accession by the year 2000 have 
gradually been revised. See, e.g., Lionel Barber, Brussels Sees East European Nations in EU from 
2002, FIN. TIMES, June 17, 1996; HUNG. REp., supra note 41, No. 2.15, Sept. 30, 1996 (head of 
Hungarian Foreign Minister'S secretariat for integration affairs Somogyi said "negotiations could be 
wound up around 2000, followed by a ratification period of one or two years, so Hungary cannot expect 
full membership before 2000"); REUTERS Week, WARSAW Bus. 1., Sept. 16-22, 1996, at 1 
(Commission spokesman said "[r]ealistically it cannot take place sooner than 2002"). See also Of Hype 
and Halos, Bus. CENT. EUR., Feb. 199~, at 37 (Poland's "goal of EU membership - set, rather 
optimistically, for 2000"); Long Sprint, Bus. CENT. EUR., Feb. 1997, at 38 ("by 2002 a real possibility"). 
Slovakia has been continually criticized for lack of democratic reforms, and its eligibility to begin 
accession negotiations has been called repeatedly into question. In one incident, a Slovak official 
reacted angrily to a statement by the Polish President (made during a visit to Hungary) that Slovakia 
would "gain EU membership later than the other VisegrM countries because of its domestic political 
situation." OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 21, 1996. According to the Slovak spokesman, Slovakia could 
join at the same time as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; Slovakia "does not consider the 
process of integration into EU structures as a race" and "does not ... publicly evaluate difficulties its 
neighbors are experiencing in the transformation process." Id. Slovakia's isolation has continued to 
grow. Commissioner van den Brook reassured Slovakia that its "enormous economic potential" would 
make it a "front-runner among the candidates for accession, on condition that it also meets the political 
and democratic criteria," Association Councils, supra note 136, but also warned Slovakia that it must 
send out "positive signals" and take "practical steps" if it wanted to be invited to expansion talks 
expected to be decided by the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, May 30, 1997. In June 1997, EP deputies "warned that Slovakia stood little chance of 
joining the EU," RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 18, 1997, and insisted that it "must implement 
specific changes in domestic policy" by November or be excluded when accession negotiations begin 
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divisions over the prospects for enlargement of the EU. The discrepancy, 
which first manifested itself as a disagreement over timing, reflects a 
fundamental difference of opinion as to the rationale for enlargement. The 
EU tends to hold out the prospect of membership as a reward for successful 
transition, whereas the EA countries view membership as the key to 
successful transition. 184 In other words, the EU says that the EA countries 
may join when they are ready to be full members, I8S while the EA countries 
consider full membership necessary in order to achieve that readiness. This 
dilemma epitomizes the true distance between East and West. 186 
The EA countries have pushed consistently for a firm commitment 
from the EU as to when accession negotiations would begin. 18? The EU, for 
its part, made clear that no enlargement would be undertaken until after 
conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).188 Ultimately, the 
with other EA countries. RFE/RL NEWSLlNE, supra note 41, June 19, 1997. A Slovak representative 
responded that political tension in the country "is typical of any country before e!ectior.s" (scheduled 
for September 1997), RFE/RL NEWSLlNE, supra note 41. June 17,1997, while Slovak Prime Minister 
Meciar acknowledged that his'country's accession to the EU would be "postponed," as was its entry to 
NATO. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, July 3, 1997. The Commission did not recommend 
commencing accession negotiations with Slovakia. See infra note 206. "The Slovak parliament 
unanimously adopted a declaration that the current political troubles were of a 'temporary nature' and 
that Slovakia would take all necessary measures to remedy this .... Then, the Government published 
a 'non-paper' calling for accession negotiations to begin simultaneously with all [CEEC] candidates." 
AOENCE EUR., Oct. 24, 1997, at 4. 
1M. From the standpoint of the EA countries, the economic reasons for seeking membership 
include: increased exports to EC (via free access for both industrial and agricultural goods, elimination 
of anti-dumping rules and safeguard measures against CEEC products, and decreased transaction costs 
due to elimination of formalities); increased inward investment (i.e. since CEECs would be more 
attractive owing to enhanced access to EC market); and net transfers of funds (e.g. from CAP & 
structural funds). Barta & Richter, supra note I, at 18-20. 
IRS Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31. 
1M" Kennedy, supra note I, at 379 (this is the "darker side" to enlargement "in which relaxation 
of West em hesitance about allowing the East 'in' seems only possible once the conditions of chronic 
inequality have been stablized"). 
,"7 This started with the Visegrad Memorandum, supra note 130, and continued unabated until the 
decision was taken. A variety of reasons have been given for this obsession with fixing the time 
schedule. Certainly it would be useful inasmuch as it would provide "a clear signal and a visible target" 
for the applicant countries. Barta & Richter, supra note I, at 15. This was especially acute during the 
early years of transition, when applicant countries were in the early stages of painful economic 
restructuring, and when CEEC governments had more urgent need to justify their policies to their 
electorates, but is still a sensitive issue among the EA countries. Compare Nathaniel Nash, Europe 
Group Sets Timetable For Nations Seeking Entry, N.Y. TIMES, Oec.l7, 1995, at 4 ("Eastern European 
leaders had asked for a commitment on timing so that they could go back and tell their constituents that 
the austerity measures many had instituted had not been in vain. "); with Statement by Polish Prime 
Minister Cimoszewicz, Polish Prime Minister in Brussels, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 104, Mar. I, 1997 
(expressing confidence that the Commission's opinion on Polish accession will "give us good marks" 
for the country's political, legal and economic reforms). 
1M" The IGC was convened in March 1996 to review progress under the (Maastricht) Treaty on 
European Union and to propose further changes to the EU, including whatever changes might be needed 
in order to enable enlargement to proceed. The Reflection Group charged with preparing the IGC first 
met in Taormina on June 3, 1995. AOENCE EUR., June 2, 1995, at 2. See Final Report of the Reflection 
Group Set Up to Prepare for the IGC, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1995, points 1.97-.111 and 
\.9.2; Commission Opinion on Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement, reported 
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EA countries managed to extract a series of promises that accession 
negotiations would begin within a certain period oftime after conclusion of 
the IGC. 189 However, these commitments turned out to be moving targets, 
in part because the IGC was not concluded on schedule,I90 and in part 
because the EU repeatedly postponed the commencement of enlargement 
negotiations. 191 The EU also had prior commitments to other non-CEEC 
in BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, points 1.1 and 2.2.1 [hereinafter Commission Opinion on Political 
Union and Enlargement] (Commission argues that the EU cannot commit itself to enlargement without. 
making sure that changes are first made to the ways and means of its operation and emphasizes the 
importance of: bringing Europe closer to its citizens, making Europe's presence felt in the world, and 
adopting an institutional system whi<:h will work well in an expanded Europe). 
The lOG -- "dubbed 'Maastricht Two' by no less a fervent federalist than German Chancellor .. 
. Kohl . . . floundered throughout its 14 months of existence, making no perceptible substantial 
progress." Joel Blocker, EU: Tomorrow's [NoordwijkJ Summit Critical For Eastward Expansion, 
ARMENIAN NEWS NETWORK, (May 22,1997) <groong@usc.edu> [hereinafter Blocker]. The IGC was 
concluded at the European Council's Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. See Conclusions of the 
Presidency (Amsterdam European Council, June 1997), reprinted in BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1997, 
points 1.1-.31 [hereinafter Amsterdam Summit Conclusions]. 
189 "Clashes about the timing of the next wave of enlargement have taken on something of a ritual 
nature." Enlargement: The Timing is What Matters, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 102, Feb. 1, 1997. 
Against the Commission's recommendation "that it would be premature at this stage to set a timetable 
for accession or for the beginning of negotiations," Enlargement Interim Report, supra note 29, the 
European Council at its Madrid Summit promised to start enlargement negotiations for Cyprus and 
Malta six months after the end of the IGC. Conclusions of the Presidency (Madrid European Council, 
December 1995), reprinted in BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1995, points 1.1-.102, at point 1.25 [hereinafter 
Madrid Summit Conclusions]. See also Conclusions of the Presidency (Florence European Council, 
June 1996), reprinted in BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1996, Points I. I -.37, at point 1.9 (urging Commission 
to produce needed reports so that "the initial phase of negotiations with [CEECs] can coincide with the 
beginning of negotiations with Cyprus and Malta ... "). Seeforther Nash, supra note 187 (the "IS 
leaders agreed to begin formal negotiations ... by the end of 1997"). This timetable was repeatedly 
confirmed. See, e.g., Statement by Commission President Jacques Santer, AGENCE EUR., Jan., 24, 1996, 
at II (Commission will present its opinion on all applications for membership shortly after completion 
of the IGC, and negotiations can begin six 6 months thereafter); Standing Conference on Enlargement, 
in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 106, Apr. I, 1997 [hereinafter Standing Conference on Enlargement] (EU 
foreign affairs ministers, meeting in Apeldoom in March 1997, reiterated their intention to stick to this 
scenario). 
190 The European Council should have wrapped up the IGC at its Dec. 1996 Dublin Summit, 
according to the timeframe set by the TEU. However, the Dublin Summit was preoccupied with 
problems surrounding monetary union; its major accomplishment was to reach agreement on the main 
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Conclusions of the Presidency (Dublin European Council, 
December 1996), reprinted in BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1996, points 1.1-.38 [hereinafter 1996 Dublin 
Summit Conclusions]. See also Summit Marks Peaks and Troughs, EIS EURO-EAST REp., supra note 
57, Dec.lO, 1996 (noting that for the EA countries, "the most urgent matter is progress with the 
accession strategy, and the signals on this are stiIl not encouraging. Delay and uncertainty continue to 
dog the [IGC], which should produce the master-design for the new [EU] into which new members can 
merge"). Thus, conclusion of the IGC was postponed until the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. See 
Amsterdam Summit Conclusions, supra note 188 ("The European Council meeting in Amsterdam on 
16 and 17 June 1997 successfully concluded the IGC with full agreement on a draft Treaty. This opens 
the way for the launching of the enlargement process in accordance with the conclusions of the Madrid 
European Council."). 
191 Promises made to the EA countries regarding the timetable for accession negotiations have 
been inconsistent over time. Original predictions (i.e. within 6 months after conclusion of the IGC) 
were subsequently revised; see Statement by Commission President Santer, OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 
5, 1996 (negotiations "could begin in early 1998"); OMRI, supra note 13, June 18, 1997 ("Poland is 
receiving signals that accession talks may not begin until April or May 1998" and not in "January as 
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applicants -- Turkey,192 Cyprus,193 and Maltal94 -- each of which had applied 
originally scheduled"). 
192 Turkey has been associated with the Community since the effective date of the EEC-Turkey 
Association Agreement. 1964 0.1. (L 217). It applied for accession on Apr. 14, 1987, but has been 
"given to understand that its membership is in the distant future." Enlargement Outlook, in TOGETHER 
IN EUR., No. 107, Apr. 15, 1997 [hereinafter Enlargement Outlook]. The Commission gave a negative 
opinion on Turkish accession in 1989. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1989, point 2.2.37. In the 
meantime, Turkey expressed "fear that relations between the Community and the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe might develop to the detriment of Turkey," and urged conclusion of a customs 
union with the EC. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1993, point 1.3.20. The EC-Turkey Association 
Council agreed on March 6,1995, to finalize the customs union between the EC and Turkey. BULL. 
EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.65. The EC-Turkey Customs Union Agreement was approved by the 
European Parliament on Dec. 13, 1995. OMRI, supra note 13, Dec. 13, 1995. It entered into effect on 
January 1, 1996. See Decision No. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of22 December 1995 
on Implementing the Final Phase of the Customs Union, 19960.1. (L 35) 1. See also Decision No. 
2197 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 4 June 1997 Establishing the List of Community 
Instruments Relating to the Removal of Technical Barriers to Trade and the Conditions and 
Arrangement Governing their Implementation by Turkey, 1997 OJ. (L 191) 1. A free trade agreement 
for products covered by the ECSC Treaty (which products are not covered by the Customs Union 
Agreement) was concluded on July 25,1996, and entered into effect on Aug. 1, 1996. BULL. EUR. 
UNION, July-Aug. 1996, point 1.4.101. Unhappy with its marginal position, Turkey threatened to block 
NATO enlargement plans unless the EU began to take its application to join seriously. EUR. DIALOGUE, 
supra note 41 (May/June 1997). See also ECOSOC Opinion on Enlargement, supra note 29 
(recommending a "stepping-up of dialogue with the aim of ensuring that human rights were recognized 
irrevocably ... , that a constitutional and democratic State was set up once and for all and dlat economic 
development was speeded up"). The EP has expressed ongoing concern with human rights violations 
in Turkey. See, e.g., Resolution of22 April 1993 on the Problem ofthe Kurds in Turkey, 19930.1. 
(C 150) 262; Resolution of IS July 1993 on the PKK Terrorist Campaign, 19930.1. (C 255) 148; 
Resolution of 16 February 1995 on the Draft Agreement on the Conclusion of a Customs Union 
Between the EU and Turkey, 1995 OJ. (C 56) 99. 
193 Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Community and the Republic 
of Cyprus, 1973 OJ. (L 133) 2, as last amended by the Protocol on the Implementation of the Second 
[Customs Union] Stage of That Agreement, 1987 OJ. (L 393) 2. Cyprus applied for accession to the 
Community on July 3, 1990. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1990, point 1.4.24. See Commission 
Opinion on Cyprus's Application for Membership, COM(93)313 final, reported in BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, June 1993, point 1.3.6 [hereinafter Commission Opinion on Cyprus]; Council 
Conclusions of 19 July 1993 on the Commission Opinions on the Applications for Membership by 
Cyprus and Malta, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.2; Council 
Conclusions of 4 October 1993 on the Commission Opinion on the Cypriot and Maltese Applications 
for Accession, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1993, point 1.3.7 (the Council "invited the 
Commission to open substantive discussions with the Government of Cyprus to help it to prepare for 
the accession negotiations, which would then follow under the best possible conditions"); Council 
Conclusions of 6 March 1995, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.60a (agreeing on 
the general policy framework for the development of relations with Cyprus); EP Resolution of 12 July 
1995 on Cyprus's Application for Membership of the EU, 19950.1. (C 249) 74. See also ECOSOC 
Opinion on Enlargement, supra note 29 (noting that "the problem posed by the partition of its territory 
should first be resolved"); AGENCE EUR., June 14, 1995, at 9; Protocol of Financial and Technical 
Cooperation Between the European Community and the Republic of Cyprus, 1995 OJ. (L 278) 23. 
During the June 1995 meeting of the Association Council, the EU extended the Structured Dialogue and 
Pre-accession Strategy format to Cyprus. BULL. EUR. UNION, J!Jne 1995, point 1.4.70; AGENCE EUR., 
June 12-13, 1995, at 6. See also Council Decision of 17 July 1995 on Detailed Procedures for the 
Structured Dialogue Between the EU and Cyprus, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 
1.4.72; Ministerial Meeting of 18 October 1995, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, !"oint 1.4.72 
(Commissioner Monti suggested that the CEEC White Paper, supra note 29, "could ... provide a useful 
point of departure for Cyprus"). Ultimately, the Commission did not recommend commencement of 
accession negotiations with Turkey, AGENCE EUR, July 12, 1997, at 4, although Turkey is still deemed 
eligible, despite concerns over "macroeconomic instability" and the need for "major improvements in 
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for accession ahead of the CEEC countries. At one time it appeared that the 
EU might make the CEEC applicant countries wait until after conclusion of 
accession negotiations with these prior applicants, but this danger has 
faded. 195 
Within this timing debate lurked the even more troubling dilemma: 
Should the EU conduct accession negotiations with all applicant countries 
in parallel,196 or single some out for earlier negotiations? Hungary, 
the political situation .... " AGENCE EUR., July 17, 1997, at 4. See Commission Communication to the 
Council and EP on the Further Development of Relations with Turkey, COM(97)394 final. 
194 Agreement Establishing an Association Between the EEC and Malta, 1~71 OJ. (L oi) 1. Malta 
applied for accession to the EU on July 16, 1990. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1990, point 
1.4.25. See Commission Opinion on Malta's Application for Membership, COM(93)312 final, reported 
in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, June 1993, point 1.3.7 [hereinafter Commission Opinion on Malta]; 
Council Conclusions of 19 July 1993 on the Commission Opinions on the Applications for Membership 
by Cyprus and Malta, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.2; Council 
Conclusions of 4 October 1993 on the Commission Opinion on the Cypriot and Maltese Applications 
for Accession, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1993, point 1.3.8 (the Council "supported 
the Commission's approach, which was to propose to use all the instruments offered by the Association 
Agreement to help implement the structural reforms vital for the transition of Malta's economy towards 
integration into the European Union" and "invited the Commission to open an in-depth dialogue 
forthwith with the Maltese Government so as to define by common agreement the content of, and 
timetable for, the priority reforms to be implemented"); Commission Report of 1 March 1995 to the 
Council on the Implementation of Economic Reforms in Malta with a View to Reviewing Malta's 
Application for Accession to the European Union, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 
1.4.63 [hereinafter Commission Report on Malta]; Council Conclusions of 10 April 1995 on Malta, 
reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1995, point 1.4.72; EP Resolution of 12 July 1995 on Malta's 
Application for Membership of the EU, 1995 OJ. (C 249) 17. See also ECOSOC Opinion on 
Enlargement, supra note 29 (observing that "Malta's membership did not pose any serious problems, 
provided that institutional changes were brought about so as to take into account the need to balance 
the representation of Member States"); AGENCE EUR., June 14, 1995, at 9; Protocol of Financial and 
Technical Cooperation between the European Community and Malta, 1995 OJ. (L 278) 14. During the 
June 1995 meeting of the Association Council, the EU extended the Structured Dialogue and Pre-
accession Strategy format to Malta. BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.72; Agence Eur., June 12-
13, 1995, at 6. See also Council Decision of 17 July 1995 on the Detailed Procedures for the Structured 
Dialogue between the EU and Malta, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, July-Aug. 1995, point 1.4.75. 
Malta withdrew its application to accede to the EU in Nov. 1996. BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1996, point 
1.4.79. The Council accordingly suspended the Structural Dialogue and Pre-accession Strategy. Id. 
See generally Speech by Maltese Minister Vella to the EU-Malta Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Environment 
<http://www.medac.comnet.mtlmfanetlgvellaleu-malta.htrn>. 
195 Negotiations with Cyprus and Malta were scheduled to commence six months after conclusion 
of the IGC. See, e.g., Statement by General Affairs Council on 6 March 1995, reported in BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.60a; BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.68 (Cannes European 
Council "confirmed that negotiations on the accession of Cyprus and Malta would begin six months 
after the conclusion of the 1996 [lGC]"). Negotiations with Malta were expected to proceed smoothly. 
AGENCE EUR., Feb. 10, 1996, at 2 (Malta'S Prime Minister stated that Malta's waiting period has lasted 
long enough and that the accession negotiations "should not last more than six months ... [since] Malta 
already fulfills the accession conditions. "). Negotiations with Cyprus on the other hand, were more 
likely to encounter delays, since the political tensions there "continue to make it an emotive and 
controversial subject." EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (July/August 1997). However, "on a purely 
technical basis [Cyprus] has for the most part been accepted already." Id. 
196 Enlargement Outlook, supra note 192 ("All that is clear so far about the structure of the 
negotiations is that formally and juridically there will be eleven negotiations conducted in parallel."). 
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consistent with its perennial fear of being held back by its slower neighbors, 
continued to remind the EO that accession should be a bilateral and not a 
multilateral process. 197 The EO, for its part, attempted to tread r.arefully 
around this sensitive issue. However, its statements were inconsistent198 
and, in the end, its actions divisive. 
Debate on this issue intensified during the period right before the 
Commission was due to present its opinions (avis) assessing the readiness 
of each of the current applicants. 199 Among' the alternatives, the 
Commission focused on three: "proposing that negotiations open at the same 
time with all applicant countries, it being understood that they would then 
be held according to different timetables;" "proposing that negotiations open 
first with three countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) and in a second 
phase with Estonia and Slovenia;" and opening "negotiations at the same 
time with the five CEEC countries mentioned and with CypruS."200 
Regardless of the starting point, it has not been seriously contested that 
negotiations will proceed at different speeds, and thus that countries which 
commence accession talks at the same time will not necessarily conclude 
them at the same time.201 
197 See, e.g., Statement of Hungarian Minister Juhasz, AGENCE EUR., Feb. 5-6, 1996, at 14 ("I will 
place speed ahead of solidarity."). 
198 Compare Statement of Council President van Mierlo and Commission President Santer in 
Apeldoorn in March 1997, Standing Conference on Enlargement, supra note 189 (admitting that 
"enlargement negotiations would probably begin with some countries before others" and noting that the 
"Council will decide with which countries to start negotiations once it has received the Commission's 
opinions on the applicant countries and on the enlargement impact on Union's policies"), with Statement 
by EP Vice-President Hoff, EP President Meets CEEC Counterparts, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No.1 OS, 
Mar. 15, 1997 (it is "an accepted fact" that enlargement negotiations would begin "at the same time with 
all CEECs"); Statement by Commission President Santer, OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 9, 1996 (he 
considers it more likely that CEECs will be admitted to the EU one by one rather than in groups, as has 
been the past practice); van den Broek in Lithuania and Latvia, in TOOETHERIN EUR., No. 107, Apr. IS, 
1997 [hereinafter van den Broek Statement] (noting that each application is being analyzed on "an equal 
and entirely objective basis, strictly on [its] own merits" and that it is "virtually excluded ... that all 
applicants for membership will actually join the Union on the same 4ate, once the process of negotiation 
and ratification is over"). 
199 Enlargemeni Outlook, supra note 192. The opinions - like those already prepared for Cyprus, 
supra note 193, and Malta, supra note 194 -- must consider both the applicant country's economic and 
political situation. [d. Commission President Santer stated that the Commission will "differentiate its 
opinions, which analyse the real situation and, therefore, be a sort of moment of truth. n Standing 
Conference on Enlargement, supra note 189. See also Commission Interim Report to the European 
Council on the Effects of Enlargement to the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe on 
the Policies of the EU, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.47; EP Resolution on 
Financing the Enlargement, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Dec. 1996, point 1.4.49. 
200 AGENCEEUR., July 12, 1997, at 4. Denmark, Greece and Sweden wanted to start negotiations 
with all candidates at the same time (barring Slovakia), AGENCE EUR., Oct. 24, 1997, at 2, as did some 
of the countries that feared being left behind, AGENCE EUR., July 25, 1997, at 10. Latvia, for example, 
urged taking a "common starting line as a basis" then introducing differentiation in the process of 
negotiations" in order to "ensure [a] fair approach towards all candidate states." [d. 
201 See, e.g., Enlargement Interim Report, supra note 29 (Commission "stresses that countries will 
accede on an individual basis in the light of their economic and political preparedness and on the basis 
of the Commission's opinion on each application."). 
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The Commission presented its long-awaited opinions202and its 
"Agenda 2000" report203 to the Council and the EP on 16 July 1~'. 
Emphasizing the "neutral and objective criteria" laid down by the European 
Council at its Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the Commission recommended 
that accession negotiations commence in early 1998 with Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia/os but not with Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia,206 or Turkey, despite the negative 
ramifications of such a decision.207 The EU has "promised" that these 
countries "can move to the 'fast-track' for prospective new members ifthey 
make sufficient progress in economic and political reform."208 
Commissioner van den Broek observed that the "detailed and 
objective analysis leaves no doubt that there is a natural differentiation 
among the applicants for a variety of historical, political and economic 
reasons," and stressed ethat "differentiation in no sense means 
discrimination."209 Indeed, he has been at pains to emphasiz~ that "all . 
applicants are assured of membership" and that "it is not a question of if, but 
202 Commission Opinion on the Applications of Hungary, COM(97)2001 final; Poland, 
COM(97)2002 final; Romania, COM(97)2003 final; Slovakia, COM(97)2004 final; Latvia, COM(97) 
2005 final; Estonia, COM(97)2006 final; Lithuania, COM(97)2007 final; Bulgaria, COM(97)2008 final; 
the Czech Republic, COM(97)2009 final; and Slovenia COM(97)2010 final. 
203 Supra note 29. Agenda 2000 presents not only the. Commission's recommendations on 
enlargement, but also its study of the impact of enlargement on the EU.ld See a/so AGENCE EUR., July 
18, 1997, at 4 (describing the "Santer package" in some detail). 
204 AGENCE EUR., July 17, 1997, at 3 (Commission concludes that it is possible to envisage 
opening accession negotiations with five countries). 
20S See id at 9. See also Delia Meth-Cohen, Code Busting, Bus. CENT. EUR., Sept. 1997, at 20. 
206 Slovakia was excluded on political grounds "for its lack of democratic reforms." RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, July 17, 1997. See also AGENCE EUR., July 18, 1997, at 8 (van den Broek 
asserted that there can be no compromise in respect to the need for "pOlitical institutions [guaranteeing] 
respect of democratic principles, the rule of law and minority rights."). Regarding Bulgaria and 
Romania, Commissioner van den Broek stated that they "still have to make progress on the road to 
reform" since reforms in both countries "were launched only after their present governments came to 
power." RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, Dec. 8, 1997. He added that "citizens in the two countries 
should not blame the EU for their 'own pOlitical and economic past'." Id. Lithuania was excluded 
mainly on economic grounds, while Latvia was excluded for both political and economic reasons. 
AGENCEEUR., July 18, 1997, at 9. For a summary of the Commission's reasons for not recommending 
commencement of accession negotiations with these countries, see id. at 9-10. 
207 For example, a report by the Centre for European Policy Studies noted that "beginning 
negotiations with certain countries first would not only "cause considerable problems" LUL would also 
"be crass." AGENCE EUR., Feb. 5·6, 1996, at 13·14. See also Waitingfor Brussels, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
16, 1997, at 9 (noting that "the process of discrimination between membership candidates has been 
clumsily handled" and suggesting that "[i]f anything," those in the second wave "should get positive 
discrimination in the allocation of assistance."). 
208 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Dec. 15, 1997. 
209 AGENCEEuR., July 17, 1997, at 4. See also AGENCEEuR., July 16, 1997, at 3 (Hungarian Prime 
Minister and EU President Juncker "stressed that the principle of differentiation would be at the basis 
of negotiations, not only when they opened but also for their conclusion"); AGENCE EUR., Oct. 23, 1997, 
at 4 (EU President luncker confirmed that "[t]here will be 'group negotiations' as the 'CEECs do not 
form a group,' but they are independent and proud, and to consider them as part of a group would be 
to fall back into the Soviet logic."). 
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when."210 
There was some speculation that the Luxembourg European 
Council, held in December 1997, might disregard the Commission's 
recommendations and decide to open negotiations simultaneously with all 
applicant countries "as [a] political act."211 However, the European Council 
"decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in the spring 
of 1998 to begin negotiations with" the six countries recommended by the 
Commission.212 In an effort to soften the blow to the countries not placed 
on the fast track, the European Council decided to implement a French 
suggestion to "set up a European Conference which will bring together the 
Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to 
accede to it."213 Thus, enlargement will technically commence for all 
applicant countries at the first meeting of the European Conference in 
London on 12 March 1998,214 but only Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia actually began negotiations in Brussels on 31 
March 1998.215 
An enhanced Pre-accession Strategy involving "accession 
partnerships" and "increased pre-accession aid" has been created, which will 
"mobilize all forms of assistance to the applicant countries ... within a 
central framework."216 
The dispute over commencement of accession negotiations has been 
210 AGENCE EUR., June 6, 1997, at 9. 
211 AGENCE EUR., July 12, 1997, at S. See also AGENCE EUR., July 25, 1997, at 10 (Lithuania 
complained that the Commission's recommendations were "subjective, unjustified and politically 
motivated" and based on outdated or inaccurate data). 
212 Conclusions of the Presidency (Luxembourg European Council, Dec. 1997) EU-rr':'3idency Site 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.uepres.etat.luluepres/textes/conseil/13dec003eng.htm> 
[hereinafter Luxembourg Summit Conclusions], at point 27. 
213 Id., at point 4. In an apparent effort to address the likely fallout of non-simultaneous 
commencement of accession negotiations, the French suggested setting up a standing conference on 
enlargement "which would meet once a year at the summit level and more often at different levels (of 
the ministers or of officials), in which would gather all EU member states and all the applicant 
countries, independently of the timing of their negotiations with the Union." EP President Meets CEEC 
Counterparts in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 105, Mar. IS, 1997. The purpose, according to Council 
President von Mierlo, "is to give all applicant countries the feeling that they are eligible to become EU 
members, whether it will be in the short or longer term." Id. France's proposal was endorsed by the 
Commission, see AGENCE EUR., July 17, 1997, at 2, and discussed by the General Affairs Council in 
Mondorfin Oct. 1997. AGENCE EUR., Oct. 27-28,1997, at 2 (participants in favor of this suggestion 
"observed that by first convening [the European] Conference open to all, the European Union could 
better convince all candidate countries that they are really included in the process"). 
214 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Jan. 27, 1998. Eleven countries attended this European 
Conference, but Turkey boycotted it. Stuart Parrot, East-Central Europeans, But Not Turkey, Meet in 
London, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Mar. 12, 1998. 
mId. See Joel Blocker, Six Nations Begin Enlargement Talks, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, 
Mar. 31,1998 (ceremonial opening ofEU "expansion process"); Joel Blocker, EU Begins Expansion 
Talks With Six Countries, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Mar. 31, 1998. 
216 Luxembourg Summit Conclusions, supra note 212, at point 13. See generally id. at points 13-
30; Agenda 2000, supra note 29; AGENCE EUR., July 11, 1997, at 4. See also COM(97) 112 final (new 
guidelines for pre-accession PHARE assistance). 
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resolved, at least for those countries placed on the fast-track. Attention has 
now shifted onto substantive issues,where seriou.s obstacles remain. 
Developments surrounding the IGC lent force to the perception that 
the EU was trying to slip the noose of its commitment to enlargement.217 In 
particular, the IGC failed to undertake the institutional reforms and policy 
changes21S that are generally considered the preconditions to the next wave 
of enlargement.219 While the desire to delay the enlargement process was 
surely not the sole, or even a principal reason for deferring institutional and 
other policy reform, some perceived the lack of political will to embrace the 
217 See, e.g., Commission Enlargement Report, 'supra note 31, at 9-10 ("integration of [the] new 
democracies into the European family presents a historic opportunity ... ; [the EC] has never been a 
closed club, and cannot now refuse the historic challenge to assume its continental responsibil ities and 
contribute to the development of a political and economic order for the whole of Europe."); Essen 
Summit Conclusions, supra note 29; Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31. 
218 See also EP Resolution of 17 November 1993 on the Negotiations Concerning Enlargement 
of the Union to Include Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway, 1993 OJ. (C 329) 146 (expressing the 
view that "enlargement should coincide with institutional reforms" and calling for "the opening of an 
interinstitutional dialogue on the changes needed to increase the effectiven;:s~ of the UHivll'S stra,egy 
as a whole, including improvements to the system of qualified majority voting, recourse to a double 
qualified majority instead of unanimity, revision of the arrangements for the composition, appointment 
and supervision of the Commission and strengthening the powers of its President, provision for an 
automatic presidency rotation system and more flexible procedures for revising the treaties" and for 
further "democratizing the Union by extending procedures for joint decision-making and cooperation 
and making use as often as possible of qualified majority voting when adopting common foreign and 
security policy decisions"); AGENCE EUR., June 13, 1997, at 5 (EP confirmed that "there could be no 
EU enlargement negotiations as long as the institutions had not been reformed"); Blocker, supra note 
188 ("key reforms include the future size of the ... Commission, re-weighting of members' votes among 
small and large states, and the extension of majority voting to such sensitive areas as common foreign 
and security policy"); The Intergovernmental Conference Starts Dealing with the Difficult Issue of 
Institutions, in TOGETHER IN EUR.;No. 105, Mar. IS, 1997. For a general discussion of the negotiations 
on "the most divisive institutional issues" in the context of the IGC, see On Commissioners and 
Weighted Voting, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 107, Apr. 15, 1997. 
As for how the results of the IGC are likely to affect the enlargement process, see Kevin Done, 
Hopes for EU Growth by 2000 'Very Optimistic', FIN. TiMES,. Dec. 12, 1996, at 3 (report by U.N. 
Economic Commission for Europe wams that "[i]f the IGC fails to deal effectively with the big 
problems facing the Union, especially those affecting the process of decision-making and the 
effectiveness of the present institutional structure" enlargement "could be postponed indefinitely"); 
Kirsty Hughes, The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and EU Enlargement, 72INT'LAFFAIRS 1,4 
(Jan. 1996) (the IGC "will not ... address these major strategic issues, which leaves questions about 
when or how they will be addressed unanswered."). (Danish representative declared that Denmark's 
priority for the IGC is enlargement and that "the outcome of the IGC will have to be seen in the light 
of what it has accomplished on this, and not only at institutional level"). In anticipation of the 
December 1997 meeting of the European Council, Luxembourg Foreign Minister Poos declared his 
govemment's intention to "conduct an objective, non-<iiscriminatory study of documents on enlargement 
submitted by the Commission, so as to enable the Luxembo.urg European Council on 12 and 13 
December [1997] to launch the enlargement process." Id. 
219 But see RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 30, 1997 (EU promised "that the union's ... 
failure [in the IGC] to agree on institutional reforms will not affect its eastward expansion"; Dutch 
Premier Kok affirmed that "enlargement ... will not be slowed down by internal reform questions"); 
AGENCE EUR., Oct. 29, 1997, at 4-5 (French and German parliamentarians "regretted that the IGC had 
ended without the most essential reforms necessary for enlargement being decided, and ... added that, 
in their view, the institutional reforms are not a hindrance to enlargement; on the contrary, the prospects 
for enlargement must be the lever for deepening."). 
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EA countries as a drag on the IGC.22{) Notwithstanding the Commission's 
recommendation and the Luxembourg European Council's decision to 
commence accession negotiations with six applicant countries, the 
Commission has made it clear that there can be no enlargement before the 
"necessary institutional reforms have been carried OUt."221 The Commission 
has accordingly called for a new IGC in early 2000 to undertake the 
necessary "institutional reform (hardly begun in the Amsterdam Treaty)".222 
The accession criteria set at the Copenhagen Summit223 are: stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for the protection of minorities;224 a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union; and the applicant's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, i.e., the acquis communautaire, and adhere to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. 
The EA countries will certainly not have an easy time fulfilling the 
economic conditions for accession.22S But, the relatively amorphous 
political criteria are even more likely to prove stumbling blocks for the 
applicant countries. One "touchstone" principle that will be important in the 
context of CEEC enlargement is that applicants must accept the acquis 
communautaire in full, and that no permanent opt-outs are available.226 
Accession is thus a moving target in the substantive sense, as well as in the 
temporal sense described above: Internal EU developments create ever more 
220 The Polish Ambassador to the EU remarked, on the eve of the Cannes Summit in June 1995, 
that he was "not very optimistic" about the CEEC's prospects for accession because of "deterioration" 
in the general climate in the EU. In particular, he noted that preparation of the IGC led to the 
emergence of many problems and questions internal to the EU, which in tum caused the member states 
to be more reluctant to undertake eastern enlargement. AOENCE EUR., June 23, 1995, at 9. 
221 AOENCE EUR., June 28, 1997, at 10. Dutch Foreign Minister van Mierlo observed, in this 
regard, that "we still have a lot of time in which to resolve this." Id. 
222 AOENCE EUR., July 12, 1997, at 2. 
223 Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31. 
22' See Minority Views Sought for Enlargement, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 106, Apr. 1, 1997 
(Commissioner van den Broek asked OSCE High Commissioner for national minorities to provide an 
"assessment of each [applicant] country's level of protection for its national minorities"). 
22S Barta & Richter, supra note 1, at 14-16, have argued that more precise accession criteria are 
needed, particularly in the economic sphere. These authors provide an economic analysis of the 
enlargement process and prospects. They assert that the "low economic level of CEECs seems to be the 
major single obstacle in the process of their integration into the EU." Id. at 4. Hungarian National Bank 
Governor Suranyi has argued that CEECs seeking EU membership "should not be required to meet the 
Maastricht economic criteria immediately" since "inflation in the region will be much hig.~e! for at least 
five to ten years than what is required in the strict ... criteria"). OMRl, supra note 13, Nov. 8, 1996. 
But see Anthony Robinson, Dawn of a More Hopeful Era, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1996, at 1 (noting that 
the "EBRD is starting to talk seriously of the prospect of , Asian-style' growth rates spreading across the 
region from central Europe where they are already in sight"); Of Hype and Halos, supra note 183, at 
38 (noting that Poland "has had a budget deficit ofless than 3% ofGDP for the last three years, meeting 
the Maastricht criterion and putting to shame many of its Western European neighbours"). See also 
Long Sprint, supra note 183, at 39 (arguing that Poland "might be an economic case for early [EU] 
membership"). 
226 Preston, supra note 51, at 452-53. 
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"qualitative" barriers to full membership. For example, the move towards 
economic and monetary union227 and the growing emphasis on the Third 
Pillar (i.e. justice and home affairs) issues228 are certain to cause problems 
for Central and East European countries. 
Even more significant, in the context of applicant countries' ability 
to take on the obligations of membership, is the growing emphasis on the 
need for EA countries to undertake "special efforts ... to strengthen public 
administration and the judicial system. "229 The Commission (DGX) has 
described the problem as follows: 
Imagine being asked to build a state-of-the-art spacecraft 
using nothing more than a cheap screwdriver and a handful 
of nails. This is the scale of the task facing many of the 
[CEEC applicant countries which] need to put in place an 
efficient public administration system capable of coping 
with EU legislation ... All applicants have theoretical 
227 See, e.g., Commission Opinion on Political Union and Enlargement, supra note 188 
(commitments based on TEU "must be fully respected, particularly as regards the single currency"). 
228 This has become a major area of attention and concern, particularly in the wake of the TREATY 
OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 31, which calls for the progressive establishment of an area of freedom, 
security and justice. When effective, the Treaty of Amsterdam will amend Article B of the TEU, which 
states as an objective "to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security andjtistice, 
in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect 
to external border controls, immigration, asylum and the prevention and combating of crime." See IGC 
and the Third Pillar, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 105, Mar. 15, 1997 (draft text on justice and home 
affairs submitted to IGC); Amsterdam Summit Conclusions, supra note 188. 
The EU is very concerned about these issues in the context of enlargement. See generally New 
PHARE Orientations, supra note 58 (new PHARE orientations allocate 30% of funds to institution-
building in the EA countries; "[p ]articular attention will be paid to strengthening the CEECs abilities 
in the area of justice and home affairs"). See a/so OMRI, supra note 13, Aug. 9, 1996 (EU helps 
Lithuania draft money-laundering law, noting that this is "one of the most important criteria for 
membership"); OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 15, 1996 (Baltic States signedjoinl d.:c1aratiu.l with inter 
alia EU to combat money laundering); OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 25, 1996 (interior ministers of 
Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine agree to step-up cooperation in fighting cross-
border crime); EIS EUR. REp., supra note 106, Dec. 11, 1996 (Commis~ion's Director-General for 
Customs and Indirect Taxation gave CEECs "the unambiguous message ... that effective customs 
services by the time of EU accession are 'a decisive aspect of their readiness for membership, in order 
not to put at risk the economic benefits of the Single Market and the security of European citizens."'); 
OMRI, supra note 13, Dec. 12, 1996 (EU and Council of Europe sponsored conference in Sofia on 
combating organized crime and corruption); EP March Plenary SeSSion, in TOOETHER IN EUR., No.1 OS, 
Mar. IS, 1997 (EP Committee oflnquiry Report into Fraud in the Transit System noted that "organised 
crime is deeply involved in transit fraud, the organisations concerned originating not only in the [EU] 
but in ... the newly-opened countries of central and eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union"); EUR. 
DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (May/June 1997). 
229 van den Broek Statement, supra note 198. The need to "establish administrative and judicial 
structures which can ensure that the new legislation will actually be implemented" has been a topic of 
discussion within Association Council meetings. See, e.g., AOENCE EUR., Feb. 28, 1996, at 8 (EC-
Romania). According to van den Broek, "we are now entering a phase when the proper implementation 
and enforcement of the new laws is just as important as the laws themselves." Statement of 
Commissioner van den Broek, supra. See a/so, OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 10, 1997 (van den Broek told 
Romanian leaders that their country's "integration into the EU will heavily depend on the passage of 
legislation that meets EU norms [and] on 'administrative efficiency' ... "). 
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programmes in place for taking on the acquis, but that is 
not necessarily the point. It is relatively easy to adopt 
legislation in national parliaments. Making it function on 
the ground is another matter.230 
Commissioner van den Broek emphasized repeatedly in 1997 that 
democracy and rule of law are essential preconditions to membership, and 
that implementation of the acquis communautaire "requires independent 
judges and prosecutors in addition to changes in the national legislation. 
This can only be achieved through education and training and a gradual 
evolution of daily practice."231 
Even if the chosen EA countries were ready to take on the burdens 
of membership, enlargement presupposes that the EU itself is ready to 
absorb new members. This substantive barrier to accession is likely to be 
the most difficult to breach. During the early and mid-1990s, the EU placed 
enormous emphasis on the need for the CEECs to ready themselves for 
integration. Now that the artificial timing barrier has fallen, the EU has 
reached back to the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions of June 1993 and 
reminded the applicants that accession not only presupposes their own 
readiness, but also hinges on the EO's "capacity to absorb new members, 
while maintaining the momentum of European integration."232 In mid-1997, 
when accession negotiations would have commenced if the EU had kept its 
earlier promises, the Commission brazenly confessed that "before facing the 
complexities of enlargement, [the EU] needs to address internal problems 
as well as come up with a strategy for the future which includes the 
uncertainties of enlarging the union. ,,233 Thus, additional Commission 
studies were required before accession negotiations could begin: first, an 
230 Public Administration, in EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (July/Aug. 1997). See also Buxbaum, 
supra note 49, at 133 (at present "the overabundance of the wrong type of vertical, administrative 
structures - the structures ofthe command economy -- is matched only by the hypertrophy, if not the 
total absence, of the right type of administrative structures with a clear delegation of legislative and 
judicial authority subsumed within general legislative policy guidelines."). 
Accordingly, PHARE will henceforth "concentrate on strengthening the CEECs democratic 
institutions and public administrations" for the EA countries; to that end, 30% of PHARE funds will be 
reserved for institution-building. New PHARE Orientations, supra note 58. 
231 Statement of Commissioner ~an den Broek (Noordwijk Conference, June 23, 1997), European 
Union Website <http://europa.eu.intlen/comm/spp/me/me970623.htrnl>. See also Richard Rose & 
Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Enlarging the European Union Eastwards, 33 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 427 (1995) (analyzing "the chances for democracy" in the CEECs). 
232 Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31. See Barta & Richter, supra note 1, at 5-10, 
for an analysis of the budgetary implications of enlargement. They argue that the timing of CEEC 
enlargement "is very much dependent on the level of the budgetary burden." ld. at 5. The current 
budget is the so-called Second Delors package (1993-1999). The negotiation of the First Santer 
Package is expected to absorb the EU's attention after conclusion of the IGC. EUIAgenda 2000: No 
Budget Explosion After 1999, say Commissioners, EIS EURO-EAST REp., supra note 57, Dec. 10, 1996. 
233 Countdown to Membership, in EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (July/Aug. 1997). See also 
AGENCE EUR., Oct. 23, 1997, at 3 (Commission President Santer calls for "a meeting to do, in 
institutional terms, what must be done before enlargement"). 
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impact study of the effect and cost of enlargement on a sector-by-sector 
basis; and second, a horizontal or composite study that will provide a 
strategic overview of the enlargement process.234 The horizontal study 
addresses sensitive policy issues -- such as redistribution under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural policy23s-- and draws attention to 
what are certain to pose major stumbling blocks to the applicant countries.236 
If there were ever any outstanding doubts about the likely result of this stage 
of the process, they have been put to rest by the ED's statement -- made in 
the wake of the long-awaited conclusion ofthe IGC -- that "[i]t is possible 
in this turbulent and uncertain stage of proceedings that enlargement as a 
whole will be delayed due to one of these horizontal issues, rather than any 
particular circumstance in anyone country.,,237 
The enlargement process must be based on "the principle of 
reciprocity" according to which "adaptations will have to be made on both 
sides."238 Ultimately, enlargement will depend on the "political will of the 
[EU] countries," which must be measured against the "yardstick ... [of] 
n. Countdown to Membership, supra note 233. The Amsterdam Summit Conclusions, supra note 
188, refer to this as the Commission's "comprehensive communication (Agenda 2000) covering the 
development of Union policies including the agricultural and structural policies, the horizontal 
questions related to enlargement and finally the future financial framework beyond 1999," and invite 
"a comprehensive report to the European Council at its December [1997] meeting in Luxembourg." 
"Agenda 2000"- originally the title of a Commission seminar held in November 1996 -- now refers to 
the report released by the Commission in July 1997. See supra note 29. Compare Done, supra note 218, 
at 3 (re: U.N. Economic Commission for Europe Report) with UN Adds to Enlargement Debate, in EUR. 
DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (May/June 1997) ("over-optimistic"). German President Herzog has wamed 
that "aspiring member countries will have to bear most of the integration costs." OMRT, supra note 13, 
Feb. 27, 1997. 
235 Commission DG X has reiterated that the two major challenges are the CAP and structural 
funds, which together account for some 80-90% of the EC budget and are especially sensitive to the 
"rural, low-income character" of many of the EA countries; thus "neither policy can absorb ten new 
members without significant reform." [d. The CEEC Agricultural Study, supra note 29, addresses some 
of these issues and was presented to the European Council at its Madrid Summit. See Madrid Summit 
Conclusions, supra note 189 (Alternative Agriculture Development Strategies in the EU in View of 
Enlargement). See also Barta & Richter, supra note I, at 6-8; Long Sprint, supra note 183, at 39 
(observing "the hope ... that the drive to expand the EU eastwards will have positive effects on both 
sides, forcing the EU to speed up reform of the CAP, which devours 60% of it~ total budget ... "). 
Compare Statement of EU Budget Commissioner Liikanen, AGENCE EUR., Jan. 20, 1996, at 2 (CEECs 
"would not be able to absorb efficiently so much Community money" if current Structural Funds system 
were extended to them). 
236 In addition to the inevitable controversy and delay that will attend reform of the CAP and 
regional policy, the Commission (DG X) has observed that the task presented is a "Catch 22: the EU 
cannot decide which new members to take on until it knows what impact enlargement will have on. its 
policies as a whole. But neither can it determine what that impact will be until it knows exactly which 
countries are going to join." Countdown to Membership, supra note 233. 
231 [d. The Commission (DG X) has concluded with a warning: "Although there is no doubt that 
each country will, in the final analysis, stand alone, the impact of the Commission's horizontal analysis 
should in no way be underestimated." [d. 
238 Statement of Polish Prime Minister Olesky During the Meeting of the European Council and 
Associated States (Cannes, June 27, 1995), Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176. 
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internal refonns of the Union ... "239 This process is bound to continue well 
into the next century. 
3. The Participation Paradox 
The most disturbing (and intractable) paradox in the context of East-
West European integration concerns the gap between democratic rhetoric 
and reality. It is undisputed that the EAs are meant to encourage the 
transition towards democratic government as well as market economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe.24o At the same time, however, it is clear that the 
EU's vertical association strategy is profoundly anti-democratic, in so far as 
the strategy has denied the EA countries an opportunity to participate in 
decisions or even discussions which affect their interests.241 David Kennedy 
observed that "[t]he internationalization of democratic rhetoric has 
accompanied a domestic displacement of democratic politics,"242 which 
results in "the establishment of a political instance freed from the 
institutions and pressure points of a national mass politics and responsive 
only to the bureaucratic imperatives of managing an industrial policy and 
the wishes of member State governments."243 
The deficiencies in the EU's strategy are of both substantive and 
procedural character. The EA countries have been denied participatory 
rights in two substantive areas: approximation of laws and the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The procedural deficiencies inhere 
in the Structured Dialogue framework itself. 
The requirement that EA countries approximate their laws to those 
239 Address by Polish Foreign Minister Bartoszewski (Prague, May 29, 1995), Polish Gov't 
Website, supra note 176. For a skeptical view, see Joel Blocker, Europe: EU Promises Most, Delivers 
Least to the East, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Nov. 11, 1997 ("Nor is there much prospect in the 
near future of the EU matching its rhetoric with a realization of the East's hopes for early membership. 
That discouraging assessment is widely shared not only by many historians and analysts, but also by 
some high EU officials - although they will not say so in their own names."). 
240 For example, the Hungarian EA provides: 
CONSIDERING the opportunities for a relationship of a new quality offered by the 
emergence of a new democracy in Hungary; ... 
REAFFIRMING their commitment to pluralist democracy based on the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, a multiparty system involving free and democratic 
elections ... which constitute the basis for the association; ... 
Preamble, Hungarian EA, supra note 42. 
241 The focus of this critique is not on the so-called "democratic deficit" within the EU itself, 
although this becomes relevant in the context of the EA countries' desire to accede to the EU. See 
discussion of the EU's failure to undertake institutional reform, supra note 218. 
m Kennedy, Architectures, supra note 1, at 384. 
243 Id. at 384-85. 
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of the EU has already been noted.244 This sweeping obligation does not 
carry with it any rights to participate in the process of making or modifying 
EC law.24s This everyday aspect of accession246 is particularly offensive in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where transition and enlargement are intimately 
tied to the promotion of democracy.247 
The CEEC White Paper248 -- nobly intended "to assist the Central 
and East European countries with their planning and programming"249 -- sets 
forth in elaborate detail "the essential legislative measures in the sphere of 
2" See discussion supra text accompanying notes 48-51. It bears repeating that PCA countries 
are merely urged to do so. Supra note 52. 
24S Compare EEA Agreement, supra note 170 (which pairs more concrete approximation 
obligations with limited rights to participate in EC legislative procedures). The EEA Agreement 
"establishes a permanent information and consultation process covering all stages in the preparation of 
Community instruments." BUll. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, point 1.2.1. See also Commission 
Proposal of 5 October 1993 Conceming Arrangements for Implementing the EEA Agreement, 
COM(93)466 final, 1993 OJ. (C 290) 5 (decision-making procedures in cases where the decisions to 
be taken by the EEA Joint Committee are simply an extension of an existing Community provision to 
the EEA or where they involve the adoption of the "interim acquis package" i.e. all Community 
instruments of relevance to the EEA published between Aug.!, 1991 and the entry into force of the EEA 
Agreement). 
246 "HarmoniZation in the wake of liberalization requires openness towards a reception of the legal 
regimes appropriate to modem versions of liberal economic-organization regimes." Buxbaum, supra 
note 49, at 126. However, that author goes on to note that "harmonization is at war. with the rest of the 
necessary goals - with codification and with liberalization. Approximation of yet to be liberalized, yet 
to be codified - yet to be written! -laws to assure their compatibility with European Union legislation, 
and thus to assure at least a better trade and investment relationship ... if not also a better starting 
position for possible later accession and membership, is a daunting task." ld. at 130. Thus, one way 
to characterize the problem is how to "harmonize harmonization with creation, codification, and 
liberalization oflaws." ld. Compare Dream On, Bus. CENT. EUR., Feb. 1997, at 24 (noting that some 
CEEC govemments believe that it is "better to regulate even if the regulation is not very sophisticated" 
and observing that Hungary may have "passed 120 new laws and 124 amendments" but that Hungarian 
"laws and regulations are still way offEU norms" in the financial and business sectors). 
247 CEEC receptivity to harmonization varies. Buxbaum concludes that it is "not even the actual 
stage of transformation/liberalization, but rather the state of discourse or pOlitical/societal consensus 
about the legitimacy of the goal and pace towards a liberal economy, that influences [the] attitude 
towards harmonization." Buxbaum, supra note 49, at 128. He notes further that in the context of 
transition it is impossible to focus on "harmonization as an autonomous desideratum on the part of these 
countries." Id. Rather, harmonization "is a supportive v3!ue for other ends, ends concerning economic 
and political and even societal and cultural goals, not an end in itself." ld. at 134. In the end, he 
concludes that this is a "story of partly externally imposed, partly internally desired, adaptation of the 
legal and administrative systems of a still-transforming group of polities to the standard laws of 
democratic states with liberal economic systems." ld. at 13 5. 
A Polish author has argued, in view of the "[m]any difficulties [that] confront Poland during the 
integration process," that the "continuity and coherence of Poland's legal system must be maintained" 
and that [p]reference should be given to the reformist methods oflegal harmonization as long as they 
are able to ensure a sufficient degree of legal conformity," notwithstanding the fact that the EA allows 
"a large degree of freedom and does not demand that, in most areas, Community institutions be followed 
slavishly." Jan K. Bielecki, Poland and the European Community: Toward Full lntel?'"alion, 16 
HASTINGS INT'l & COMP. L. REv. 619, at 630 (1993). 
248 Supra note 29. The CEEC White Paper calls for "the careful scrutiny and implementation of 
nearly eight hundred European legal acts." Statement of Polish Prime Minister During lnterministerial 
Meeting of the Teamfor the Europe Agreement (Warsaw, Feb. 16, 1996), Polish Gov't Website, supra 
note 176. 
249 BUll. EUR. UNION, May 1995, point 1.4.63. 
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the internal market and in other spheres such as competition and social and 
environmental policy, which are of vital importance for the operation of the 
market. n250 The CEEC White Paper also establishes priorities for each 
applicant country.251 The Commission sent the EA applicant countries a 
200-page questionnaire in April 1996, and requested that they submit their 
completed responses within three months' time.252 It can hardly come as a 
surprise that this program has been hard for some CEECs to swallow.2S3 
Indeed, there is a perception that the CEEC White Paper insists on "some 
things ... [that] have not even been achieved in certain Member States."254 
The second context in which the EA countries were deprived of 
substantive participatory rights was in regard to the recently-concluded IGC. 
The EA countries repeatedly requested (and were denied) the opportunity to 
participate in the IGC.255 While the IGC was clearly concerned with affairs 
250 ld 
251 The Annex to the CEEC White Paper, supra note 29, adopted by the Commission on May 10, 
1995, further sets out: 
[I]n 23 different spheres of legislative activity, and on a deliberately selective basis, the 
Articles of the Treaty and secondary legislation which have a direct impact on the freedom 
of movement of goods, services, persons and capital. A logical order for the adoption of 
these measures is established, with the "key" measures being separated from the whole body 
of measures applicable, it being understood that it is up to the associated countries 
themselves to set their priorities in accordance with their own situation and strategies; [and] 
stresses the need to create the necessary administrative and organizational context to ensure 
that this legislation can be implemented effectively. As a guide for the Central and East 
European countries, the Annex contains a summary of the structures needed to ensure 
implementation of Community legislation and identifies relevant national (or international) . 
structures in the light of the experience acquired within the Union in this matter ... 
ld. It is unlikely that EU's priorities will always coincide with those of the CEECs. See, e.g., van den 
Broek in Romania, in TOGETHER IN EUR., No. 105, Mar. IS, 1997 (Commissioner van den Broek 
emphasized that "Romania must improve its process of approximation of legislation and monitor 
progress on the priorities set in the Commission's White Paper"). But see Estonia to Give Priority to 
Joining EU, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., supra note 69, Dec. 10, 1996 (Estonian Prime Minister 
Vaehi said that "the drafting of laws ... related to the EU will take precedence over purely domestic 
issues"). 
252 OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 29, 1996. 
25l Some misunderstandings surrounding the legal effect of the CEEC White Paper had to be 
smoothed over in the framework of the Structured Dialogue. At the joint ministerial meeting held in 
Luxembourg on June 6, 1995, a "consensus was reached" that the "White Paper ... created no new 
conditions for the future accession negotiations, and ... that each country had to adopt its own 
programme of preparation for the internal market." BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, point 1.4.59. 
2S4 AGENCE EUR., June 23, 1995, at 10 (statement by Polish Ambassador Kulakowski). 
255 See, e.g., AGENCEEUR., May 31,1995, at 5 (Hungary "is not seeking to play an active role in 
the preparation or in the actual events of the 1996 IGC, but it would in any case like to be consulted 
through existing mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation, particularly the Council & Association 
Committee [created by the EA] and the various ministerial meetings [that take place within the 
structured dialogue]"); ld. (The "Polish Government's desire for Polish involvement in preparations for 
the 1996 [lGC], [as well as] the timing of the start of accession talks, the holding of a special European 
summit with the Central and East European countries, and Poland's participation as an observer in 
meetings of the European Monetary Institute, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in 
November [1995] and the 1996 Asia-Europe Summit"). Q&A: Estonia and the EU, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
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internal to the EU, it is equally true that excluding the CEECs (and other 
applicants for membership) from participation was tantamount to cJi.cluding 
them from the drawing board for the "new" Europe.2S6 
Procedural flaws afflict the Structured Dialogue2S7 which constitutes 
the principal framework for ongoing participation between the EU and the 
EA countries.2s8 The Structured Dialogue is a framework for regular 
political cooperation -- on a multilateral basis -- between the CEECs and EU 
Dec. 19, 1994, at 5 (Estonian Foreign Minister Luik considered it "very important that the association 
countries be actively involved in the preparation of the [IGe] documents," not least because they will 
deal with "the financial and practical implications of the enlargement"; this document is especially 
important "because it's easy to prove financially that the enlargement is not profitable, that [it] is too 
complicated"). In the end, the associated countries were not invited to attend the Amsterdam Summit 
in June 1997; however, they were invited to attend a special meeting of foreign ministers later that 
month. No Invitation to Amsterdam Summit, in TOGETHER IN EUR:, No. 107, Apr. IS, 1997. 
256 The commission has ackowledged the importance of including the CEECs in this process. See 
Commission Enlargement Report, supra note 31, at 18 (recognizing the CEECs' "political needs" and 
proposing the creation of a "European political area" which would build upon the existing achitecture 
in order to provide "reassurance that they will be treated as equal partners in the dialogue concerning 
Europe's future."). 
217 See Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31. For a detailed description of the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Structured Dialogue, see Hartnell, Long and Winding 
Road, supra note I, at 203-04; Hartnell, Association Agreements, supra note I, at 232-34. The 
Structured Dialogue basically involves: meetings on the fringe of the European Council; meetings at 
ministerial and other levels on questions related to the CFSP, as well as on home and justice affairs; 
meetings at ministerial or other levels "if necessary and in accordance with needs" on subjects of 
common interest. Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, supra note 31, at point 1.26. "The Community 
proposes that the associated countries enter into a structured relationship with the institutions of the 
Union within the framework of a reinforced and extended multilateral dialogue and concentration on 
matters of common interest. The arrangements ... include dialogue and concentration on a broad range 
of topics and in several forums." Id. at point I. \3. 
The EU also conducts relations with the various associated countries in the bilateral institutional 
framework established under each EA and PCA, discussed supra in note 41, as well as in the framework 
of other international organizations, such as those mentioned supra in note 21. 
m In fact, the Structured Dialogue itself resulted from earlier efforts to improve political dialogue. 
The drive for improved political relations began with, but did not end with the Visegrad Memorandum, 
supra note 130, which challenged the EC to deepen political dialogue with the EA countries. In the 
Joint Declaration of 5 October 1992 on Political Dialogue (Luxembourg Summit), EC and Visegrad 
foreign ministers agreed to strengthen political cooperation in the interest of the shared goals of: 
political convergence, better mutual understanding, and enhanced stability and security. BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNTllES, Oct. 1992, point 1.4.6. However, the nature of the contemplated political cooperation 
differed substantially from one side to another. The EA countries sought "gradual incorporation ... into 
the political cooperation of the European Communities, especially via direct linking to thc Common 
Foreign and Security Policy." Visegrfld Memorandum, supra note 130. However, the EC had 
something other than full inclusion in mind. 
The Commission offered a variety of important and concrete proposals for reform, which 
ultimately led to the Structured Dialogue and its ongoing adjustment. Noteworthy here is the tenor of 
the Commission's program, rather than its detail: the Commission envisioned a multilateral, pan-
European "Political Area" that would extend political cooperation even beyond the EAs and thereby 
further the convergence of different economic and political systems. Commission Enlargement Report, 
supra note 31, at 18. In particular, the European Political Area conceived by the Commission would 
consist of a "structured institutional relationship" designed to serve the need for closer cooperation in 
a growing number of fields but that would not interfere with the EC's "own ailtvnomous clt:;-,clopment." 
Commission Guidelines, supra note 29, at 6. 
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representatives.259 
The EA (and particularly the Visegnid Group) countries have 
viewed this format skeptically since its inception, not least because of its 
multilateral nature. Criticism and calls for improvement have been 
continuaI.260 The most consistent complaint has been that Structured 
Dialogue meetings are often "ceremonial" in nature and do not provide 
adequate opportunity for discussion.261 For example, Hungarian Minister 
Juhasz called it "more a monologue than any real dialogue, and criticized the 
219 The participation of representatives of the EA countries in the biannual summit meetings of 
the European Council has been marginal. For example, representatives of the (then six) EA countries 
were invited at the last minute to attend a working dinner on the eve of the Essen Summit in December 
1994, even though that Summit was slated to make momentous decisions concerning the future of 
Central and Eastem Europe. Lionel Barber, EU's Outstretched Hand to the East Begins to Waver, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 23,1994, at 3. By the time of the Cannes Summit in June 1995, the number of associated 
countries invited to send representatives to the Cannes Summit had nearly doubled. (In addition to 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, the French Presidency also 
invited the three Baltic States, Cyprus and Malta to attend.) The participation of these eleven countries 
in the Cannes Summit was equally (if not even more) marginal than the participation of the first six EA 
countries in the Essen Summit. See AGENCE EUR., May 29-30, 1995, at 5 ("Eleven Non-EU Countries 
invited by Mr. Chirac to Meet on the Fringe of the European Council"); AGENCE EUR., June 29, 1995, 
at 2 (French President Chirac "complained of the problems of 'communication' that ... existed over 
Europe: 'something is not quite right ... Many, many abuses have discredited Europe,' which 'has made 
the mistake of paying too much attention to its bureaucrats' ... [T]he 1996 IGC ... will have to make 
Europe more democratic and more effective ... "). ld. 
Numerous joint ministerial meetings have taken place within the framework of the structured 
dialogue, e.g. Luxembourg (Apr. 10, 1995), reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1995, point 1.4.60 
(discussions were mainly concerned with preparation of the CEEC White Paper on adapting the 
associated countries' legislation to Community legislation in fields connected with the internal market, 
and with regional and interregional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe). Special joint 
ministerial meetings are occasionally held to deal with particular issues. For example, there have been 
such meetings on agriculture (BULL. EUR. UNION, Sept. 1995, point 1.4.34), economic affairs and 
finance (BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.61), education (BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 
1.4.62; BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1996, point 1.4.67), foreign affairs (BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1995, 
point 1.4.60; BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.63), the internal market (BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 
1995, point 1.4.49), justice and home affairs (BULL. EUR. UNION, Sept. 1995, point 1.4.33; BULL. EUR. 
UNION, Nov. 1996, point 1.4.68), and transport (BULL. EUR. UNION, Sept. 1995, point 1.4.35). More 
recently, EU and CEEC foreign ministers met to discuss cooperation in international organizations (i.e. 
the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Trade Organization, and the Wor!!! Intellectual 
Property Organization). EU/CEEC Cooperation in International Organisations, in TOGETHER IN EUR., 
No. 107, Apr. 15, 1997. See also AGENCE EUR., Oct. 8, 1997, at 9 (first meeting of Social Affairs and 
Labour Ministers) and at 13 (third joint meeting of Transport Ministers). 
2GO See, e.g., Statement of Hungarian Minister Juhasz, AGENCE EUR., May 31, 1995, at 5 (noting 
the importance of the Structured Dialogue, but adding that improvement is "indispensable" to making 
it more efficient); Barta & Richter, supra note 1, at 31 ("Although the term ... 'structured dialogue' is 
expected to generate a feeling that the pre-accession movement entered another qualitatively new phase 
. its real content is rather vague and misses the major signals illuminating the path forward so much 
needed and expected by the associated countries. "). 
261 EU "Ceremonial" Meeting with East European Foreign Ministers, OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 
I, 1995 (British Foreign Secretary did not attend, since "[t]here is a limit to what can be achieved by 
ceremonial meetings"). Hungarian Minister Juhasz suggested that more time be devoted to these 
meetings, "in any case more than two hours, as is the case now." AGENCE EUR., May 31, 1995, at 5. 
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discussions for failing to focus on concrete and specific subjects. ,,262 The 
EU has made some strides toward ameliorating the associated countries' 
disenchantment in this regard, but more improvement is needed.263 
Meanwhile, the CEECs' frustration has impelled them to seek other fora for 
meaningful participation. 
4. The Sovereignty Paradox 
The perennial issue of sovereignty plays an important role in the 
newly-emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, as it continues 
to do within the EU itself. While related to the former discussion of 
democratic participation, the sovereignty paradox warrants special, if brief, 
mention. 
The sovereignty paradox reveals itself within each EA country, in 
the contradictory impulses to revel in the newly-won sovereignty, on the one 
hand, and to join the EU, which demands a significant surrender of 
sovereignty, on the other.264 Many people in the region share the belief that 
"[i]ndependence must precede interdependence."26s Polish Primate J6zef 
Glemp has observed that membership "is not just a political issue. The 
Church perceives it as a moral problem as well ... a fight for independence, 
for preserving one's identity."266 This sentiment should not be ignored, lest 
262 Id. Polish Ambassador to the EU Kulakowski has echoed these comments. AGENCE EUR., June 
23, 1995, at 9 (the Structured Dialogue "is more a limited dialogue than a structured dialogue" and there 
is no "real debate on fundamental problems"). When asked how he would make the di:1ogue more 
effective, he suggested the following changes: provide more time for meetings, since one hour for 
multilateral discussion on several major issues is unreasonable; improve preparation of the meetings by 
holding a preparatory meeting (e.g. within the CoRePer framework) prior to each ministerial meeting; 
and reducing the number of subjects on the agenda. Id. 
263 See, e.g., Pre-accession Progress Report, supra note 29 (noting that the "successful functioning 
of the structured relationship ... could be improved by concentrating on more concrete issues at joint 
meetings"). Commission President Santer also indicated that the substance of ministerial meetings 
which regularly take place within the "structured dialogue" framework "will be improved." AOENCE 
EUR., Jan. 24, 1996, at 11. Improvements include better preparation of ministerial sessions and limiting 
the number of agenda items. AGENCE EUR., Feb. 28, 1996, at IS. 
264 Milward and others have argued that joining the EU can actually enhance the international 
position of some [small] countries. See ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN REsCUE OF THE NATION 
STATE (1992); Alan S. Milward & Vibeke Sl!Jrensen, Interdependence or Integration? A National 
Choice, in ALAN S. MILWARD ET AL., THE FRONTIER OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORY AND THEORY 
1945-1992 (1993). These arguments are surely being debated within some elite circles in Central and 
Eastern Europe. However, the sovereignty paradox is not primarily a product of rational analysis, and 
pertains more to popular attitudes than to political calculations. Compare Kennedy, Architecture, supra 
note 1, at 382 (the "internal market will be built ... by sneaking up on sovereignty"). 
26S Stefan A. Bielski, To Be or Notto Be Peers, WARSAW Bus. J., Sept. 1995, at 17. See also 
Statement of Czech Prime Minister Klaus, quoted in Bugge, supra note 168, at 6 ("we do not wish to 
be the least bit less sovereign"). 
266 Bielski, supra note 265, at 11 (quoting Glemp). A more elegant, poetic and moving 
exploration of this phenomenon can be found in Drakulic, supra note 6. See also Statement of Slovene 
President Kucan, RFEIRL NEWSLlNE, supra note 41, June 9, 1997 (people in CEECs "must not lose their 
identity in the rush for European unity"). 
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it "sour" into "anti-European feeling" or fester into nationalism and 
xenophobia.267 
The sovereignty paradox itself contains a paradox: it intensifies as 
time passes, and as the citizens of EA countries learn that accession entails 
costs as well as privileges,268 but abates as the discourse shifts away from 
sovereignty and towards identity.269 
5. The Competition-Cooperation Paradox 
The final and most intriguing paradox inherent in the current model 
of East-West integration inheres in the relations of the EA countries inter se. 
At the same time as trying to aid and to accommodate the wishes of the 
CEECs, the EU has urged them to cooperate with each other, in part because 
it rightly knew it could not fill the void left by the post-1989 collapse of 
COMECON trade, and in part because of the potential benefits to be gained 
through shared transition experiences.27o These countries have a great deal 
267 Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 482 ("particularly among those countries where the need for 
affirmation as free sovereign states, having left the Russian sphere of influence, is most strongly felt. 
Nationalism and xenophobia, never far below the surface, would feed on this disillusionment, fostering 
all those pathologies which were feared but had not materialized in the aftermath of communist 
collapse. "). 
268 See Eurobarometer poll results supra in note 182 (showing a drop in enthusiasm for joining 
the EU). Kolankiewicz predicted "the inevitable demobilization of the European idea in the east." 
Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 479. Further, he has suggested that "the adjustment and rationalization 
of the idea of Europe following on more direct experience of its nature will give rise to a constellation 
of competing economic and political interests in eastern Europe over the region's own future 
geopolitical and economic alignments, just as the process of ratifYing the Maastricht treaty [did] among 
the Twelve." Id. 
269 Czech President Havel has called for "a new and genuinely clear reflection on what might be 
called European identity, a new and genuinely clear articulation of European responsibility, an 
intensified interest in the very meaning of European integration in all its wider implications for the 
contemporary world, and the recreation of its ethos or, if you like, its charisma." Speech by President 
Havel before the European Parliament, AGENCE EUR. Docs, March 16, 1994, at 4. 
270 See generally supra note 156. Some forms of subregional cooperation offered prospective 
benefits to the EU, as well as the CEECs. For example, President of the European Council De Deus 
Pinheiro "stressed the vital importance ... of regional cooperation" in May 1992 at the second 
conference on the coordination of assistance to the independent States of the former USSR, reported 
in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, May 1992, point 1.2.8. Donors were urged to "consider triangular 
arrangements, so that Central and East European countries could sell their output to the new 
independent States." Id. As a follow-up, the Community provided that certain funds (i.e. ECU 1,250 
million) could be "used exclusively to enable the new independent States to import agricultural and tbod 
products and medical supplies originating in the Community, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and the Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia." BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1992, point 1.4.13 (emphasis added). 
However, before they could become eligible to qualifY for the loans, the independent States had to agree 
to accept joint and several responsibility for the former Soviet debt. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-
Aug. 1992, point 1.4.14. See Council Regulation 1897/92 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the 
Implementation of a Medium-term Loan to the Soviet Union and its Constituent Republics, Established 
by Council Decision 91/658/EEC, 1992 OJ. (L 191) 22. 
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in common,271 beyond their shared history, their current transition towards 
market economy and democracy, and their fixation on the EU272 as the road 
to salvation. 
At first, the CEECs -- and especially the Visegnid Group of 
countries -- resisted being forced back into the COMECON bloc,273 in large 
part because they feared being forced to proceed on the road to accession at 
the speed of the slowest country274 and, worse, being consigned permanently 
to Europe's periphery.27S They were reluctant to associate with one another, 
271 Indeed, cooperation among the Visegrad Group of countries was premised on the assumption 
that these countries would "strive to build a common approach toward Western institutions." 
Declaration of Cooperation on the Road to European Integration, signed at Visegrad Summit, quoted 
in Vachudova, supra note 127, at 40. The Visegrad Summit was meant to mark a turning point, away 
from divergent approaches towards the West and away from competition with one another. Id. 
m See Drakulic, supra note 6, at 4 ("[AI common denominator is still discernible, and still 
connects us all, often against our will. It is not only our communist past, but also the way we would like 
to escape from it, the direction in which we want to go. It's our longing for Europe and all that it stands 
for. Or, rather, what we imagine Europe stands for."). She goes on to address the questions "what does 
Europe mean in the Eastern European imagination. It is certainly not a question of geography, for in 
those terms we are already in it and need make no effort to reach it. It is something distant, something 
to be attained, to be deserved. It is ... plenitude ... lilt offers choice ... It is a promised land, a new 
Utopia, a lollipop." Id. at 12. See also Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 481 (noting that "the European 
idea ... acts as an ideological shorthand standing for participatory democracy, the market economy, 
the rule oflaw, constitutional order and social citizenship."). 
213 See, e.g .. Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 478 (CEEC "ruling elites, burdened by the experience 
of the imposed cooperation of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, have found it equally difficult to 
associate for the furtherance of their common aims."). , 
27. The Visegrad countries in particular feared that their progress would be slowed down to match 
the pace of the slowest country. See, e.g., Statement by Hungarian Foreign Minister Jeszenszky, quoted 
in Vachudova, supra note 127, at 45 (Hungary "should not have to wait until the others also catch up"). 
This fear was most acute during the period after conclusion (i.e. December 1991) and before entry into 
effect of the Hungarian and Polish EAs. The ratification delays were a source of constant irritation, 
especially to Hungary and Poland, whose EAs were held up in 1993 while the EC concluded EAs with 
Bulgaria and Romania and negotiated new EAs with the successor countries after the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia Thus, the EAs with Hungary and Poland could not enter into force on Jan. 1, 1993 as 
originally planned. See BULL. EUR. COMMUNmES, Oct. 1992, point 1.4.15 (extending the validity of 
the Interim Agreements). 
There are' numerous instances in which the Visegrad countries, as the pioneers under the EU's 
association strategy, have won hard-fought battles, only to see the advantages they secured be passed ' 
along automatically to the other EA countries which came after them. See, e.g., AGENCE EUR., July 18-
19, 1994, at 9 (Commission noted that the EAs "concluded with Bulgaria and Romania ... will be fully 
brought into line with those of the" Visegrad countries); Meeting of EU-Romania Association Council, 
reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.67 (aligning Romania's timetable for EC trade 
concessions with that of the other associated countries). 
275 The Visegrad countries feared the creation of a "Europe-bis" in Central and Eastern Europe, 
"a new division iii Europe, the creation of a zone protecting the Community from the insecurity coming 
from the East, and that this Europe-bis [might) become something permanent as was the case of the past 
European historical developments." TOGETHER tN EUR., No.9 (May 15, 1992) at 2. This fear has not 
abated. Czech President Havel said in May 1996: 
It is hard to believe that one half of Europe will blossom, will be able to protect itself from 
different dangers and cooperate along democratic principles and that the other half of Europe 
will forever find itself in some indeterminate vacuum .... It is now six years ago that the 
Iron Curtain fell. I feel that relatively little has happened in these years. And time is 
working against the democrats, ... against those who want peace and peaceful cooperation. 
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lest that cooperation seal their marginal fate.276 These attitudes persist even 
today.277 _ 
The EA countries, while deeply suspicious ofthe EU's motives and 
ambivalent towards each other, perversely discovered that cooperation 
among themselves provided yet another opportunity for them to compete 
with each other for the EU's approval.278 Less cynical leaders claim that 
their countries "are partners, not rivals" in their bid for EU membership.279 
Havel, quoted in Bugge, supra note 168, at 5. 
276 A Croatian writer explains the key role of the shift from collective to individualistic terms of 
reference: 
With the collapse of communism, the individual countries started to emancipate themselves 
from their collective status and to distinguish themselves from their neighbours. So in 
Eastern European countries, the difference between "we" and "I" is ... far more important 
than mere grammar. "We" means fear, resignation, submissiveness, ... and somebody else 
deciding your destiny. "I" means giving individuality and democracy a chance. 
Drakulic, supra note 6, at 4. 
277 See, e.g, AGENCE EUR., Nov. 7, -1997, at 2 (Hungarian Ambassador to the EU Juhasz takes 
"explicit stance in favour of differentiation between applicant countries ... Hungary supports the 
European Commission's '5+ I' proposal ... and doubts the practical feasibility ... of a common starting 
date for negotiations, with later differentiation .... The main consequence [of this approach] would be 
to delay the enlargement process as a whole, and 'this is a very high price to pay .... In his view 
holding the process up cannot be in the interest of any applicant country."). 
27. See, e.g., Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 482 (observing that the "competition for EU entry 
which has previously served to lend impetus to the painful tasks of transformation ... has also served 
to breed mutual suspicion and intimations of national superiority among the contestants."). One early 
example involves the Baltic States, where Estonia peeved Latvia and Lithuania by hurtling forward 
towards establishing a free trade area with the EC without any transition period. BULL. EUR. UNION, 
June 1995, point 1.4.63 (noting that "in view of the Baltic States' commitment to rapid economic and 
political reform and membership of the [EU], there is no transitional period for Estonia, and the 
transitional periods for the other two Baltic States are shorter than for the other associated countries"). 
An interesting example involves Hungary and Poland, which were both trying to meet with the EU 
to discuss their possible accession. In early 1997, the EU squeezed Poland to relax its import regime 
against Citrus fruit, and refused to hold the pre-accession talks until Poland made adequate concessions. 
The meetings were finally held with both countries (on separate days). RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 
41, Apr. 29,1997. At its meeting, Hungary decided to abolish its tariffs against citrus fruit as of the end 
of 1997. Id. 
Ironically, the Structured Dialogue itself has become a major arena for this competition. See, e.g., 
Joint Ministerial Meeting of 22 May 1995 Between the Economic Affairs and Finance Ministers of the 
EU and the EA Countries (including the Baltic States which at the time had not yet concluded EAs), 
BULL. EUR. UNION, May 1995, pOint 1.4.64 (discussion of the CEEC White Paper, supra note 29, during 
which the EA countries had "the opportunity to present their programme of reform" and to "describe 
their macroeconomic restructuring programmes"); Joint Ministerial Meeting of 23 October 1995 
(economic affairs and finance ministers), BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.61 ("exchange of 
views highlighted the areas where progress had already been made by [CEECs],,). 
279 Hungarian President GOncz, to Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra 
note 41, June 10, 1997. See also OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 19, 1996 (Polish President Kwasniewski 
stressed that Poland and Hungary are not competing to gain admission to the EU); OMRI, supra note 
13, Nov. 20, 1996 (Hungarian Prime Minister Horn tells Polish President that their countries are 
"strategic partners"); OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 21, 1997 (Polish President says Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland "would form close-knit group as they approach EU ... membership"). A 
Hungarian writer has taken it even further. See GyOrgy Konrad, Turning Towards Europe, BUDAPEST 
WK., Sept. 22-28, 1994, at 7 (urging CEECs to "cooperate where we can" especially in the cultural 
sphere; "begin building a spiritual unity with each other, and ... like each other."). Bul see RFEIRL _ 
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The EU's decision to commence accession negotiations with just a few 
CEECs has exacerbated the tension among CEECs, but has also given new 
impetus to the need for cooperation. Most importantly, EA countries have 
come to appreciate the power that exists at the margins -- the possibility of 
intermediation -- in their space in-between Brussels and Moscow.2so 
The fact that the power structures are shifting does not obviate the 
existing vertical integration framework established by the EA agreements. 
Iri fact, the recent changes in CentrallEast European consciousness manifest 
themselves partly in incremental corrections of some of the imbalances 
identified above and examined in Part V below. However, the changes can 
also be seen in migration of the center and in redefinition of boundaries, 
which just might alter our mental maps. 
IV. HAPPENINGS ON THE MARGINS: 
REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION 
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This part examines the key regional and subregional integration 
projects underway in Central and Eastern Europe, and considers their 
implications.281 Section B sets forth the primary types of endeavors, and 
introduces each one briefly. In Sections C, D and E, the various regional 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 30,1997 (Slovene President Kucan speaking in Budapest says Europe 
is "doomed to cooperate"). 
280 See Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 480 ("[T]he absence of vigorous regional cooperation, 
mutual support and a common identity consisting of something more than post-communist societies 
awaiting European membership is most keenly missed and could, it is feared, jeopardize the east 
European enlargement of the Union. What each country lacks individually could be compensated for 
collectively."); Uszl6 Lengyel, Towards a New Model (unpublished manuscript on file with author) 
("A Western country in the East, or an Eastern country in the West - these are the alternatives for 
Hungary. It is still too early to judge whether this unique 'corridor' position will be similar to that of 
neutral Austria and Finland before they joined the EU, or rather to Tito's non-aligned Yugoslavia, or 
perhaps Kadar's Hungary which, though within the Soviet bloc, somehow enjoyed an intermediate 
position ... One of the great political dilemmas of the 1990s is that there are no clear boundaries among 
the various models [i.e. EU or Russian-Balkan]. "). 
281 At its 1996 Dublin Summit, the European Council noted ''the wider range of regional activities 
in Europe" and that "the Commission will submit regular reports to the Council on these regional 
initiatives." 1996 Dublin Summit Conclusions, supra note 190, at point 1.21. The first general report 
prepared by the Commission in this field was the Commission Communication on European 
Community Support for Regional Economic Integration Efforts Among Developing Countries, 
COM(95)2 I 9 final [hereinafter Communication on EC Support] (including, but not limited to, European 
regional initiatives). A report focused on Europe was submitted to the Luxembourg European Council 
in Dec. 1997. See Report from the Commission to the Council on Regional Co-operation in Europe, 
COM(97)659 final [hereinafter Commission Report on Regional Co-operation]. 
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and subregional undertakings are presented in some detail.282 Finally, 
Section F explores the significance of the developments taking place within 
the broad framework established by this profusion of initiatives. In 
particular, it examines the meaning of these developments within the 
broader context of East-West European integration. 
B. REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
The types of regionaF83 and subregional economic integration· 
initiatives may be divided into formal and informal arrangements.284 A 
formal integration initiative is an arrangement which imposes legal 
obligations on the contracting parties and creates institutions for the purpose 
of carrying out the purposes of the agreement. The most interesting 
example of such a project is the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
282 An effort is made to survey developments in PCA as well as in EA countries; any imbalance 
in coverage reflects availabil ity of information rather than a judgment as to the relative importance of 
any particular initiative. 
283 This article views the EU and the CIS as formal regional integration initiatives. However, the 
CIS is discussed infra Part IV.C.3, along with various subregional initiatives in the independent States 
of the former Soviet Union, in order to provide a more complete framework for analysis. 
2R4 This simple functional definition does not take full account of the rich literature on 
international relations theory, but purports at least to be in line with it. See Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, Mesoinstitutions: The Role of Formal OrganizatiOns in International Politics I, 3 (July 
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors: k-abbott@nwu.edu and snidal@chicago.edu) 
(analyzing mesoinstitutions which are "between the polar metaphors of the centralized state and 
decentralized anarchy"); Frank Garcia, New Frontiers in International Trade: Decisionmaking and 
Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 357, 359 (1997) (analyzing the design and operation of trade governance institutions). 
Abbott and Snidal analyze "combinations of ... intermediate activities" which they characterize as 
''facilitation and production." Abbot & Snidal, supra at 4. They "focus on intermediate levels of 
centralization" in order to "better understand the multiple roles of institutions in promoting 
cooperation." Id. at 9. Their "mesoinstitutional analysis" highlights "other reasons for centralization" 
besides enforcement. Id. Facilitative organizations "differ from the pure model of decentralized 
cooperation because central institutions playa key role in achieving cooperation - often by improving 
information and communication. Such institutional arrangements enable states to solve problems 
among themselves without independent action by 'centralized' institutions. Their impact comes through 
reducing the transaction costs of reaching mutually beneficial agreements, as well as facilitating the self-
enforcement of those agreements in the light of changing circumstances." Id. at 10. Productive 
organizations are "mesoinstitutions in which some significant operational activity is organized 
internationally rather than nationally. Sometimes states use IDs simply to achieve outcomes more 
efficiently; at other times centralized institutions perform functions that cannot be accomplished as 
effectively (or at all) at the national level. They operate in a way that is more or less independent of any 
individual state and goes beyond simply promoting decentralized cooperation." Id. at 11. See generally 
ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFfER HEGEMONV (1984) (facilitative regimes); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1995); Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, 
45 INT'L ORG. 495, 495-538 (Fall 1991); KENNETH A. OVE ED., COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (1986) 
(rationalist cooperation theory based on analysis of decentralized interaction); BETH V. YARBROUGH & 
ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1992); ORAN R. 
YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (1994). 
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described in Part IV.C.l below, but there are other free trade areas28S and 
customs unions286 in Central and Eastern Europe as well. Informal 
subregional integration initiatives are cooperative arrangements involving 
creation of institutions for more general cooperative purposes (i.e. 
discussing common interests and undertaking joint projects), but which do 
not actually impose legal obligations on the members. Informal initiatives 
tend to bring together countries in a particular geographical region, such as 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Carpathian Border Region 
Economic Development Association, and the Council of Baltic Sea States, 
although some -- such as the Central European Initiative and the Economic 
Cooperation Organization -- are more inclusive, despite having a 
geographical component to their identity. 
The designationsformal and informal do not necessarily correspond 
to a particular governance structure. Thus, the distinction does not mean 
that formal initiatives are necessarily supranational in nature, and informal 
ones are intergovernmental. In fact, nearly all of the developments 
considered below have an intergovernmental character. They can be 
understood as largely facilitative mesoinstitutions287 that have been "created 
merely to facilitate the parties' integration goals," and are not "actually 
empowered to produce substantive integration results in forms such as new 
norms, dispute resolution decisions, and harmonization legislation."288 
C. FORMAL INTEGRA TION INITIATIVES 
1. Central European Free Trade Area 
The prime example of viable sub-regional economic integration in 
CentrallEastern Europe is the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), 
which has been in effect since 1 March 1993.289 The formation ofCEFTA 
28S See infra note 328 regarding the Baltic States' free trade agreements for both industrial and 
agricultural goods. 
286 For example, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have formed a customs union. OMRI, supra 
note \3, Sept 6, 1995. There are also, at least on paper, customs unions within the CIS framework (see 
infra Parts IV.C.3.c, IV.C.3.d and Part IV.C.4). Also, Moldova and Ukraine signed a customs union 
agreement on Mar. 11, 1997. OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 12, 1997 ("At a press conferen';(' ... the two 
presidents said the customs union will be totally different from that between Russia and Belarus, 
because it will be based on full equality."). Finally, the Baltic States are working towards establishing 
a customs union among themselves. See infra note 329. 
287 Abbot & Snidal, supra note 284. 
288 Garcia, supra note 284, at 360. 
209 See Central European Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 21, 1992, Czech Republic-Hungary-Poland-
Slovakia, 34 I.L.M. 3 (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter CEFT A Agreement]. The proposal to establish a free 
trade area was made at the Visegrad Summit in Feb. 1991, Delia Meth-Cohn and Greg Grandsen, 
Building Bridges. Bus. CENT. EUR., July/Aug. 1995, at 9, and subsequently discussed at the Cracow 
Summit in Oct. 1991. See Vachudova, supra note 127, at 40. On Nov. 30, 1991, the ministers 
responsible for international economic cooperation in the Visegrad countries met in Warsaw and "issued 
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"expressed [the] will to stop the disintegration of the links between their 
economies and [the] trust in the beneficial influence of strengthened 
cooperation on the economic growth and welfare" of the members' 
economies.290 The economic and political importance ofCEFTA in East-
West European integration is growing and should not be underestimated, 
despite the fact that it is a remarkably weak organization, both substantively 
and institutionally. 
The founding members of CEFTA were Czechoslovakia (now the 
Czech and Slovak Republics), Hungary, and Poland.291 In 1996, Slovenia 
became the fifth member of CEFTA, and the first new entrant.292 This 
accession was especially significant because, in 1994, Slovenia had scorned 
CEFTA as "not dynamic enough. ,,293 Slovenia's decision to participate 
reflects the improved internal dynamics ofCEFTA, and reveals Central and 
East European perceptions both of the advantages of participation in a 
subregional integration initiative, and of the diminishing likelihood of quick 
accession to the EU. Romania became the sixth CEFTA member in 1997,294 
bringing the size of the market up to 67 million people.295 
Today, CEFTA is poised to undergo further geographical 
expansion.296 The CEFTA members decided in September 1997 to launch 
a memorandum reaffirming the goal of creating a free trade zone, including an appendix outlining the 
scope and the general provisions of the agreement to be negotiated." Pro Memoria (Nov. 30, 1991), 
quoted in Vachudova, supra note 127. For an evolutionary overview ofCEFTA's early years, see Meth-
Cohn & Grandsen, supra. See also, Sandor Richter, European Integration: The CEFTA and the Europe 
Agreements, wnw RESEARCH REpORTS, No. 237 (Vienna, May, 1997). Information, albeit largely 
unofficial, is finally becoming available on line. See, e.g .• Website of the "Jozef Stefan" Insitute 
<hnp:llwww.ijs.si/cefta/englindex.html-12> [hereinafter CEFTA Website]; Central and Eastern Europe 
Business Information Center <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/eebic/ceebic.htm> [herr.inafier EEBIC 
Website). 
290 Ryszard Lawniczak, Sub-Regional versus Pan European Free Trade of the CEECs 139, 139, 
in FINN LAURSEN & S0REN RI1SH0J, THE EU AND CENTRAL EUROPE: STATUS AND PROSPECTS (1996). 
291 Victor Gomez, Despite CEFTA. Trade Within Eastern Europe Isn't Too Neighborly, THE 
BUDAPEST SUN, Apr. 28-May 4, 1994, at 8 (noting that CEFT A "aimed at creating a 60 million' person 
market"). 
292 Slovenia concluded accession agreements with the existing CEFTA member states in Nov. 
1995, OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 27,1995, and became a member on Jan. 1, 1996. CEFTA Website, 
supra note 289. 
293 Victor Gomez, Regional Trade Integration, THE BUDAPEST SUN, May 5-11,1994, at 1 (quoting 
a Slovene diplomat). Slovenia tried to circumvent the multilateral approach by concluding bilateral 
trade agreements with each of the CEFTA member countries. Id. 
294 The accession agreement was signed on Apr. 12, 1997, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 
14, 1997, and entered into effect on July 1, 1997, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, July 2,1997. 
29\ Central European Free Trade Agreement Creates $240 Billion Market 0/67 Million People, 
EEBIC Website, supra note 289. 
2% In November 1994, on the occasion of the Poznan Summit, the Visegrad Group of countries 
agreed on the future expansion of CEFTA to include other Central European countries, provided that 
they are members of the World Trade Organization, have concluded an association agreement with the 
EU, and sign bilateral agreements with all existing CEFTA member states. Declaration of Prime 
Ministers of the CEFTA Countries (Poznan, Nov. 25,1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Poznan 
Summit Declaration). The rules of accession were amended on the occasion of the Bmo Summit. See 
Declaration of Prime Ministers of the CEFTA Countries (Bmo, Sept. 11, 1995) (on file with author) 
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fonnal negotiations with Bulgaria, which is expected to become a member 
in 1998.297 There is strong support for allowing the. Baltic States to join, 
once they fulfill all the accession criteria.298 Ukraine has reached a basic 
agreement with CEFTA's members regarding "a plan for Ukraine's entry 
into the organization, but still must fulfill any prerequisites."299 
The CEFT A Agreement, which provides for the gradual 
establishment of a free trade area, is modeled closely on the standard EA 
fonnat, which in turn is patterned after the EC Treaty. Thus, CEFTA is a 
horizontal extension at subregional level of the regime established by the 
EAs, which in turn replicate the basic structure ofthe EC Treaty.3oo And yet, 
the CEFTA Agreement is more like the EAs than it is like the EC Treaty, 
inasmuch as it more closely mimics the scope and depth ofthe EAs.301 
a. CEFTA's Institutional Structure 
CEFTA has a weak intergovernmental institutional structure. There 
is no general legislative competence, nor is there any judicial authority 
empowered to make binding interpretations of the Agreement. CEFTA's 
sole institution, the Joint Committee (lC), is charged with the task of 
superVising and administering the implementation of the CEFTA. 
Agreement.302 It has very limited decisional capaci~. Thus, the JC 
[hereinafter Bmo Summit Declaration]. It is no longer essential that the applicant have concluded free 
trade agreements with all CEFTA members. Richter, supra note 289, at 8. 
m Conclusions of the Summit of the Prime Ministers of the CEFTA Countries (Potroro, Sept. 
12-13, 1997) [hereinafter Potroro Summit Declaration], CEFT A Website, supra note 289. 
298 Slovak Prime Minister Meciar has advocated broadening CEFTA membership even further. 
Association Councils Stress Positive, in EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (July/Aug. 1997). For example, 
he suggested in 1996 that not only the Baltic States, but also Ukraine and the Balkans (including all ex-
Yugoslav countries) be considered for membership. HUNG. REp., supra note 41, Sept. 16, 1996. 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia and Ukraine have all expressed an interest in 
joining CEFTA. CEFTA Website, supra note 289. For a brief overview of the status of potential 
CEFTA member countries' applications to the World Trade Organization, see infra note 440. 
199 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Sept. 15, 1997. 
lOO Certain key language, e.g. pertaining to the basic rules governing movement of goods, state 
monopolies, state aids, and competition, is identical throughout the entire web of treaties. 
lOI Strictly speaking, CEFT A's scope is narrower than that of the EAs, since the latter not only 
establish a free trade area, but provide for political dialogue and extensive cooperation as well. 
302 The Joint Committee is composed of representatives of each member state. CEFT A Agreement, 
supra note 289, art. 34(1). The CEFTA member states themselves must ensure that provisions of the 
CEFTA Agreement are "effectively and harmoniously applied." Id. art. 16(2). The JC has broad 
competence to consider trade liberalization and trade protection measures. See id. arts. 13(2), 14,27-28, 
33. Its most sensitive and important role is in connection with the application of safeguard measures. 
Id. art. 31. CEFT A member states are obliged to notify the JC of certain events.ld. arts. !3(2), 20(1), 
21(3),23(4),28(6),31(3). 
303 The JC is limited both by the scope of its decisional authority, id., arts. 10(2),23-24, and by 
the requirement that it take decisions by common agreement on certain matters, id. art. 34. Beyond this, 
the JC only has the power to mak~ recommendations. Id. While the JC has jurisdiction to decide some 
sensitive disputes, its effectiveness is severely constrained by the unanimity requirement: One member 
state can hardly be expected to be iii common agreement with a complaint brought against its own 
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mainly provides a forum where member states can exchange and discuss 
information relevant to proper implementation of the Agreement, although 
members have also demonstrated a willingness to discuss within the CEFTA 
institutional framework some matters that clearly fall outside CEFTA's 
conipetence.304 The JC is also designated as the forum for discussing further 
integration among CEFTA member states: It is charged with considering 
further liberalization of trade among the member states, as appropriate, and 
proposing amendments to the CEFT A Agreement. 305 
The key to CEFTA's institutional weakness lies more in the lack of 
supranational decision-making power than in the limited scope within which 
the JC may take decisions. And yet this weakness is intentionaP06 The 
CEECs are fond of their newly-acquired independence, and reluctant to 
yield any bit of it, especially to an organization that reeks of the COMECON 
and second-class European citizenship. During the first years ofCEFTA's 
operation, the member states were circumspect about raising their common 
voice, and cautiously avoided expanding the scope of their cooperation, 
largely because each of them was preoccupied with asserting itself 
individually vis-a-vis the EU and trying to distance itself from the pack of 
associated CEECs in the race to accession. The Visegnid countries have 
practices. 
As the history of the EU shows, however, deeper integration is often marked by a willingness over 
time to yield to decision-making by qualified majority. No such tendencies are apparent at this early 
stage of Central European integration. However, the member states acknowledged this weakness in 
their Record of Understandings, where they "consider that an arbitration procedure could be envisaged 
for disputes which cannot be settled through consultations between the Parties concerned or in the Joint 
Committee. Such a possibility may be further examined in the Joint Committee." [d., Record of 
Understandings, Clause I, para. 7. To date, however, no concrete steps have been taken in this 
direction. 
304 Notwithstanding the fact that trade between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is expressly 
excluded from the scope of CEIT A, these two countries discussed their dispute over customs duties and 
import surcharges on foreign cars in the framework of the CEITA Brno Summit in September 1995. 
Bmo Summit Declaration, supra note 296. The fact that these discussione tock place "It t.l}e CEFTA 
Summit may merely reflect considerations of convenience, but it also may reflect growing comfort with 
(or even confidence in) the CEFTA institutional structure. 
30S CEITA Agreement, supra note 289, art. 39. 
306 As early as 1991 and 1992, Czech and Hungarian leaders made it clear that they were not 
seeking to use the Visegrlld cooperation as a "framework for advocating the creation of new 
bureaucracies and institutions." Vachudova, supra note 127, at 41. A Czech minister reiterated in 1995 
that "[w]e don't want to create any kind of institution." Timea Spitkova, Visegrad's Usefulness in 
Doubt, PRAGUE POST, June 7-13, 1995, at 5 ("The Czech Republic again snubbed efforts to create 
institutional1inks among the Visegrlld Four countries ... "). Vachudova argues that the "Hungarians see 
Visegrad above all as a process, not as an organization." Vachudova, supra note 127, at 42. Polish 
President Walensa, by way of contrast, expressed the view early on that "limited institutionalization 
would be useful." [d. at 41. See also Richter, supra note 289, at 20 ("The fear of the institutionalization 
of regional cooperation is obvious from the fact that CEFTA has no organization, or headquarters, or 
any paid employees"). 
The JC has discussed CEFTA's organizational structure and expressed its opinion that no 
permanent institution is needed yet, but it is considering ways to improve the existing structure. Agreed 
Minutes on the Session of the Central European Free Trade Agreement Joint Committee (Bratislava, 
June 5-6, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bratislava Summit Declaration). 
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been especially sensitive to being lumped together and treated as an 
amorphous mass by the EU.307 This aversion has ebbed somewhat since 
CEFTA's economic success has become an established fact.308 
In a dramatic proclamation, Hungarian Prime Minister Hom 
endorsed the political component of the economic cooperation by calling on 
other CEFTA countries -- all of whom "know exactly what they do not want 
cooperation to be like in the future" -- to base their relations not merely on 
"denial of the decades past, but rather [on] the kind of co-operation which 
meets with the interests and ambitions of free, independent states. ,,309 It is 
this growing willingness to cooperate for mutual gain -- rather than formal 
organizational strength -- that accounts for CEFTA's growing importance in 
the region. It should not escape notice that the current members of CEFTA 
are all EA countries, as are the countries most likely to join CEFT A in the 
near future. CEFT A should thus be seen as an important voice of the first 
tier of the associated countries vis-a-vis the EU. 
)07 The staunchest opponents to Visegrftd cooperation have been the Czechs. Prime Minister Klaus 
heavily criticized CEFTA from the outset, arguing that the Visegrad cooperation "framework was 
imposed on the countries concerned by Western states in order to stall their entry into Western 
institutions." Vachudova, supra note 127, at 41. President Havel largely agreed with Klaus' assessment, 
but Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski did not; he retorted that "Whoever s?ys the West 
authored [Visegrftd] is wrong." [d. at 42. In Vachudova's 1993 view, "the Poles ... see it as something 
intrinsically good; the Czechs see it as something to be avoided; but the Hungarians take a 
nonideological view that emphasizes the practical benefits to be gained." [d. See also Kolankiewicz, 
supra note 2, at 483-84 (noting the Czech "minimalist" strategy and fear that "the Visegrad ante-room 
[might be] transformed into a pennanent residence"); Bugge, supra note 168, at 4. But see id. at 4 
(noting in 1997 that the "Czech Republic has had to abandon its initial scepticism towards the CEFT A" 
especially in light of positive trade results). 
)08 According to a July 1996 report prepared by the Nomura Research Institute ("NRI"), the 
"turning point in inter-regional trade came in 1994." Ma1gorzata Halaba, Trade Levels among Eastern 
European Countries Rising, WARSAW Bus. J., Aug. 26 - Sept. I, 1996, at 5 (quoting NRI report) 
[hereinafter NRI Report]. The NRI Report documented significant rises in interregional trade for the 
Visegrftd countries during the 1994-1995 period, and predicted that interregional trade "ought to become 
increasingly important." [d. See also Cooperation with CEFTA Countries, POLISH FOREIGN TRADE, 
Oct. 95, at 6-7; Agreed Minutes on the Session of the Central European Free Trade Area Joint 
Committee (Warsaw, Aug. 17-18, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Warsaw Summit Declaration] 
(noting the "significant rise in mutual trade, recorded in 1994 and the first months of 1995"); Agreed 
Minutes on the Extraordinary Session of the Central European Free Trade Area Joint Committee 
(Warsaw, Dec. 21, 1995) (on file with author) (noting the "almost 100% increase of mutual trade 
reached" since CEFTA's effective date); Bratislava Summit Declaration, supra note 306 (noting the 
"significant growth in mutual trade, recorded in 1995 and in the first months of 1996"). Of course, not 
all improvement in subregional trade can be attributed to CEFT A, since the "improving economic 
situation in the Visegrad Four has played a role." Backyard Trade, THE BUDAPEST SUN, May 12-18, 
1994, at 4. 
By "success" I do not mean to suggest that trade among CEFT A countries is replacing trade with 
EU and other countries, but rather that trade among CEFT A members is growing. See generally. NRI 
Report, supra (showing that Czech and Polish trade in 1994 and 1995 shifted increasingly away from 
the EU and towards interregional trade); Bugge, supra note 168, at 4 (quoting 1997 Czech sources and 
noting that Czech "trade within CEFT A is developing positively in stark contrast to the growing deficit 
in Czech trade with the EU."). 
309 Gyula Hom, CEFTA Works, Bus. CENT. EUR.: THE ANNUAL, Dec. 1995, at 18. 
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b. CEFTA's Substantive Provisions 
The CEFTA Agreement provides for the gradual creation ofa free 
trade area310 for industrial goods by 1 January 2001.311 It does not, however, 
create a free trade area for trade in agricultural products.312 CEFTA's rules 
on free movement of goods are supplemented by a wide range of trade-
related measures,313 all of which can be traced to similar (or identical) 
provisions found in the EC Treaty and in the EAs. The CEFTA Agreement 
l10 The legal fonnat of the CEFTA free trade area for industrial products is familiar to anyone who 
has read the EC Treaty or an EA. In essence, the CEFTA Agreement abolishes existing (and prohibits 
the introduction of new) customs duties on imports and exports (including measures of a fiscal nature 
and those having equivalent effect to customs duties). CEFT A Agreement. supra note 289, arts. 3-7. 
Further, it abolishes existing (and prohibits the introduction of any new) quantitative restrictions on 
imports and exports, including measures having equivalent effect. [d. arts. 8-9. Member states must 
refrain from any discriminatory measure or practice of an internal fiscal nature. [d. art. 17. Member 
states are also entitled to the standard general and security exceptions to the free movement of goods. 
[d. arts. 18-19. 
The CEFT A Agreement also provides for common rules of origin. [d. Protocol 7. The definition 
of "originating products" contained in Protocol 7 and the procedures established therein are very similar 
to those found in the EAs. Annex YIIl to Protocol 7 calls upon the member countries at a session of the 
Joint Committee "in the near future" to examine the question of the treatment of materials originating 
in other member states (i.e. multilateral cumulation) and the further question of the treatment' of 
materials originating in European Free Trade Area (EFTA) or in the EC. This crucial issue is discussed 
further, infra Part IV.F.!. 
No instances of interpretation of the CEFTA Agreement's basic provisions on free movement of 
goods have come to light. 
III However, CEFTA countries have negotiated almost continuously since concluding the CEFTA 
Agreement in December 1992 "to start immediate negotiations on speeding up liberalization." Meth-
Cohn & Grandsen, supra note 289, at 9. As a result of the various agreements to accelerate dismantling 
of tariffs, CEFTA achieved free trade 98% of industrial goods on January I, 1997, rather than by 
January 1,2001 (or 2002 for automotive goods) as originally planned. Christopher Serres, CEFTA 
Leaves Farmers Out in the Cold, WARSAW Bus. J., Sept. 23-29, 1996, at 4. Richter notes that "specific 
reductions of trade barriers are [made] on a bilateral basis." Richter, supra note 289, at 3. 
ll2 The CEFTA Agreement establishes a network of bilateral concessions and calls upon the 
member states to "examine the possibilities of granting each other further concessions." CEFT A 
Agreement, supra note 289, art. 12(2). It also requires each member state to apply its sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations in a non-discriminatory manner. [d. art. 15. Liberalization in the agricultural 
sector has been agonizingly slow. The member states agreed at the Poznan Summit on Nov. 25,1994 
to seek reductions in duties on agricultural goods. Meth-Cohn & Grandsen, supra note 289, at 9. In 
August and December 1995, CEFT A member countries signed protocols liberalizing agricultural trade. 
CEFTA 's Development, CEFTA Website, supra note 289 (visited Jan. 28, 1998). 
III For example, the CEFT A Agreement, supra note 289, contains provisions on: state monopolies 
of a commercial character, art. 20; competition, art. 22; state aids, art. 23; procurement, art. 24; 
intellectual property, art. 25 (member states must grant and ensure protection of intellectual rights on 
a non-discriminatory basis and, within a stated period, raise the level of protection to that determined 
by certain designated multilateral agreements); dumping, art. 26; safeguard measures, art. 27; structural 
adjustment measures, art. 28; and shortages, art. 29. The permitted safeguard measures are "restricted 
with regard to their extent and to their duration to what is strictly necessary in order to rectify the 
situation giving rise to their application and shall not be in excess of the injury caused by the practice 
or the difficulty in question. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the 
functioning of the Agreement. The measures taken by a [member state] against an action or an omission 
of another [member state] may only affect the trade with that [member state)." [d. art. 31(5). In 
addition, any safeguard measures taken shall be discussed within the JC, with a view to "their relaxation 
as soon as possible, or abolition when conditions no longer justify their maintenance." [d. art. 31(6). 
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also contains provisions relating to payments,314 which have analogues in the 
EAs and in the EC Treaty.315 However, compared to the EC Treaty, and 
even to the EAs, there are huge gaps in CEFTA's coverage.316 
CEFTA has one major, and one minor structural weakness. The 
major structural weakness is that CEFTA lacks a central mechanism for 
eliminating non-tariffbarriers.317 Its minor structural weakness is that the 
CEFTA Agreement contains no provision caIling for approximation of 
laws.318 
Despite all its limitations and weaknesses, CEFTA is a success 
story. Encouraging economic results have led CEFTA member states to talk 
seriously about expanding the scope of their cooperation, as well as their 
membership. Proposals made in the context of CEFTA summits suggest 
that at least some CEFT A member states are enthusiastic about the benefits 
and optimistic about the future of economic integration in Central and 
Eastern Europe,319 although actual progress has been slo~o CEFT A 
3" First, CEITA member states must permit payments relating to trade in goods to be made in 
freely convertible currency without restriction. CEIT A Agreement, supra note 289, art. 21. However, 
the CEIT A member states have reserved the right to apply exchange restrictions until such time as they 
are subject to Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Articles 
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 1947,60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. 1501,2 V.N.T.S. 39. 
Second, CEIT A member states shall endeavor to avoid imposing restrictive measures relating to 
balance of payments difficulties. CEFTA agreement, supra note 289, art. 32. However, they may do 
so under the conditions established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A-II, T.I.A.S. 1700,55 V.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAlT]. 
31S See, e.g., Hungarian EA, supra note 42, arts. 59 (payments in freely convertible currency) and 
art. 60(2) (foreign exchange restrictions); EC Treaty, supra note 22, arts. 67-73h. 
316 CEITA's competence does not extend to free movement of persons, freedom to provide 
services, or freedom of establishment; neither does it cover matters such as investmeni..>, industrial 
policy, social policy, or economic policy. Also implicitly excluded are the transport, energy and 
telecommunications sectors. 
317 See Meth-Cohn & Grandsen, supra note 289, at 12. See also id. at 9 ("major obstacle is ... 
CEIT A's inability to make sure its members stick to the spirit of free trade now that some of its 
companies are competing on quality as well as on price"). Developments in the region demonstrate that 
CEIT A member states have been creative in finding ways to protect domestic producers against cheaper 
imports from other CEIT A countries. Hungary, for example, introduced a system of import monitoring, 
under which the importer must send all documents to the industry ministry, which then gives permission 
for the goods to pass through customs. Id. at 12. 
318 This weakness is minor, since each CEITA country is already bound under its respective EA 
with the EC to approximate its legislation to that of the EV. The CEITA Agreement establishes a 
standstill procedure under which member states must notifY one another of draft technical regulations 
and wait three months before adopting them (except in urgent cases), in order to give the other member 
states time to comment on and consult regarding them. CEFT A Agreement, supra note 289, Annex V. 
However, no standstill period is required for a draft technical regulation which "merely transposes the 
full text of an international or European standard." Id. Annex V, art. 2(2). 
31' For example, at the Sept. 1995 Bmo Summit, CEIT A member states agreed inter alia to speed 
up talks on certifying industrial and agricultural products (including mutual recognition of certificates); 
to simplify and standardize CEITA's rules of origin, and to bring them into line with those of the EV; 
and to consider expanding CEITA activities to include trade in services and the free movement of 
capital. The Polish government, which prepared the proposal on capital, went so far as to suggest 
setting up a regional trade and investment bank. CEFTA Members Agree to Add Slovenia; Bulgaria, 
Romania Likely to Join Next, BNA INT'L TRADE REp., Sept. 20, 1995, at 1582-83. According to a 
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contains a limited "evolutionary clause" under which a member state may 
propose adding new areas to CEFTA's competence.321 
One significant feature of CEFTA is that it does "not prevent the 
maintenance or establishment of customs unions, free trade areas or 
arrangements for frontier trade to the extent that these do not negatively 
affect the [CEFT A] trade regime and in particular [its] rules of origin. "322 
CEFTA, thus, expressly foresees that its member states will enter into 
bilateral trade agreements with other countries.323 This criss-cross pattern 
of bilateral linkages may actually impel further integration within CEFTA 
itself, since the member states declared themselves ready "to examine in the 
Joint Committee the possibility of extending to each other any concessions 
they grant or will grant to third countries with which they conclude a Free 
Trade Agreement or other similar agreement. .. "324 Another dynamic 
element of the CEFTA structure is that it does not hinder its member states 
from seeking closer integration with each other.32s Thus, for example, the 
Czech Republic and Poland deepened their cooperation by concluding a 
bilateral agreement on cooperation in agriculture and the food industry in 
August 1995.326 
Subregional success, measured in both economic and political 
terms, ensures that CEFTA is not only here to stay, but is likely to increase 
in regional importance in the coming years. The role ofCEFTA has become 
more complex and less certain since four of its members--the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia--were placed on the enlargement 
"fast-track" by the Commission's July 1997 deCision to commence 
statement by Hungarian Prime Minister Hom, there is some interest in broadening cooperation to 
include transport, telecommunications, energy, infrastructure, and privatization. Hom has further 
advocated "more meaningful and pragmatic cooperation" between institutions and officials. Hom, 
supra note 309, at 18. 
320 Completion of the internal market has been held up by Slovenia's reluctance to lower 
agricultural trade barriers, and by Poland's imposition of import duties on steel. Month in Review: 
Politics and Economies, Bus. CENT. EUR., Oct. 1997, at 17. See also Portoro Summit Declaration, supra 
note 297 (finding that "the functioning of CEFT A is less dynamic after the first successful years," and 
agreeing to move ahead in respect to: "free movement of capital, common interpretation of certain 
articles of the Agreement, liberalisation of trade in services or in the field of mutual recognition of 
certificates and test results for agricultural and industrial products."). 
321 CEFTA Agreement, supra note 289, art. 33(1) (a member state that "considers that it would 
be useful in the interest of the Parties to develop and deepen the relations established by the Agreement 
by extending them to fields not covered thereby [shall] submit a reasoned request to the other [member 
states which] may instruct the Joint Committee to examine such a request and, where appropriate, to 
make recommendations, particularly with a view to opening negotiations. "). 
322 ld., art. 36(2). 
323 As a matter of fact, CEFT A member states have concluded numerous free trade agreements 
with other European countries. See the discussion of interregional links infra in notes 347-50. 
324 CEFTA Agreement, supra note 289, Record of Understandings, CI. I. 
325 Since the Czech Republic and Slovakia have formed a customs union between themselves, 
supra note 286, the CEFT A Agreement does not govern trade between them. ld., art. 36( 1). 
326 Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176. They were "forced" to do this outside the CEFTA 
framework because of Hungarian intransigence. 
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accession negotiations with them ahead of Slovakia (also a CEFTA 
member) and Bulgaria (next in line to join CEFTA). CEFTA may be 
transitional in nature for some members since they could drop out upon 
accession to the EU. But the enlargement process will be slow, if past 
experience is any guide, and not all present or likely future CEFT A 
members face reasonable prospects of joining the EU. This is all the more 
reason to build on CEFTA' s success. 
2. Baltic States 
The Baltic States have been moving towards closer integration 
among themselves, in addition to seeking closer ties with CEFT A i1nd other 
CEECs. For example, they established a Baltic Council of Ministers,327 and 
have concluded free trade agreements for both industrial and agricultural 
goods.328 Recent joint declarations have called for intensifying 
cooperation,329 which includes working towards establishing a customs 
union.330 However, not all sailing is smooth. For example, conflict often 
arises among the Baltic States in the context of their relations with the EU.331 
This tension is likely to increase, now that Estonia has been placed on the 
enlargement "fast track" by the Commission's July 1997 decision to 
commerce accession negotiation with Estonia, but not with Latvia or 
321 Communique o/the Council o/the Baltic Sea States, Fourth Ministerial Session (Gdansk, May 
18-19, 1995) [hereinafter CBSS Gdansk Communique], point 17, Baltinfo Website 
<hnp://www.baltinfo.orgl> [hereinafter Baltinfo Website]. 
328 OMRl, supra note 13, Jan. 3, 1997. The free trade agreement covering industrial goods was 
concluded on Sept. 13, 1993, and entered into effect in Apr. 1994, whereas the one covering agricultural 
trade was signed on Aug. 15, 1996, OMRl, supra note 13, Aug. 16, 1996, and entered into effect on Jan. 
I, 1997. OMRl, supra note 13, Jan. 3, 1997. See generally Lawniczak, supra note 290, at 151-54 
(noting slow progress in real tenns). 
329 EUR. DIALOGUE, supra note 41 (May/June 1997). See also OMRl, supra note 13, Nov. 27, 
1996; OMRl, supra note 13, Feb. 7, 1997 (Council of Ministers signed five documents directed at 
further liberalization of economic relations). 
330 RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, May 27,1997. There was some concern that Estonia would 
lose interest in the proposed customs union after it was placed on the EEU's accession fast-track ahead 
of its Baltic neighbors. RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, Sept. 10, 1997. They have moved forward 
somewhat, by agreeing to "abolish non-tariff customs barriers" and by signing a " resolution on 
establishing a joint economic area that would allow the free movement oflabor and services and the 
creation ofajoint border region." RFEIRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, Nov. 21,1997. 
331 See Lawniczak, supra note 290, at 152 (documenting the rivalries and conflicts) and at 153 
(noting the " paradox ... that it is the outside western pressure that is the driving force for sub-regional 
cooperation"). For example, tensions came to a head in mid-I997, when the EU was preparing to 
announce which EA countries would be invited to commence accession negotiations. While Baltic 
foreign ministers urged the EU to start negotiations with all three Baltic States simultaneously, RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 2, 1997, Baltic prime ministers were unable to agree on a joint 
declaration on joining the EU. Estonia and Latvia favored "a statement saying that even if only one 
Baltic country were admitted, the other two would still benefit from its membership," while "Lithuania 
... wanted the declaration to stress that the Baltic States favor entering the EU together." RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 17, 1997. 
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Lithuania.332 
3. Commonwealth of Independent States 
This overview of the current situation in those republics of the 
former Soviet Union that have joined the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)333 is surely incomplete, owing to the pace of developments and 
the difficulties of obtaining accurate information about developments in the 
region. The following should be viewed as a preliminary look at some of 
the proposed structures within the CIS, rather than an analysis of actual 
practice, and an illustration of some parallels between the structure 
envisaged by the CIS and those present in the EU. 
a. Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
The scope of the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS Charter)334 is comprehensive~3s The CIS Charter expressly 
declares the intergovernmental nature of the CIS,336 which must be borne in 
mind when considering the profusion of institutions that the CIS Charter 
132 See, e.g. RFEIRL Newsline, Aug. 28, 1997 (Latvian Foreign Minister Birkaus asserted that 
"Estonian diplomats are advertising their country's success more 'aggressively' than their Latvian 
counterparts"). 
l3l See supra note 64 (regarding conclusion of the CIS Agreement and related declarations). The 
Russian Duma voted on Mar. IS, 1996 to repudiate the dissolution of and to restore the former Soviet 
Union. OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 20,1996. The Federation Council (i.e. Russia's upper house) asked 
the Duma (Le. lower house) to reconsider this decision, noting that it could "create difficulties in 
achieving the 'noble goal' of ... CIS integration." Id. 
334 The Charter of the Commonwealth ofindependent States was Signed by all twelve members 
of the CIS (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) during the course of 1993, and entered 
into effect in 1994. Commonwealth of Independent States: Charter, June 22, 1993,34 I.L.M. 1279 
(1995) [hereinafter CIS Charter). This agreement establishes -- at least on paper -- an extensive 
framework of organs and institutions for the CIS and contains a broad range of commitments. It 
recognizes that some countries may wish to participate fully in the Commonwealth, while others 
"willing to participate in certain kinds of activities ... may join" as associate members. Id. art. 8. 
Ukraine exercised the option to become an associate member, but all other countries are full members. 
m The competence of the CIS is very broad: it covers cooperation in political. economic, 
ecological, humanitarian, defense, scientific, technological, and other areas. CIS Agreement, supra note 
64, art. 2. The member states have agreed to cooperate with regard to human rights; foreign policy; 
formation and development of a common economic space; customs policy; transport; communications; 
health care; education; culture; protection of the environment; sports; social policy and immigration; 
defense policy and the protection of external frontiers; and the struggle against organized crime. Id. 
arts. 2-6. The "common economic space" shall be formed on the basis of market relations and of free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Id. art. 19. Cooperation "in economic and social 
fields" is defined further to include coordination of credit and fiscal policy; encouragement and mutual 
protection of investments; promotion of standardization and certification of industrial goods; and 
protection ofintellectual property. Id. 
ll6 The Commonwealth shall be "based on sovereign equality of its members" and "shall not be 
a state and shall not be supranational." CIS Charter, supra note 334, art. I. 
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calls into existence,33? among them an Economic Court.338 The CIS Charter 
contains no binding dispute resolution procedure, except for such disputes 
as fall within the jurisdiction of the Economic Court.339 Nor do CIS 
institutions have any legislative competence. 
The CIS Charter envisages law as one of the principal means of 
integration. Article 20 calls upon the member states to "cooperate in the 
field of law, in particular, by means of concluding multilateral and bilateral 
agreements on rendering legal assistance and shall enhance rapprochement 
of national legislations."34o As further explained below, much of the 
m The principal executive organs of the CIS are the Council of the Heads of State and the Council 
of the Heads of Government. Id. at ch. VI (describing these organizations' functions). The former is 
the "supreme organ ... on the issues of defence and guarding of the external frontiers," and takes 
decisions on "the principal issues relating to the activity of the member states in the field of their mutual 
interests." Id. arts. 14, 21. The latter, on the other hand, is the organ in which the "executive power 
organs of member states" meet to "coordinate cooperation" in military, economic, social, and other 
spheres of mutual interest. Both of these Councils take their decisions on the basis of consensus. Id. 
art. 22. As a matter offact, these organs were actually established by the Minsk Agreement and the 
Alma-Ata Declaration, both supra note 64. 
The CIS Charter also calls for the establishment ofan Interparliamentary Assembly. CIS Charter, 
supra note 334, arts. 36-37. The Assembly (based in St. Petersburg) consists of parliamentary 
delegations from the member states. Its task is to deliberate, "to discuss questions of cooperation, and 
to elaborate joint proposals in the sphere of activity of national parliaments." Id. art. 36. Its seventh 
session (in St. Petersburg in February 1996) outlined plans for more cooperation among the member 
states. Russian President Yeltsin and Duma Chairman Seleznev stressed the need for the Assembly to 
become a viable forum for inter-CIS relations. OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 19, 1996. The Assembly 
has been active. For example, it has adopted resolutions concerning the agreement to normalize 
relations between Moldova and the breakaway Transdniester region and calling for implementation of 
a decision to broaden the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, June 10, 1997. 
Some 80 supranational organs have been created since 1991, "many of which are duplicative and 
wasteful." OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 28, 1997. Therefore, the CIS foreign ministers "imposed a 
moratorium on creating new ones." Id. 
)l8 The role of the Economic Court is to ensure that the economic obligations undertaken by the 
member states are observed. CIS Charter, supra note 334, art. 32. The Court shall have jurisdiction to 
settle disputes which arise "while the economic obligations are being executed," as well as other 
disputes referred to it by agreement of the member states." Id. It shall also have jurisdiction to 
"interpret the provisions of agreements and other acts of the Commonwealth on economic issues." Id. 
The Council of the Heads of State is instructed to adopt an Agreement on the Status of the Economic 
Court and' governing Regulations. See id. A lack of information prevents assessment of the actual 
power or effectiveness of the Economic Court at this time. 
ll9 The C.S Charter contains very weak dispute resolution provisions. In the case of conflicts 
"which are likely to entail the violation of human rights," the member states are obliged to "take all . 
. . possible measures to prevent" and to "render each other in assistance in settlement of" such conflicts. 
Id. art. 16. The member states are obliged to refrain from "actions ... likely to cause losses to other 
member states," and "in good faith and in the spirit of cooperation do their utmost for fair and pacific 
settlement of their disputes by means of negotiations" or other appropriate procedure. Id. art. 17. If the 
member states are not able to resolve such a conflict between or among themselves, they may submit 
it to the Council of Heads of State. Id. The most far-reaching provision merely empowers the Council 
of the Heads of State, in case of a dispute which pose a threat to peace or security, to intervene at any 
time to recommend an appropriate method of resolving the dispute. Id. art. 18 (emphosis added). 
)<0 Id. art. 20(1). Article 20(2) provides that "[s]hould a contradiction arise between the norms of 
national legislations of member states, goveming the relations in the fields of joint activity, the member 
states shall conduct consultations and negotiations with the view of elaboration of proposals on 
elimination of the contradictions." Id. art. 20(2). An Agreement on Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation 
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cooperation within the CIS framework will take the form of law.341 
While remarkable on paper, the fact is that implementation of the 
CIS Charter has been minimal.342 And yet, concrete steps have been and 
continue to be taken, such as the conclusion of the CIS Treaty on Creation 
of Economic Union343 and various measures in the security field.344 
b. CIS Treaty on Creation of Economic Union 
The CIS Treaty on Creation of Economic Union (CIS Economic 
Union Treaty) was signed in Moscow on 24 September 1993.345 This 
Treaty, like the CIS Charter, establishes an institutional framework and 
contains a broad range of commitments. However, the CIS Economic Union 
Treaty is not self-executing; like the CIS Charter, the Treaty only establishes 
a framework whose provisions require further implementation. And 
implementation has been very limited.346 
The CIS Economic Union Treaty provides that the contracting 
in the Legal Sphere was signed' in Moscow on Feb. 27, 1992 by Annenia,Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine. For an analysis .tee Buxbaum, 
supra note 49, at 126-27 and 134-35. 
341 At the seventh meeting of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in February 1996, Duma 
Chairman Seleznev indicated that the newly-elected Duma would "likely consider the coordination of 
legal codes among member states to be of utmost importance." OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 19, 1996. 
342 See infra notes 377-78. 
343 See infra text accompanying notes 345-63. 
344 Not surprisingly, cooperation among CIS members in the security arena has been intense. 
However, this topic is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 5,1996 
(Dushanabe meeting to discuss cooperation in the fight against drugs and arms smuggling); RFEIRL 
NEWSL.INE, supra note 41, Apr. I, 1997 (agreement on creation ofa CIS commission to mediate the 
conflicts in Transdniester, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, and Nagomo-Karabakh); OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 
3, 1997 (foreign ministers' follow-up meeting to discuss May 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective 
Security); RFEfRL NEWSL.INE, supra note 41, Apr. 24, 1997 (CIS-Chinese Border Agreement). 
However, even in this field, cooperation is "tenuous." OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 28, 1997 (only 9 of 
the 12 CIS states formally attended March 1997 meeting of CIS defense ministers). 
34S Commonwealth ofIndependent States: Treaty on Creation of Economic Union, Sept. 24,1993, 
341.L.M. 1298 [hereinafter CIS Economic Union Treaty]. All twelve members of the CIS joined the 
Economic Union Treaty, although Ukraine is only an associate member. 
346 On Jan. 17, 1997, the CIS Heads of Government Council considered" 17 proposed economic 
agreements but approved only nine of them." OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 20, 1997. This meeting also 
considered an overall Concept for Integrated Economic Development, which envisages creating a single 
CIS, expanding the customs union, and integrating transport and energy systems. RFEIRL NEWSL.INE, 
supra note 41, Apr. 3,1997. See also OMRI, supra (proposals for "unified CIS trade, labor, transport, 
customs, and currency systems"). This Concept was formally "approved" by "8 of 12 countries," 
RFEfRL NEWSL.INE, supra note 41, Apr. 3, 1997, but only Yeltsin actually signed it. RFEIRL NEWSL.INE, 
supra note 41, Apr. I, 1997. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan refused to support the 
Concept, and Ukraine insisted that it be submitted for further discussion. OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 
20,1997. Further negotiations and modifications to the Concept have ensued. RFEfRL NEWSL.INE, 
supra note 41, Apr. 3, 1997. At the Mar. 1997 CIS Summit, talk still focused on plans to create a 
"'single economic space' which would include free trade zones, a vast customs union and integrated 
energy and transport systems." Timothy Heritage, CIS Leaders Meet More Divided than United, 
REUTER (Mar. 28, 1997), EEuROPE-NEWS-DIGEST <europe-news.request@hookup.net> [hereinafter 
EEuROPE-NEWS-DIG.]. 
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parties shall "employ existing and create new Jomt executive and 
coordinating" organs.347 Like the CIS Charter, the CIS Economic Union 
Treaty calls for decisions to be taken on a consensus basis; unlike the 
former, the latter's provisions on dispute resolution are more concrete and 
far-reaching. 348 
The CIS Economic Union Treaty calls for the progressive 
establishment of a multilateral free trade association; a customs union; a 
common market of goods, services, capital, and labor; and a monetary 
union.349 The treaty states that there shall be "coordinated fiscal, budgetary, 
tax, pricing, foreign economic, customs and monetary policies; harmonized 
economic legislation ... ; and common statistics.'t3S0 There shall be a 
mechanism for anti-monopoly regulation,3S1 and various coordinated 
policies.3S2 Trade among contracting parties shall be on a non-
discriminatory basis,3S3 and enterprises of one contracting party residing in 
another one and engaged in economic activities there shall be entitled to 
national treatment.3S4 The CIS Economic Union Treaty contains a broad 
chapter on "Sociiil Policy," which includes visa-free movement of citizens 
throughout the territory of the Economic Union/55 non-discriminatory 
treatment of persons on the basis of nationality,356 mutual recognition of 
certificates of education,3S7 coordinated policies on working conditions and 
occupational safety,3S8 and special agreements to provide for the migration 
of workers, social security insurance, and pensions.3s9 The scope of the CIS 
Economic Union thus appears, at least on paper, to be similar in scope to 
that of the EC Treaty360 and the TEU, and in some instances is even wider. 
The CIS Economic Union Treaty obliges the member states "to 
bring their national legislation into compliance with the norms of the present 
Treaty and intemationallaw."361 Thus, the member states must: 
341 CIS Economic Union Treaty, supra note 345, art. 27. 
348 [d. art. 31. The CIS Economic Union Treaty expressly states that any contractin/1: party "may 
declare it has no interest in a particular question, which should not be regarded as an obstacle to the 
adoption of the decision." [d. art. 27. 
3'9 [d. art. 3. 
3SO [d. art. 3. 
35, [d. art. 7. 
m For example, there shall be coordinated policies for transport and communications. [d. 
353 Jd. art. 8. 
354 [d. art. 8. 
355 [d. art. 19. 
356 [d. art. 21. 
351 Jd. art. 22. 
m Jd. art. 23. 
359 Jd. art. 24. 
360 Supra note 22. 
361 [d. art. 26 (contracting parties recognize "the necessity of achieving uniform regulation of 
economic relations"). 
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[W]ork out model acts regulating mutual economic 
relations; . . . carry out work on coordination and 
approximation of national legislation in force on the basis 
of the model drafts and norms of international law in order 
to eliminate the contradictions between them; . . . 
coordinate the adoption of the new legislative acts on 
economic issues; [and] . . . carry out preliminary 
examination of the drafts of normative acts, providing for 
the compliance of these acts with the norms of international 
law, the present Treaty, and bilateral and multilateral 
agreements.362 
The principle of supremacy of the laws of the CIS Economic Union is 
clearly stated.363 
This brief sketch of the main institutional and substantive aspects 
of the CIS Charter and the Economic Union Treaty suggests many parallels 
between economic integration in the CIS and in the EU. It would be 
premature to undertake further comparative analysis at this time, however, 
since the texts of the CIS Charter and the Economic Union Treaty alone do 
not provide an adequate basis for meaningful assessment. 
c. Economic (Customs) Union 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia concluded an 
economic (customs) union agreement on 29 March 1996.364 Few details 
362 Id. art. 26. 
3.3 Article 25 of the CIS Economic Union Treaty states: 
[E]conomic relations between the Contracting Parties and their economic entities shall be 
regulated by the present Treaty, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and by the norms of 
international law and national legislation. If the present Treaty contains norms and rules 
other than those provided by national legislation, the rules and norms of international law 
and the present Treaty shall be applied. 
Id. art. 25 (emphasis added). 
364 See Treaty Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Spheres, reported in OMRI, 
supra note 13, Apr. 1, 1996 [hereinafter Quadripartite Treaty, per OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 3, 1997]. 
Further economic accords were signed at an Apr. 12, 1996 meeting of CIS Prim;: Mln:s!::rs. OMRI, 
supra note 13, Apr. 15, 1996. See also OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 22,1996 (meeting of the Integration 
Committee in Minsk). 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan decided against participating in the enhanced union, citing inter alia 
their independence, preference for bilateralism, and antipathy to reviving the Soviet Union. 
Turkmenistan prefers "bilateral relations" and rejects "entry into rigid supranational structures" as 
"politically inexpedient and legally inapplicable." OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 9, 1996. Uzbekistan, 
known for its "growing autonomy and its strongly independent stance in foreign policy," also elected 
not to join. See Interview with Uzbekistan's Ambassador [to EUj: Links to West for Slow But Steady 
Transition, EIS EURO-EAST REp., supra note 57, Dec. 10,1996. 
According to Kyrgyz President Akayev, such efforts do not signal the return of the USSR, but 
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about the content of this agreement are known,365 although it appears to 
implement relevant provisions of the CIS Economic Union Treaty discussed 
above. However, the low level of implementation of this agreement has led 
to dissatisfaction among the participants.366 Some recent pronouncements 
have been more optimistic. In January 1998, the prime ministers "signed 
documents on joint customs tariffs, coordination of their tax systems, 
forming a transport union, and unified transit tariffs.»367 However, the 
presidents were unable to agree to Kazak President Nazarbaev's proposal 
"to 'create a common economic space' modeled on the EU".368 Nazarbaev 
views the customs union as the "nucleus" of a Eurasian union.369 
d. Belarus-Russia Union 
The Treaty on the Formation of a Community between Belarus and 
Russia was signed on 2 April 1996.370 A more detailed Union Charter was 
signed on 23 May 1997.371 The Belarus-Russia Union calls for the 
rather the "coming together of its former republics on a new basis." OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 29, 
1996. Tajikistan has expressed its "readiness to join the customs union and willingness to participate 
in a 'single economic space.'" Id. -
J6S The Quadripartite Treaty, supra note 364, covers diverse issues, including free movement of 
goods and common information systems. It also provides for a new set of institutions: an Inter-
Governmental Council (composed of presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers), an Integration 
Committee, and an Inter-Parliamentary Committee. OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 1, 1996. 
366 OMRI, supra note 13, Sept. 23,1996 (Kazakhstan disappointed); OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 
26, 1996, and OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 10, 1997 (largely unimplemented); OMRI; Jan. 30, 1997 
(customs dispute between Russia and Kazakhstan). See also OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 20, 1997 
(referring to the "CIS tradition of paper creativity"). According to an official from Kazakhstan, 
"agreements between CIS states are often ineffective, and bilateral deals more useful. ... [Iln some 
respects integration is proceeding slower with CIS members than with other countries. Kazakhstan has 
signed 20 agreements preventing double taxation with non-CIS countries and oraly one wi:.'! anoth~r CIS 
country. Agreements on investment protection were signed with 12 foreign countries but not a single 
CIS country." OMRI, supra note 13, Oct. 25, 1996. Russian President Yeltsin expressed dissatisfaction 
with the work of the customs union in September, 1997. RFEfRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41 Sept. 11, 
1997. 
367 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Jan. 23,1998. 
368 Id. 
369 -RFEfRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Jan. 19, 1998. 
370 OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 2,1996 (Lukashenko hailed the agreement as the "highest form of 
community within the CIS"); OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 3, 1996 (uncertainty over what to call the new 
entity). Tens of thousands ofBelarusians marched in protest against this treaty. OMRI, supra note 13, 
Mar. 25,1997. A Russian-Belarusian Parliamentary Assembly was also formed in April 1996. OMRI, 
supra note 13, Apr. 29, 1996. This body "will not have legislative authority but will instead prepare 
draft legislation for consideration by the Russian and Belarusian legislatures." Id. 
17I RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, May 26, 1997. The provisions of this agreement appear to 
echo the largely unimplemented April 1996 agreement. See, e.g., OMRI, supra note 13, Dec. 31, 1996 
("Is Vodka Disrupting Russian-Belarusian Relations?"); OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 14, 1997 (Yeltsin 
suggested measures to accelerate the April 1996 agreement which "has languished largely 
unimplemented"); OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 10, 1997; RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 1, 
1997. See also RossnsKA YA GAZETA, Apr. 3, 1997, EEUROPE-NEWS-OIG., supra note 346, Apr. 4, 1997 
(English translation of the Treaty on a Union between Belarus and Russia provides in Article 1 that the 
"Community of Russia and Belarus shall be transformed into a -Union with the terms of reference 
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formation of an integrated political and economic union based on the 
sovereignty and equality of the member-states.372 It calls inter alia for 
common citizenship and for coordination of economic and security issues.373 
In any event, integration will be gradual,374 and implementation has been 
limited. The Belarus-Russia Union is open for other CIS countries to join.37S 
stemming from its Charter."). Since the precise relationship between these agreements is not clear, they 
will be referred to collectively as the "B-R Union Treaty" . 
. Belarussian President Lukashenko signed a decree ordering his government to implement the B-R 
Union Treaty. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June S, 1997. In Russia, it was ratified by both the 
Duma, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 6, 1997, and the Federation Council, RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 10, 1997. The B-R Union Treaty entered into effect on June II, 1997. 
RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 12, 1997. See generally Floriana Fossato. Belarus/Russia: 
Goal of Union Charter on Eve of Signing, ARMENIAN NEWS NETWORK, supra note 188, May 21, 1997. 
372 OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 3,1997. See also RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 7, 1997 
(quoting Belarusian President Lukashenko as saying that unification will "take place in line with the 
EU model, where each of the members retains its sovereignty"). The agreement was reportedly watered 
down at the last minute, when Belarus objected to a "Russian-proposed clause under which the ultimate 
aim of the union ... would have been to form a single federation." RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, 
May 23, 1997. 
The main institution of the Belarus-Russia Union is the Supreme Council, composed of the 
presidents, prime ministers and speakers of parliament; its decisions must be taken on a unanimous basis 
"signed by both presidents." Id. 
373 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 3, 1997. According to Be1arusian President 
Lukashenko, "the charter only specifies but does not develop the idea of" union. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, Apr. 9, 1997. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov "added that the extent of the union 
will be determined by the peoples ofthe two states in the future rather than now." Id. See further 
OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 28, 1997 (Belarus pushing for talks on currency union); OMRI, supra note 
13, Mar. 29,1997 ("the main thrust of the treaty lies in the voluntary harmonization of economic and 
social legislation" and "there is no specific pledge to introduce a common currency"); OMRI, supra 
note 13, Apr. S, 1996 (Russian Central Bank Chairman said that Russia will not shore up the Be1arusian 
currency); RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 5,1997 (the union may lead to ajoint defense policy 
and a common currency). Russia's major preoccupation seems to be security. See RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, Apr. 2, 1997 (Russian President Yeltsin stressed that the union "will not hurry to form 
a common budget or establish a single currency" but rather that "coordinating security policies and 
border controls will be the top priority"); Statement of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, quoted 
in RIA NOVOSTI, May 22, 1997 (stressing "the need for Russia to be present around the entire perimeter 
of CIS external borders"). The first joint budget was approved in December 1997. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, Dec. 17, 1997. 
374 See RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, Apr. 7, 1997 (Russian Duma pa~sed a statement 
demanding gradual unification; President Yeltsin stressed that the union agreement is "only the 
beginning" of the integration process). 
m A poll taken in May 1997 revealed that "75% of Russians view the Russia-Belarus union as 
the first step towards the restoration of the USSR." RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, June 27, 1997. 
See Liz Fuller & Harry Tamrazian, Will Armenia Be First to Join Russia-Belarus Union?, RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, May 29, 1997; RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 3, 1997 (quoting CIS 
presidents' reactions to the Belarus-Russia Union; only Tajik President Rakhmonov was 
"unambiguously in favor" and expressed the "hope that other CIS states would accede"). Ukraine has 
asserted that the B-R Union "will destroy the CIS." RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 16, 1997. 
See also Paul Goble, Integration as the Final State of Disintegration, RFEIRL NEWSLINF., supra note 
41, May 26, 1997 (B-R Union "makes the formation of a single federal state including them or other 
former Soviet republics significantly less, rather than more, likely"). 
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e. Conclusions 
The evolution of the CIS is ongoing, particularly with regard to 
economic measures. The CIS foresees, at least on paper, a more 
comprehensive form of union than that yet achieved by the EU. However, 
the problems encountered in getting the CIS economic (customs) union off 
the ground suggest that it will be many years before the CIS catches up, if 
ever, to the ED's level of real integration.376 
In the CIS context it is exceedingly difficult to keep track of the 
many texts that have been concluded, and even moreso to ascertain whether 
and to what extent they may actually have been implemented.377 According 
to the Chairman of the Integration Committee of the economic (customs) 
union, he has "analysed nearly 600 joint documents in this sphere, ... [and] 
hardly any of the 200 such agreements provide for any obligations. "378 
Notwithstanding the doubts about the viability of the CIS,379 the March 1997 
CIS Summit yielded surprisingly optimistic (if not outright tangible) results, 
including forthright discussion and a sense of common purpose in "looking 
376 See Pavel Shinkarenko, Five Years After the Fall: CIS is Alive, ifnot Kicking, EEUROPE-NEWS-
DIG., supra note 345, Dec. 10, 1996 (according to the CIS Executive Secretary, "[t]he attempt to create 
an Economic Union modelled after the European Common Market has failed. Many leaders believes 
[sic] that the supra-national coordinating agencies, which should be created in this case, will greatly 
endanger the sovereignty of the new states. Wise men say that time alone can heal us of the childhood 
'independence disease'. "). 
377 The level ofimplementation has been very low. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 49, at 134, 
n. 23 (noting that hundreds of legal instruments have been promulgated among CIS members; the 
Russian Press Digest of Jan. 21, 1993 estimated more than 200 agreements in the economic sphere alone 
and reported a low level of implementation); OMRI, supra note 13, May 3, 1996 (Deputy Chairman of 
the Interstate Economic Committee "conceded that monitoring the implementation of the 600 plus 
agreements signed by CIS members is a difficult challenge"). The Russian Duma has proposed that it 
should monitor the implementation of the various agreements concluded by Russia and other CIS 
Member States. RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, June 27, 1997. 
A corresponding problem is the difficulty of assessing how various developments or proposals 
relate to one another, or where they fit within the broader framework. Some measures apparently 
pertain to implementation of the CIS Economic Union Treaty, while others pertain to matters that fall 
outside of the scope of the CIS Economic Union Treaty. For exampl\!, Russia hel;! talks with 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the formation of an energy union in April 1996. OMRI, supra note 13, 
Apr. 9, 1996. 
378 Shinkarenko, supra note 376 ("That is why the Economic Union is a stillborn baby ... It is 
much more difficult to implement one agreement than to sign ten new ones."). But see id. (CIS 
Executive Secretary estimates that "365 of 800 such agreements have a direct effect and 'are working 
to full capacity"'). See also OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 28,1997 ("[D]espite the signing of700 inter-
governmental agreements and the creation of 80 supranational CIS organs, coordination of economic 
policies remains weak to non-existent, while political rifts continue to grow. "). 
319 Even Russian President Yeltsin has admitted "that the CIS has many faults," but has 
nonetheless "called for faster and more effective CIS integration." OMRI, supra note 13, Dec. 6, 1996. 
See also OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 28, 1997 ("Like OMRI, the CIS seems to have outlived its 
usefulness as a temporary organization bridging the transition from socialism to capitalism."). 
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for ways of consolidating the CIS. "380 However, subsequent events cast it 
even further into doubt. While Belarus and Russia have continued to push 
for further integration within the CIS,3810 ther members have expressed 
doubts about the CIS' viability.382 Despite these doubts, the CIS did manage 
to implement the concept for Integrated Development of the CIS,383 and to 
reach agreement on creating a common agricultural market.384 
An important point of contrast between the CIS and the EU is the 
view towards "variable geometry".385 As noted in Part IV.C.3.a above with 
regard to the CIS Charter, integration within the CIS contemplates a multi-
speed process.386 On the other hand, the EU insists, at least for aspiring 
380 See Sergey Ivanov, 'I Do Not Recall Anything Like This Happening Before.' This is What Boris 
Yeltsin Said After the CIS Summit, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, Mar. 29, 1997, at 3, EEuROPE-NEWS-DIG., 
supra note 346 (quoting Russian President Yeltsin). Even the usually skeptical Ukrainian President 
Kuchma, see, e.g., OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 28, 1997, called the Mar. 1997 meeting "a watershed." 
Ivanov, supra. See also President Yeitsin's Speech at the CIS Summit Session (Moscow, Mar. 29, 1998), 
reprinted in EEUROPE-NEWS-DIG., supra note 346, Mar. 31, 1997. Compare Paul Goble, Analysis from 
Washington -- reitsin's CIS Ultimatum, EEuROPE-NEWS-DIG., supra note 346, Apr. 10, 1997 (noting 
that Yeltsin "made it clear that he equated 'anti-integration' sentiments in the CIS as the equivalent of 
'anti-Russian forces'" and referring to his "shift to the new hardline"). Russia has expressed concern that 
"Western companies have supplanted Russian ones as trading partners in CIS countries." RFEIRL 
NEWS LINE, supra note 41, Apr. 16, 1997. 
381 See, e.g., RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Oct. 2, 1997 (Belarus President Lukashenko 
"advocated more systematic implementation of decisions adopted by the CIS and the creation of new 
forms of economic integration"); RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Dec. 19, 1997 (Russian President 
Yeltsin "sent an unequivocal message to the presidents of the other CIS member states outlining 
proposals for further integration"). 
382 See, e.g., RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Aug. 21, 1997 (Khazak President Nazarbayev); 
RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Oct. 15, 1997 (Ukrainian President "casts doubt on [the] CIS' 
future" and suggests that it "has exhausted itself as an institution" at least "in its current form"); 
RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Oct. 23, 1997 (most participants at Chisinau CIS Summit "not 
optimistic"). 
383 Discussed supra in note 346. See RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Oct 10, 1997 (noting, 
however, that Georgia did not approve the concept). 
3 .. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Oct. 24,1997. 
38l See John Usher, Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the European Union, 
INT'L& COMPo L. QUARTERLY, Vol. 46, Part II, Apr. 1997. . 
386 See, e.g., Statement by Deputy Chairman of CIS Interstate Economic Committee, OMRI, supra 
note 13, May 3, 1996 (noting that by "an accident of history" there are three alliances within the CIS --
the Central Asian Customs Union, the CIS economic (customs) union, and the Belarus-Russia Union--
which bodies "form a 'pyramid' of increasing integration"). The Central Asian Customs Union is 
discussed in Part IV.C.4. See also Ivanov, supra note 380 (intra-CIS alliances "do not contradict the 
idea of the CIS"); Shinkarenko, supra note 376 (discussing the "diesel engine method" by which "one 
country, or a group of countries, pull other members along" as an alternative to the "method of creating 
a strong union geared to the possibilities of the weakest member"). 
There are many other examples of formal and informal bilateral agreements seeking to achieve 
further integration between various CIS member states. For example: Georgia signed nine bilateral 
agreements on economic cooperation with Ukraine, OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 17, 1997 (presidents 
of both countries "voiced skepticism over the viability of the CIS"); Ukraine has proposed signing a free 
trade agreement with Kazakhstan, OMRI, supra note 13, July 10, 1996, signed a customs union 
agreement with Moldova, OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 12, 1997, and formed a "Commission for 
Comprehensive Cooperation" with Uzbekistan, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 18, 1997; 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan signed 19 bilateral agreements (of indeterminate nature) in June 1997, 
RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 20, 1997; Belarus and Ukraine signed a variety of trade-related 
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members, on an "all or nothing" accession. 
4. Central Asian Customs Union 
All five Central Asian republics -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- are members of the CIS and 
have signed the CIS Economic Union Treaty,387 and two of them 
(Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) have also joined the economic (customs) 
union with Belarus and Russia.388 This is generally viewed as a pragmatic 
move to help rebuild economic links with fonner trading partners, rather 
than an attempt to return to the bosom of Mother Russia.389 Indeed, 
developments in Central Asia suggest that the countries in this region are 
looking beyond the CIS for development opportunities. 
Leaders of all five Central Asian republics have met regularly since 
achieving independence, and have demonstrated a commitment to sub-
regional integration. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan fonnalized 
this commitment by concluding a customs union agreement in 1994.390 
While this agreement (like those concluded within the CIS framework) 
remains largely unimplemented, the countries involved have clearly 
demonstrated their intention to push ahead with Central Asian politicai and 
economic subregional integration efforts, alongside their· increasing 
(re)integration within the CIS.391 Thus, Central Asian institutions have been 
agreements (including customs cooperation) on January 17, 1997, OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 20, 1997 
(Belarusian President Lukashenko noted that "if the countries carry out the signed agreements, Belarus's 
relations with Ukraine will overtake its relations with other states. "). See also OMRI, supra note 13, 
Dec. 13, 1996 (State Council of Tatarstan signed protocol on interparliamentary cooperation with 
Legislative Assembly of Ulyanovsk Oblast, and has also signed similar agreements with "the 
legislatures of neighboring republics and regions as well as with the parliaments of some CIS states . 
. . "). 
381 Supra note 345. 
388 Discussed supra in text accompanying notes 364-69. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed a 
Treaty on Eternal Friendship in April 1997. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 10, 1997 (Kazakh 
President Nazarbaev rejected the suggestion that this was intended as an alternative to the Belarus-
Russia Union and said "if the CIS states unite in Europe, then the countries of Central Asia could join 
them and we would have a Eurasian Union"). 
389 See, e.g., Anthony Hyman, Moving Out 0/ Moscow's Orbit: the Outlook/or Central Asia, 69 
INT'LAFF. 289 (1993). 
390 See Liz Fuller, New Geo-Political Alliances on Russia's Southern Rim, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, Apr. 16, 1997 (noting that this union "was intended as a model for closer economic 
integration within the CIS"); RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr.l0, 1997 (Kazakh President 
Nazaraev "first floated the idea ofa Eurasian Union strengthening integration within the CIS in 1994"). 
Turkmenistan declined an invitation to join the Central Asian Customs Union. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, 
supra note 41, Jan. 7, 1998. Tajikistan's application to join was first rejected, id., but subsequently 
accepted. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Mar. 27, 1998. 
391 Meeting in Tashkent in April 1996, representatives of these three countries declared that 
conclusion of the CIS economic (customs) union with Belarus and Russia, discussed supra in notes 364-
69, would not damage their subregional cooperation. OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 9, 1996. In fact, 
resurgent interest in Central Asian integration can be partly explained by dissatisfaction regarding the 
low level of implementation of agreements concluded within the CIS framework. 
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created, which some view as "far more effective than [the] CIS 
equivalents."392 Further, these countries have taken steps to speed along and 
even broaden integration pursuant to the Central Asian Customs Union.393 
The similarities and differences between CEFTA and the Central 
Asian Customs Union are noteworthy. Both subregional movements operate 
within the context of a larger regional framework (i.e. the EU and the CIS). 
While their goals are not identical, they share in common their marginal 
position and their strategic attempts to exploit that position. Both 
subregional initiatives serve as models for further integration within that 
larger framework, although this result was accidental in Central Europe and 
intentional in Central Asia. Both CEFT A and Central Asian countries are 
actively crossing over to establish linkages with countries in the "other" 
region,394 which suggests a tendency for countries located in the marginal 
areas of Europe not to place all their bets on just one (regional) horse. This 
is probably a smart move for both groups of countries, albeit for different 
reasons. 
CEFTA countries are pushing for further integration with the EU, 
whereas the Central Asian Customs Union countries are already full 
members of the CIS. Thus, CEFTA countries tend to view subregional 
integration as a means to the end of union at regional level (i.e. accession to 
the dynamic EU), whereas Central Asian countries view subregional 
integration as an end in itself (i.e. alternative to the static CIS). In this 
Since few details are available concerning the institutions and scope of obligations that these three 
countries have undertaken towards one another, it is impossible to assess their consistency with the 
obligations they have undertaken under the CIS agreements. See Fuller, supra note 390 (Russian 
President Yeltsin expressed the view at March 1997 CIS Summit that integration within the CIS "should 
take priority over alternative alignments" and noted that CIS member states are "free to seek friends to 
the West, to the South, and to the East. But what kind of friendship is it that harms your neighbors?"). 
m Fuller, supra note 390 (referring to the Executive Committee of Heads of State and 
Government and the Council of Foreign Ministers). A Central Asian .Bank for Cooperation and 
Development has also been created. Id. Further, Kazakhstan has proposed the formation of a unified 
parliament of the three countries. In March 1998, the four members "agreed to form an international 
hydroelectric consortium and reached an accord on common principles for creating a securities market." 
RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Mar. 27,1998. 
393 Representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed various cooperative accords 
at their meeting in Tashkent in April 1996. OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 9, 1996. Further, they "sought 
to broaden cooperation" in the customs union at their meeting in Bishkek in March 1997. OMRI, 
supra note 13, Mar. 17, 1997. In particular, at Bishkek they concluded thirteen agreements, including 
one creating a "common economic area during 1997-1998" and others covering "industrial cooperation, 
a legal base for the free movement of labor ... , [and] coordination on migration." Id. But see OMRI, 
supra note 13, Mar. 19, 1997 (speculating that Kazakhstan might be planning to withdraw from the 
customs union because "the economic security of the state is suffering" because a "huge amount of 
contraband goods is being brought in"). At an earlier meeting in Bishkek, these three countries signed 
a treaty declaring eternal friendship and agreed to establish a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion. 
OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 13, 1997. 
394 For example, all Central Asian countries have concluded or are in the process of negotiation 
PCAs with the EU. See discussion supra in text accompanying notes 100-13. The CEFTA countries, 
on the other hand, have been somewhat slower to seek ties in the former USSR (for historical and 
economic reasons), but the process has begun. See infra note 448. 
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regard, CEFT A countries could take a lesson from Central Asian countries, 
which explicitly honor the dynamic potential of subregional integration. 
D. INFORMAL SUBREGIONAL INTEGRA TION INITIATIVES 
There has been a virtual explosion of participation in informal 
subregional integration initiatives having a more or less geographical 
identity. It is common for a given country to belong to more than one of 
these cooperative projects, as it is for each project to claim a diverse 
membership drawn from the EU, the CIS, Central and Eastern Europe, and 
(occasionally) elsewhere. Thus, the informal initiatives overlap in terms of 
their membership, and transcend usual boundaries. These informal 
organizations have become audible voices within the cacophonous European 
house, despite the fact that they tend to be even weaker than CEFT A, both 
substantively and institutionally. 
It is important (but not always easy) to draw a distinction between 
those projects that are the result of EU initiative, and those which are more 
or less independent of the EU. This article addresses those projects that are 
more or less independent of EU leadership, rather than detailing every ED 
initiative in Central and Eastern Europe. It bears mentioning, however, that 
the EU has encouraged and even committed funds for the support of a 
various subregional organizations.395 
1. Council of Baltic Sea States 
The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)396 provides a good example 
of the loose type of structure that is proliferating in Europe, and a good 
contrast to the more focused CEFTA model. Its membership includes the 
. three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), some EU countries 
(Denmark, Germany, Sweden), some non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway, 
Poland, Russia), and the Commission of the European Community.397 
CBSS' overriding goal is the development of "good-neighborly relations" 
among its members, which includes "political contacts, and development of 
trade and cooperation in all spheres oflife."398 The CBSS' Fifth Ministerial 
Summit was intended to increase and intensify cooperation in the areas of 
39' See, e.g., Communication on EC Support, supra note 281. 
396 The Council of Baltic Sea States was founded in 1992. See generally, Baltinfo Website, supra 
note 327. 
397 Baltinfo Website, supra note 327. 
398 CBSS Gdansk Communique, supra note 327, at point 3. At its Fourth Ministerial Summit in 
Gdansk in May 1995, CBSS members inter alia commemorated the 50th anniversary of the end of 
World War II; approved reports prepared by Working Groups on Economic Co-operation, on Nuclear 
and Radiation Safety, and on Assistance to Democratic Institutions; and decided to convene a 
conference on economic cooperation in 1996 in Helsinki. Id. 
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democracy, international cooperation, trade, economy, environmental 
control, and cultural matters in the Baltic Sea region.399 The CBSS' Sixth 
Ministerial Summit, held in Riga in July 1997, emphasized the importance 
of Russian involvement in regional developments and furthering economic 
cooperation.40o 
The CBSS operates by way of a simple intergovernmental 
institutional structure that includes the Council itself, a variety of Working 
Groups, and since October 1994, a Commissioner on Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, Including the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to Minorities, with a permanent secretariat in Copenhagen.401 A permanent 
secretariat has been proposed.402 The chairmanship of the CBSS rotates on 
an annual basis; Sweden held the chair in 1995-1996, Lithuania in 1996-
1997, and Denmark in 1997-1998. 
Two aspects of the CBSS bear special mention. First, it was until 
very recently the only forum (outside the OCSE) where the Baltic States 
willingly maintained ongoing relations with Russia.403 Second, the CBSS 
bears a close relation to the EU, not least because of overlapping 
membership. The EU undertook to study the ways in which its institutions 
might participate in the activities ofthe CBSS.404 Ultimately the EU decided 
to cooperate with the CBSS, and thus the president of the Commission and 
the Prime Minister of Italy (which then held the presidency of the European 
Council) attended the Visby Summit.405 
The EU has regularly been represented at CBSS Summits since 
then.406 Now that the prospect of earlier accession to the EU by Estonia has 
.399 Visby Summit (May 3-4, 1996) [hereinafter Visby Summit Declaration], Baltinfo Website, 
supra note 327. A ministerial meeting was held in July 1996 in Kalmar. Chairman-in-Oiftce of the 
Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Visits the European Commission, IP: 96-1146, Dec. 10, 1996. In 
Kalmar, an Action Plan was agreed to increase further regional cooperation CBSS Website, supra note 
327. . 
400 RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, July 3, 1997. 
401 CBSS Gdansk Communique, supra note 327, points 10-14 (summarizing recent activities of 
CBSS institutions, including Working Groups on assistance to democratic institutions, economic 
cooperation, and nuclear and radiation safety). There is also a parliamentary dimension to cooperation. 
Id. at point 20. 
402 Baltinfo Website, supra note 327. 
403 In May 1997, Lithuanian legislators set up a group to establish parliamentary ties with Russia. 
RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, May 7, 1997. 
404 Council Conclusions on Baltic Sea Region, supra note 145 (the Council in 1995 called upon 
the Commission to submit proposals regarding the role which the Commission may come to play, within 
its sphere of competence, in the CBSS) . 
.os See Commission Communication on a Regional Cooperation Initiative in the Baltic Sea 
Region, reported in BULL. EUR. UNION, May 1996, point 1.4.49. The EU Commission presented a 
regional cooperation initiative at the May 1996 Visby Summit, then reported back to the European 
Council at the Florence Summit in June 1996. AOENCE EUR., Feb. 28, 1996, at 7. See generally Baltic 
Sea States Summit, 3-4 May 1996 - some questions and answers, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Baltinfo Website, supra note 327. 
406 See, e.g., RFEIRL NEWSLINE, Jan 23, 1998 (Commission President Santer attended Riga 
Summit). 
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driven a wedge between the Baltic States, the CBSS is likely to become 
more prominent as a cooperative forum. At its January 1998 meeting, the 
prime ministers of the member countries "confirmed their desire to promote 
regional cooperation in order to establish a Europe 'without dividing 
lines' . "407 
2. Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was formally 
established on 25 June 1992, by the heads of state of Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey 
and Ukraine.40B BSEC is a subregional structure for multilateral 
cooperation; it covers a broad range of economic and other activity,409 and 
has set up an elaborate set of institutions.410 In the Bosphorus Statement, 
407 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, Jan. 26, 1998. 
<08 See Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation [hereinafter BSEC Summit 
Declaration], BSEC Website <http://www.access.ch/tuerkei/grupfikeid.htm> [hereinafter BSEC 
Website]. In fact, Turkey first proposed the creation ofBSEC in 1990, and called preliminary meetings 
in Ankara in December of that year. Daniel Connelly, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, RFEIRL 
REsEARCH REPORT, July 1, 1994, at 31. From Turkey's perspective, BSEC offers a possible alternative, 
or even a short-cut to EU membership. Id. at 32. See Bosphorus Statement 0/25 June 1992, BSEC 
Website, supra [hereinafter Bosphorus Statement] ("Heads of State and Government ... stressed that 
in the building of the new architecture of Europe, their countries and peoples had an important and 
creative contribution to make and that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation constituted an effort that 
would facilitate the process and structures of European integration. "); OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 11, 
1997 (Turkish Foreign Minister Viller expressed hope that in future BSEC will be "integrated into 
Europe"). See generally, 6MER F ARUK GENCKA Y A, THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERA nON PROSECT: 
A REGIONAL CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 549 (UNESCO 1993). 
Austria, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Tunisia have observer status with BSEC. 
Vladimir Isachenkov, Black Sea Nations Agree to New Economic Links, J. OF COM., Oct. 28, 1996, at 
2A. 
409 Cooperation shall include projects of common interest in the fields inter alia of transport and 
communications, informatics, environment, science and technology, energy, mining and metallurgy, 
tourism, agriculture and agro-industry, health care and pharmaceutics veterinary and sanitary protection. 
BSEC Summit Declaration, supra note 408, point 13. At their October 1996 Moscow Summit, BSEC 
leaders expanded this list to include "fighting organized crime, terrorism, illegal migration and illegal 
trafficking in drugs, arms and radioactive materials." Isachenkov, supra note 408. In one recent 
example, the Georgian Government and the EC Commission sponsored a conference to discuss the 
TRASECA proj'ect (Le. the possibility of revising the historic "Silk Road" from Europe via Turkey, 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia, to China), and invited deputy premiers and transport ministers ofBSEC 
countries to attend. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 11, 1997. BSEC also covers cultural, 
educational and financial cooperation. Connelly, supra note 408, at 32. For example, a Black Sea 
University has been proposed for Bucharest. Id. at35. In addition, some leaders (particulcll:y Ukrainian 
and Georgian) urged early on that BSEC address security issues. Id. 
410 The decision-making body of the BSEC is the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
the Participating States (MMFA), which has established subsidiary bodies (e.g. Working Groups of 
Experts). The BSEC Structure, BSEC Website, supra note 408. Working groups are active in many 
of the substantive areas listed, supra note 409, as well as in the areas of organizational matters, statistics, 
and visas. Connelly, supra note 408, at 33. An interparliamentary organization called the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABSEC) was established in February 1993. In addition, since 
1994 there has been a permanent International Secretariat in Istanbul. The BSEC Structure, supra. The 
participating states have also proposed the creation of a Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank 
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these countries expressed their shared view that "freedom must also extend 
to the field of the rights and rules governed by the free market economy," 
and agreed that they must establish "solid and effective mechanisms in order 
to achieve a higher degree of economic cooperation"411 and thereby to 
contribute "to the establishment of a Europe-wide economic area, as well as 
to the achievement of a higher degree of integration of the Participating 
States into the world economy."412 "At their October 1996 meeting in 
Moscow, leaders signed a declaration "pledging to build stronger economic 
ties" and calling "for the group to become a full-fledged regional economic 
organization."413 They met in Istanbul on 7 February 1997 to discuss the 
creation of a free trade area.414 Actual progress has been slow, but calls for 
increased cooperation continue. At a session of BSEC Parliamentary 
Assembly in Chisinau in December 1997, Moldovan President Lucinschi 
"called on member countries to coordinate economic and commercial 
legislation and to transform the organization into one with 'a well defined 
judicial status' ."415 
Tension among various BSEC Participating States "not only impairs 
its decision-making capacity but also jeopardizes its survival. ,,416 In this 
light, BSEC's tenacity is particularly salutary, for the troubled region has 
need of a forum for both political and economic cooperation. In April 1997, 
Black Sea leaders renewed the call for "cooperation and unity as a way to 
combat regional conflicts. ,,417 The continued existence of BSEC in the face 
of these obstacles further affirms the attractiveness of subregional initiatives 
as a means of paving the way to integration into the global economy and 
improved bargaining position with the West, and in particular the EU.4\8 It 
(in Thessaloniki) and established a private-sector BSEC Council (for "regulating and promoting group 
and individual initiatives by private firms and creating advantageous conditions for investment"). 
Connelly, supra, at 35. The Bank will have $300 million in contributions from member states at its 
disposal. OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. II, 1997. The BSEC Council occasionally meets in conjunction 
with the MMFA, which brings large numbers of government officials and business leaders together. 
See, e.g., RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 28, 1997. 
411 Bosphorus Statement, supra note 408. 
412 BSEC Summit Declaration, supra note 408, at point 5. 
413 Isachenkov, supra note 408. 
414 OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. II, 1997. "BSEC officials ... hope to have a free trade zone in the 
region by 2010." Jon Hemming, Black Sea Heads Seek Cooperation to End Conflict, EEuROPE-NEWS-
DIG., supra note 346, Apr. 29, 1997. The free trade agreement between Romania and Turkey is "a 
decisive step forward in this direction." Id. 
41S RFEIRLNEwsLINE,supranote41,Dec. 11, 1997. 
416 Connelly, supra note 408, at 33. For example, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over Nagorno-Karabakh; separatist struggles such as those between Georgia and Abkhazia, Moldova 
and the Transdniester, and Turkey and its Kurdish population; historical antagonisms such as those 
between Turkey and Greece and Turkey and Armenia; and competition for regional dominance between 
Turkey, Iran and Russia. Id. . 
417 Hemming, supra note 414. 
418 The EU convened a conference on "New Energy Realities in the Black Sea Region" in May 
1994, which was attended by the EU, BSEC, and the 5 Central Asian republics. This conference "was 
intended to initiate energy cooperation ... and promote trade and investment." Connelly, supra note 
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appears likely that the importance of BSEC will increase, in as much as it 
provides a fonn for a large number of CEECs which will be increasingly 
excluded from the EU's enlargement discourse. 
3. Central European Initiative 
The Central European Initiative (CEI) started out19 as a loose 
coalition that from time to time has brought together representatives of 
Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine.420 The CEI· is thus akin to an interregional 
"structured dialogue"421 that has a fluid agenda and floating participation, 
consonant with its design as a "flexible and pragmatic tool" for overcoming 
divisions in Europe.422 
408, at 36. That author further notes that "[w]hereas the BSEC has perhaps a complementary 
relationship with the EU, its relationship with the CIS region clearly has the potential to be 
competitive." Id. at 37. Some see BSEC as an alternative to "a limping CIS" and argue that "the more 
problems we solve within the BSEC, the fewer we'll have to deal with within the CIS." Id. at 38. 
419 In fact, the CEI evolved from previous cooperative forms, starting with the Quadrangolare that 
was instigated by Italy and founded on Nov. II, 1989. The founding members were: Austria (an EFTA 
country), Italy (an EC country and member of NATO), Hungary (a CMEA and Warsaw Pact country), 
and Yugoslavia (a non-aligned federation of communist republics). Maurizio Cremasco, From the 
Quadrangolare to the Central European Initiative - an Attempt at Regional Cooperation, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFJ'ER THE COLLAPSE Of THE EAST-WEST ORDER 448, 448 (Armand Clesse, et 
al. eds.). Italy intended the Quadrangonale "as a means of strengthening the economic, social and 
cultural cohesion of the region, and as a contribution to stability and the future integration of the 
[CEECs) into the European Community," and further hoped "to prevent the marginalization of the states 
of the Danubian-Adriatic region in a moment of rapid transformation of the European political and 
social landscape." Id. at 449. The Quadrangonale became the Pentagonale when Czechoslovakia joined 
in 1990, and the Hexagonale when Poland joined in 1991. The name was changed to "Central European 
Initiative" in Jan. 1992, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Id. at 450. See generally Central 
Europ.ean Initiative Secretariat Website, <http://www. 
eurocube.itlcciaatslenglishlstructurelinizcentreur.htrnl> [hereinafter CEI Website]; CElnet: Information 
Network on Internet for the Central European Initiative <http://www.digit.itlceinetlhomel.htm>. 
420 CEI Website, supra note 419. In 1995, Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine 
became members. Moldova became the sixteenth member in Nov. 1996. OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 
II, 1996. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has applied to join the CEI, but has not yet been 
admitted to membership. Id. 
421 According to Cremasco, supra note 419, at 452, CEl's "institutional and bureaucratic 
infrastructure" were "kept to a minifuum - not even a secretariat was created." There is a rotating 
Presidency, a National Coordinators' Group, and a number of Working Groups. Id. CEI Working 
Groups exist in many fields, including transport, environment, medium-sized enterprises, 
telecommunications, culture, tourism, statistics, disaster relief and protection, scientific and 
technological research, information, energy, and migration, id. at 453, but their rate of project 
. completion has been low, id. at 454. See also Statement of Polish Prime Minister Olesky During the 
Meeting of the Association Council of the CEI at the Level of Heads of Government (Warsaw, Oct. 7, 
1995), Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176 [hereinafter Olesky CEI Speech, Oct. 1995] (CEI is "the 
least formalised and non-bureaucratic platform of contacts"). Despite these intentions, a permanent CEI 
secretariat now sits in Trieste. CEI Website, supra note 419. 
m Cremasco, supra note 419, at 449 (observing that the CEI "criteria of pragmatism and 
flexibility" mean that "cooperation could be open to ... partners on specific subjects"). ~is probably 
accounts for the fact of the floating participation, i.e. the fact that not all CEI member countries attend 
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CEI appears to serve as a forum for discussion any topics of interest 
to the members.423 However, its activities have moved beyond the "good-
neighborliness" that pervades informal subregional initiatives. Among the 
recurrent themes that have been discussed among representatives of CEI 
countries are promotion of their integration into Western structures, in 
particular the EU,424 and instability in the Balkans. 425 CEI has also addressed 
economic issues,426 and even tackled some of the concrete and intransigent 
problems in this sphere. For example, a December 1995 meeting brought 
together the agriculture ministers of the CEI countries.427 Perhaps in 
response to this trend, the EC Commission decided to step-up its 
involvement with the CEI.428 
all CEI meetings. 
423 Its purpose has been defined functionally. According to Cremasco, the CEI "is intended as a 
transitory exercise toward more institutionalized organizations" and should address itself to the 
"solution of those problems which cannot be solved by [sub-subregional) working communities ... or 
bilaterally ... , and which do not have a pan-European dimension." In other words, he claims that "the 
key principle is subsidiarity." Cremasco, supra note 419, at 451. CEI's "basic strategy" is to implement 
"joint projects in various areas of 'low politics'" which would "generate parallel national action 
processes" and thus lead to "the progressive social and economic homogenization of all involved 
countries." ld. at 452. It is rather odd that Cremasco identifies subsidiarity as a means to achieve 
homogenization. However, the CEI Venice Policy Document concluded in 1990 also includes "high 
politics" within the organization's scope. ld. at 452 ("The Initiative also foresees a regular exchange of 
views between the ... member States on matters of political nature and of common interest. Wherever 
possible, joint initiatives will be carried out within the latitude permitted by the international obligation 
of each member State in this respect. ") There has been some dispute over whether CEI should discuss 
questions of national minorities. See OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 11, 1997 (Oraz meeting). 
424 This was discussed: in 1993 among Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia; in 1995 at the Kesthely Summit (although this was 
not billed as a GEl summit) among Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia; in June 1997 in Portoro among Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 6, 1997, and 
June 9, 1997. At a special conference on "Civil Society - the Hope for a United Europe" (organized by 
Slovak President Kovac and held in January 1998, in Levoca), various CEI presidents discussed 
Slovakia's role in the enlargement process. Slovak Prime Minister Meciar did not attend the Levoca 
Summit. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Jan. 28, 1998. 
425 For example, the situation in former Yugoslavia was discussed in Kesthely in May 1995 
(solemn declaration called for a cessation to fighting and affirmed that the return to "barbarity" at the 
end of the 20th century could not be tolerated) and in Graz in November 1996 (agreeing on 
reconstruction projects and calling for more aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina), OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 
11, 1996. In Sarajevo in June 1997, CEI foreign ministers pledged to send observers to cover Albanian 
elections. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 9,1997. ': 
426 At the Oraz meeting (Nov. 9-10, 1996), CEI heads of government discussed "[e)conomic 
cooperation projects in the region and cooperation with European financial institutions." CEI Meeting, 
EIS EURo-EAsT REp., supra note 57, Dec. 10, 1996. 
427 See Address by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jagielinski at the Meeting with Ministers of 
Agriculture of the CEI Countries (Warsaw, Dec. 7-8, 1995), Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176 
("This is not a matter of creating some kind of pressure group, but of common strategic thinking which 
would enable the lEU] to understand our arguments and problems ... " Another CEEC conference of 
agricultural ministers took place in Bucharest on May 4,1997. RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, May 
5, 1997 (not technically a CEI meeting; 19 countries represented, plus U.N. experts). 
428 See 1996 Dublin Summit Conclusions, supra note 190, at points 1.2 and 1.4.55 (European 
Council welcomed report on EU cooperation with CEI which Commission pursuant to request made in 
Florence). See also id. at point 1.21 (Commission will submit regular reports to the Council on regional 
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The CEI appears to be flourishing and even expanding its scope of 
activities, despite its problems.429 Rather like CEFTA, which is in some 
sense its formal counterpart, CEI now and then serves as the voice for its 
members in other international fora.430 These rn:o organizations sometimes 
appear to overlap, or even to dissolve.431 CEl's most noteworthy feature is 
that it purports to redefine its subregion as a center, and thereby subverts its 
marginalization. 
4. Economic Cooperation Organization 
Another informal integrative forum is the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO),432 which includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and the five Central Asian republics. ECO is the 
(formerly dormant) economic development counterpart of the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO), which was a military grouping of conservative, pro-
Western muslim countries.433 Despite significant changes affecting CENTO, 
these countries continue to cooperate within the ECO framework. 
While fairly limited in scope and modest in its undertakings, ECO 
is an important forum for economic cooperation in Central Asia.434 Perhaps, 
more important at this stage is the stabilizing potential of ECO. Iran and 
Turkey -- which represent quite different models for development -- are 
rivals for influence in Central Asia and in the Transcaucasian Republics, and 
yet they cooperate within the ECO framework. The CIS has criticized ECO, 
initiatives). 
429 Not surprisingly, CEI has been plagued by political and ethnic tensions among its members, 
and by financial constraints. Cremasco, supra note 419, at 453-54. 
430 Id at 452 (noting that CEI countries began submitting common proposals and joint documents 
to CSCE meetings as early as 1990), and at 4'57 ("CEI ready and willing to make its voice heard in the 
international scene and eager to be considered an organization not exclusively devoted at (sic] 
furthering the technical and economic cooperation of its members"). 
431 See also OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 29, 1996 (inaugural meeting of the Central European 
Forum, proposed by Poland in Dec. 1995 "to provide a framework for dialogue about EU enlargement"). 
See also report of Levoca Summit, supra note 424. 
m See Hyman, supra note 389, at 298. See also Turkey and the Economic Cooperation 
Organizalion<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupfJeco.htm> [hereinafter Turkey and the ECO]. 
433 The Shah oCIran was a dominant force in CENTO, and urged the establishment of a common 
market in the region. Id. 
434 For example, Turkmenistan has called for an early ECO summit to discuss regional pipeline 
schemes, rather than waiting until the next regularly scheduled meeting in late 1998. OMRJ, supra note 
13, Feb. 10, 1997. See also RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 4,1997 (Kyrgyz President Akayev 
says his country considers relations with ECO "extremely important"). ECO has established a new 
Investment Development Bank, which is under-funded but is a step in the right direction. Hyman, supra 
note 389, at 298. The members took the first step toward trade liberalization by signing a Protocol on 
Preferential Tariff Agreements, which called for a ten percent reduction in duties. Turkey and the ECO, 
supra note 432. 
208 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
however, and is concerned about losing influence in Central Asia.43S It may 
well be that Russia's persistent efforts to integrate the Central Asian 
republics further into the CIS framework are (at least in part) a reaction to 
the increased activities of ECO. The EU, for its part, has undertaken to 
"strengthen its influence with the Economic Cooperation Organization."436 
5. Carpathian Border Initiatives 
Two initiatives in the Carpathian mountain area illustrate further 
forms of subregional integration taking place in Europe: the Carpathian 
Euroregion, and the Carpathian Border Region Economic Development 
Association. Both initiatives are noteworthy because they demonstrate the 
existence of subregional integration at the level of civil society, unlike the 
formal and informal initiatives described above, which are limited to 
participation by members of the central government. Both initiatives draw 
on the participation of local government and private parties. 
The Carpathian border region "can be characterized as an ethnically 
mixed and financially devastated zone"437 which was more or less ignored 
by the former regimes because of the politically-sensitive nature of the 
ethnic minority question.438 Numerous attempts over the past decade to 
develop economic cooperation in the region failed, in part because they 
"came from higher levels of authority [which] ignored the particular 
regional sensitivities" and "gained little or no support from local business 
professionals. ,,439 
The first new initiative is the Carpathian Euroregion, established in 
1993, with the "aim of facilitating voluntary cross-border cooperation 
among local communities" in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine.440 In 
m For recent Russian hostility towards developments among certain ECO countries, see Paul 
Goble, Former USSR: Analysisfrom Washington -- Ties that Unbind the CIS, EEuROPE-NEWS DIG., 
supra note 346, Feb. 21, 1997 (strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Georgia announced). 
"During the past three months, the Moscow press has been filled with articles denouncing Georgian and 
Azerbaijani efforts to increase their cooperation both with each other and with Ukraine and Turkey as 
well." Id. 
436 Commission Communication on Central Asia, supra note 79. 
437 Raymond Becker, Struggles on These Borders Are for Economic Cooperation, CIPE (CENTER 
FOR INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE ENTERPRISE) CEE-REGIONAL NEWSLETTER, Feb. 1996, 3, at 3 
<http://www.usis.usemb.seIERT/cee/> [hereinafter CIPE NEWSLETTER]. The percentage of ethnic 
minorities in the region, principally ethnic Hungarians living in areas lost after World War I, runs as 
high as 30%. !d. 
438 Because of the complex ethnic-minority situation, "each nation in the past has chosen to be 
relatively passive in improving their respective regions, rather than dynamically intervening in what has 
been perceived as a no win situation." Id. 
439 Id. Surveyed Carpathian entrepreneurs agreed that their econ(\mic- surviv?l tJepends on 
cooperation within their Carpathian region. Id . 
.. 0 Jan B. de Weydenthal, Controversy in Poland over "Euroregions", RFEIRL REsEARCH REPORT, 
Apr. 16, 1993, at 6. The institutional framework includes a 12-member council (made up of 3 
representatives of local and central administrations in each of the four countries), a rotating general 
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particular, it was intended to "streamline communications in the entire area 
by setting up telephone exchanges, establishing economic information 
centers, planning new roads, and opening new border crossings."441 Its focus 
was to include not only support for small business, but also "cultural 
exchanges [and] cooperation among religious organizations. "442 
The second such initiative, established in November 1994, is the 
Carpathian Border Region Economic Development Association 
(CBREDA).443 CBREDA's goals are narrowly focused on facilitating 
economic development in the private sector, unlike the Carpathian 
Euroregion's broader mandate. There is, however, an overlap, for example, 
in the efforts to streamline border-crossings in order to simplify procedures 
and reduce delays for commercial trade. CBREDA meetings normally 
involve participation of citizens as well as officials from national, county, 
and local government.444 
Both of these Carpathian initiatives demonstrate an attempt to 
address, at local level and in the context of civil society, some of the same 
problems that are also the subject of discussions in the formal and informal 
integration initiatives. Thus, while modest in their scope and surely limited 
in their success, these subregional integration attempts represent a 
significant move to decentralize foreign policy. 
E. INTERREGIONAL LINKAGES 
The current state of East-West European relations is characterized 
by a high degree of formal and informal interregional44s linkage. Indeed, the 
secretary, and a permanent secretariat. Id. This initiative was supported in its inception by various 
Western institutions, including the Council of Europe, but not the EU. For a discussion of the role of 
by the EU and in particular the European Regional Development Fund) see id. at 7; see also Thiemo 
W. Eser & Martin Hallet, Der Mogliche Beitrag der EG-Regionalpolilik bei einer OSI-Erweiterung der 
EG: Hilfe or Hindernis?, OSTEUROPA-WIRTSCHAFT, Sept. 1993, at 195. The establishment of 
Euroregions has been controversial in Poland, and resulted in a storm of nationalistic criticism. For 
example, Euroregions have been condemned as "suggesting the idea of [a new] partition of Poland .. 
• SO that its integration with Europe would be made easier." de Weydenthal, supra. Moldova, Romania 
and Ukraine announced their intention to set up two Euroregions. RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, 
Apr. 29, 1997. 
«I de Weydenthal, supra note 440, at 6. 
«2 Id. 
«3 CIPE NEWSLETrER, supra note 437, at 3. CBREDA involves Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine, 
but not Poland. Id. 
... The task of implementing the shared goals has been delegated to the local Economic 
Development Agencies. CIPE NEWSLETTER, supra note 437, at 3-4. 
«\ This term is used in its broadest sense to encompass bilateral and multilateral linkages between 
countries located in different regions (i.e. the EU and the CIS, but also including EFTA countries, the 
Middle East, and Eurasia). It also includes linkages which are bilateral but based on a subregional trend 
(e.g. the CEFT A countries' process of gradually incorporating new members). The emphasis here is on 
economic linkages, thus the important category of basic treaties settling historic disputes, such as those 
between Hungary and Romania, OMRl, supra note 13, Aug. 15, 1996, are beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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profusion of such initiatives can only be hinted at here. This growing 
interregional web contributes to the ongoing processes of decentralization 
of power and process, gradual levelling of the trade regime, and 
disintegration of boundaries. Such linkages are occurring in increasingly 
contentious contexts, which suggests that this phenomenon marks the 
cutting edges of integration, where old boundaries are fading and thus 
enabling further integration to take place.446 
In its most basic form, the interregionalization phenomenon is 
evidenced by a proliferation of formal bilateral free trade agreements 
between CEECs (or between a CEEC and a non-CEEC) located in different 
regions or subregions. Such interregional agreements are most common 
between CEFTA member states and other countries.447 However, other EA 
446 See Paul Goble, Enlarging Eastern Europe, RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, June 12, 1997 
(analyzing the June 1997 Poland-Ukraine accord). 
447 Many but by no means all of such agreements tend to be precursors to CEFT A accession. For 
example, Poland has concluded free trade agreements with Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia, all of which 
aspire to CEFTA membership. See OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 22, 1996 (Lithuania); RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 29, 1997 (Latvia). The Czech Republic cOilcluaea free trade 
agreements with Bulgaria in Feb. 1996, and with Estonia and Latvia in Apr. 1996, OMRI, supra note 
13, Apr. 16, 1996, and OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 22, 1996. Slovenia has concluded a free trade 
agreement with Latvia, OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 24, 1996, and with Estonia, OMRI, supra note 13, 
Nov. 26, 1996. Hungary has concluded a free trade agreement with Turkey. OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 
9, 1997. Slovakia, which tends to cast its net more widely, is considering free trade agreements with 
Croatia and Russia. Association Councils, supra note 136; OMRI, supra note 13, Jan. 30, 1997. See 
also Joe Cook, Second Among Equals. Bus. CENT. EUR., Mar. 1997, at 24 (noting that "it's an idea that 
might backfire"). All CEFT A countries have concluded free trade agreements with all EFTA countries 
- Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland - as well. See Report on the Activities of the 
European Free Trade Association, ADOC7526, Apr. 22, 1996 [hereinafter EFTA Rep.], at point 17. 
CEFT A countries have entered into a wide variety of other types of bilateral agreement on an 
interregional basis. For example: Poland concluded an agreement with Russia on trade and economic 
cooperation on Aug. 25, 1993, Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland and 
the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation on the Development of Economic Co-operation between 
the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation (Feb. 18, 1995), Polish Gov't Website, supra note 
176; Hungary "embarked on a policy of establishing direct bilateral relations with the various Soviet 
republics" even before the demise of the USSR, and has concluded a number of agreements with 
Ukraine, Hungarian-Ukrainian Relations Continue to Develop, RFEIRL REsEARCH REPORT, Vol. 2, No. 
16, Apr. 16, 1993,22, at 22; Kazakhstan has concluded cooperation agreements with Hungary, OMRI, 
supra note 13, Feb. 22, 1996; Moldova has concluded cooperation agreements with Hungary, RFEIRL 
NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 5,1997; Slovakia has signed some 130 bilateral agreements with Russia 
(including one "intended to develop and strengthen ties in the legal sphere"), RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra 
note 41, June 16, 1997; Ukraine has concluded an extensive package of economic agreements with 
Poland (including an agricultural cooperation program), OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 19, 1997. 
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countries,448 in particular the Baltic States,449 are gradually building up their 
own networks. Bilateral linkages can also be found between CIS member 
states and other countries.450 
Interregional activity -- both bilateral and multilateral -- can be 
found in hot-spots such as the Balkan peninsula and Transcaucasia, among 
other places. For example, the Greek Development Minister proposed the 
formation of a Balkan council to encourage regional cooperation in March 
1996.451 In the Transcaucasus, little progress has been made towards 
subregional cooperation. However, Georgia and Armenia have begun to 
'48 Both Bulgaria and Romania have lagged behind in the interregional linkage process. For 
example: Bulgaria concluded eight bilateral agreements on trade and industrial cooperation with Belarus 
in February 1996, OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 22, 1996; Romania concluded a free trade agreement with 
Turkey, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 30, 1997. See Association Councils Stress Positive, 
supra note 298 (at 1997 meeting of EU-Romania Association Council, the EU welcomed Romania's 
accession to CEFTA - as well as its commitment to regional cooperation, especially in the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation and in the Central European Initiative - but urged it to conclude further free 
trade agreements with other EA countries). 
449 Consistent with their intense early drive to seek integration into Western European structures, 
each of the Baltic States concluded a free trade agreement with each of the EFTA countries in 1996. 
See EFTA Rep., supra note 447, at point 17. More recently, the Baltic States have been inching their 
way (at different speeds) towards CEFT A membership, via conclusion of bilateral free trade agreements 
with each CEFTA country. Estonia concluded a free trade agreement with the Czech Republic, OMRI, 
supra note 13, Apr. 22, 1996, and has indicated an interest in concluding one with Poland, RFEIRL 
NEWSL1NE, supra note 41, May 23, 1997. Latvia has concluded free trade agreements with the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 22, 1996, as well as with Slovenia, OMRI, 
supra note 13, Apr. 24, 1996, and with Poland, and is seeking such agreements with other CEFTA 
countries, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 23, 1997. Lithuania has concluded free trade 
agreements with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, van den Broek Statement, supra note 198, 
with Poland, OMRI, supra note 13, Apr. 22, 1996, and is reportedly negotiating one with Hungary. 
The Baltic States have been building ties to other countries as well. For example, all three 
concluded a free trade agreement with Turkey in June 1997. See RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, 
June 3, 1997 (Latvia); June 4, 1997 (Estonia); and June 6, 1997 (Lithuania). Further, Estonia sought 
to conclude a free trade agreement with Ukraine, OMRI, supra note 13, Feb. 26,1996, anll Latvia has 
concluded one with Cyprus. OMRI, supra note 248, Nov. 16, 1995. Estonia and Ukraine have also 
concluded agreements on social security and on mutual recognition of certification for goods. OMRI, 
supra note 13, Feb. 10, 1997. 
,so For example: Armenia and Bulgaria signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement in 
April 1994, Connelly, supra note 408, at 37; Georgia signed four bilateral agreements on economic 
cooperation with Iran, OMRI, supra note 13, Nov. 4,1996; Kyrgyzstan and Iran signed a variety of 
economic accords on July 31, 1996, OMRI, supra note 13, Aug. 2, 1996; Russia signed four accords 
with Yugoslavia dealing principally with trade liberalization (including agricultural issues), OMRI, 
supra note 13, Nov. I, 1996. See also OMRI, supra note 13, Dec. 13, 1996 (State Council ofTatarstan 
signed protocol on interparliamentary cooperation inter alia with "the parliaments of ... Canada, 
Turkey, and Hungary") . 
• " OMRI, supra note 13, Mar. 12, 1996. According to the proposal, the council could "gradually 
widen its activities to include industry, infrastructure policy, and, eventually, 'political cooperation and 
preventative diplomacy for defusing crises.'" Id. 'In addition, Greece "would support other Balkan 
countries in their dealings with the EU," which would be invited to send a representative. Id. At a 
November 1997 summit meeting of leaders of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Macedonia, Romania, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Greek Prime Minister Simitis 
"proposed holding regular Summits and Councils of Ministers covering different aspects of cooperation 
... setting into place a permanent cooperation body in the form of an international secretariat ... " AGENCE 
EUR., Nov. 5, 1997, at 5 (Turkish proposal for the "creation ofa Balkan free-trade zone"). [d. 
212 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
. discuss economic cooperation, regional conflicts, and the Georgian proposal 
to create a Transcaucasian interparliamentary assembly.4S2 Transcaucasus 
countries are also inclined to join in interregional groupings, e.g. the nascent 
ones involving Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine,453 on the one hand, and 
Armenia, Iran and Turkmenistan, on the other.454 Ukraine is also working 
with Moldova and Romania to establish a "free economic zone" which 
might also involve a customs union.4SS Finally, Ukraine has called for a 
Baltic-Black Sea Summit in Yalta in 1999.456 
F. FRINGE BENEFITS: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING MARGINAL 
Taken as a whole, the formal and informal subregional economic 
initiatives are affecting the ongoing process of East-West European 
integration in unexpected and salutary ways. The trend towards subregional 
coalescence creates a counterweight to the power of the big regional 
initiatives. It has begun to redress some of the imbalances present in the 
EU's top-heavy vertical integration model,4S7 and to influence the European 
integration agenda. 
The expanding CEFTA framework, in particular, has had a profound 
impact on the process of East-West European integration, despite all doubts 
about its viability458 and its weak institutional structu~? Indeed, the 
412 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, June 30, 1997. If Lithuania and Poland can establish an 
interparliamentary assembly, RFElRLNEWSLINE, supra note 41, May 28,1997 and June 16, 1997, then 
perhaps it can happen in the Transcaucasus too. See also Liz Fuller, Introducing the Other Guam, 
RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Dec. 1,1997 (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). 
413 See Fuller, supra note 390 (noting that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been mentioned as 
possible future members). This pro-Western initiative appears to contemplate economic as well as 
military cooperation. 
454 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 17, 1997. This cooperation has also been proclaimed 
"open to other countries." Id. A Chinese representative attended the April 1997 meeting. 
4ll RFEIRL NEWS LINE, supra note 41, July 7, 1997. See also RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 
41, Sept. 16, 1997 (Moldova and Ukraine discuss planned customs union). 
456 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Sept. 30, 1997. See also Paul Goble, The Spirit of 
Vilnius, RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Sept. 8, 1997 (noting that "[f]or the first time, the 
countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea have found a common voice"). 
417 Cremasco, supra note 419, at 457 (noting that the "idea of a 'bottom-up' approach to the 
construction of Europe, preserving its diversity by emphasizing both the [sub]regionali3t structure and 
the possibilities of cooperation, was valuable, particularly in [the] transition phase"). This approach still 
has much to offer to the CEECs. 
458 Doubts about CEFT A cover a broad range of issues, but most of these doubts have tapered off 
since CEFT A's early years. The first type of doubt waS economic, and focused on the poor prospects 
for trade in the wake of the collapse of COMECON. See, e.g.. Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 485-88 
(analyzing obstacles to intra-CEFTA trade). As noted supra note 308, trade among CEFTA countries 
has been growing steadily since 1993, which partially explains the waiting line of prospective entrants. 
However, doubts still persist regarding the willingness of CEFT A countries "to tackle the ... serious 
problem of non-tariff barriers." Meth-Cohn & Grandsen, supra note 289, at 12 (also noting that 
surcharges are a concern and that "paper-shuffling to keep importers doing ev;?rything but ir.-:porting has 
become something of an art in the CEFT A countries"). See also Tomasz Stephen, EU Joins Line to 
Criticize Government's New Regulations for Auto Parts Imports, WARSAW Bus. 1., Sept. 9-15, 1996, 
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significance of CEFTA must be assessed in this larger context. It bears 
repeating that each CEFTA member state has concluded a Europe 
Agreement with the EU, and that the CEFTA Agreement is modeled on 
these virtually identical association agreements. To some extent, therefore, 
CEFTA is a mere subset of the EU's overarching framework of free trade 
agreements. But, this fact does not detract from the potential benefits of 
cooperation among the CEECs which, after all, have more in common with 
one another than they have with the countries of the EU. These ties result 
from "geographical location and history as well as from ... free choice."460 
1. Economic Benefits 
The most fundamental level at which to measure subregional 
success is in the economic sphere. The "existence of common interests 
within the economic circles of the countries concerned" has been the root of 
successful integration in the EU itself.461 Despite CEFTA's rather sluggish 
beginnings, trade has increased significantly among member states since 
1994,462 which partly explains why other CEECs are now clamoring to join. 
This is a success that can be enjoyed by both the EU -- which pushed the 
Visegnid countries to concentrate on rebuilding their trade ties -- and by the 
CEFTA member states themselves, which are reaping the benefits. On the 
road to development, therefore, subregional integration is proving to be an 
effective motor.463 Still, the overt goal of CEFTA is not to substitute for 
integration into the EU, but rather to "gear up" the subregional economies, 
and thereby improve their chances of merging onto the EU Autobahn. 
The economic benefits of subregional cooperation -- particularly 
at 4 (polish government suddenly introduced controversial regulations requiring permits for the duty· 
free import of auto parts). 
The second kind of doubt was political, and focused on the Visegrad countries' yearning to escape 
from the East and "return to the West." See, e.g., Bugge, supra note 168; Kolankiewicz, supra note 
2, at 483-85. See further discussion supra in note 307. 
m Perhaps CEFT A's effectiveness stems from the fact that it is "above all ... a process, not ... 
an organization." Vachudova, supra note 127, at 42. The value of communication should not be 
underestimated. See, e.g., Bitter Pill, Bus. CENT. EUR., Feb. 1997, at 13 (subregional groupings such 
as CEI, CBSS and BSEC "help foster communication. True, they don't offer any concrete security 
guarantees. But by binding regional interests together they do help ensure that no-one is left out in the 
cold."). See also Hartnell, Long and Winding Road, supra note I, at 214 ("information is the key to 
bridging ... gaps"). 
460 Statement of Polish President Walensa (Budapest, May 25,1995), Polish Gov't Website, 
supra note 176. 
461 Mihaly Simai, Changing Views in Hungary on the European Community 85, at 87 in THE 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PERSPECTIVES, POLICIES AND RESPONSES (Frans 
A.M. Alting Geusau ed., 1974). 
462 See supra note 308. 
463 Some go so far as to predict that "[i]n a longer term perspective of20-30 years, gradually one 
will be able to speak about a reintegration of the CEECs" with one another. Lawniczak, supra note 290 
at 144 (emphasis added). 
214 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
within the CEFT A framework -- do not stop at increased trade among 
member states. Coalescence has narrowed the gap reflected in the trade 
paradox. By joining their voices, the CEFTA countries have been able to 
exert leverage and influence the EU's policy towards them within the EA 
association framework.464 For example, the CEFTA countries have pushed 
consistently and successfully to obtain improved access to the EU market,465 
especially for sensitive exports such as textiles, agricultural and ECSC 
products.466 Further, the CEFTA countries have succeeded in some of their 
464 This has happened notwithstanding Commissioner Andriessen's dismissive statement that 
"cooperation between these countries would be meaningless, because [they] have the best possible 
relations with the EC and any regional initiatives would not improve the situation." WARSAW VOICE, 
1991, quoted in Vachudova, supra note 127, at 46. Visegrad countries also pressed such claims in the 
context of their bilateral relations with the EC. See, e.g., First Meeting of the EC-Hungary Joint 
Committee of the Interim Agreement, IP (92) 508 (1992) ("parties exchanged views as regards the 
possibilities to accelerate tariff dismantlement"); First Meeting of the EC-Poland Joint Committee of 
the Interim Agreement, IP(92) 536 (July I, 1992) ("Polish side presented a list of ... products for which 
it wishes an accelerated tariff dismantlement. The Community asked for selectivity in this respect. "). 
465 For example, the Viscgrad countries emphasized the need to "improve access to Community 
markets, regional cooperation, and triangular operations as a means of furthering economic 
development." Visegrad Memorandum, supra note 130, reported in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 
1992, point 1.4.6. At the Oct. 28, 1992, London Summit, the EC agreed to "step up cooperation, 
notably in liberalizing and opening up markets." BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Oct. 1992, point 1.4.7. The 
Commission Guidelines, supra note 29, agreed that the Community must "take appropriate steps to 
improve their access to the Community markets" and "proposed a number of measures to accelerate the 
dismantling of Community customs duties and quantitative restrictions ... in order to help the countries 
concerned to increase exports and raise resources to fund their development and foreign debt 
repayments." BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1993, point U.S. Impatient for acti(.'n the Visegrad 
countries renewed their call for improved access to EC markets in June 1993. Vachudova, supra note 
127, at 47. 
The first real breakthrough came at the June 1993 Copenhagen Summit. Copenhagen Summit 
Conclusions, supra note 31, at point 1.13 ("The European Council, recognizing the crucial importance 
of trade in the transition to a market economy, agreed to accelerate the Community's efforts to open up 
its markets."). Concrete steps were proposed in the Commission Communication of 7 July 1993 to the 
Council on the Follow-up to the European Council in Copenhagen: Market-access Measures to Help 
the Central and East European Countries, COM(93)321 [hereinafter Commission Communication on 
Market-Access], and implemented by: Council Decision 93/4211EEC of 19 July 1993 on the Provisional 
Application of the Additional Protocols to the Interim Agreements on Trade and Trade-related Matters 
between the EEC and the ECSC, of the One Part, and Certain Third Countries (Hungary, Poland, and 
the Former Czech and Slovak Federal Republics), of the Other Part, and to the Europe Agreements 
Between the European Communities and Their Member States and the Same Countries, 19930.1. (L 
195) 42; Council Regulations 2232/93-2235/93 of 5 August 1993 Amending Regulations 3918/92, 
518/92-520/92 Opening and Providing for the Administration of Community Tariff Quotas and Ceilings 
for Certain Agricultural and Industrial Products, 19930.1. (L 200). One "element of the additional trade 
concessions [was] the early abolition of customs duties on imports into the Community." BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.10. See also 19940.1. (L 25) 3. 
466 The EU has been slowly forthcoming with concessions in these sectors. As described supra 
in note 465, the Commission Communication on Market-Access recommended and the Council 
approved certain improved trade concessions, in particular: 
Increases in the levels of quotas and some tariff ceilings will ... proceed faster than planned 
in the Interim Agreements. Levies or duties paid in connection with the quotas on 
agricultural products will be reduced by 60% six months earlier than planned. Additional 
trade concessions will improve access to the Community market for textiles and ECSC iron 
and steel products originating in the countries in question. 
Vol. 16, No. 1 Subregional Coalescence 215 
requests for refonn of the PHARE program.467 
One major consequence of subregional integration within the 
broader European regional framework is the move towards standardized, 
cumulative rules of origin.468 Regional (or "diagonal") cumulation is vital 
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.10. Concessions were granted, but subsequently 
rolled back. See Saryusz-Wolski, supra note 175, at 3 (noting that "[t]rom 1996 onwards, tariff quotas 
for most of the CEEC agrarian imports will increase by five per cent annually, instead of 10 per cent, 
while several products have been exempted from the reduction in customs duties"). With regard to 
ECSC products, see BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.11, and BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, Sept. 1993, points 1.3.9-.10 (regarding ECSC approval of the trade concessions). With 
regard to textiles, the Commission Communication on Market-Access, supra, called for "steps to be 
taken with regard to outward processing arrangements." BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, 
point 1.3.10. Such arrangements "determine the conditions under which products may be reimported 
into the Community after working or processing in a third country." BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, July-
Aug. 1993, point 1.3.100. This proposal was subsequently implemented by Council Regulation 3036/94 
of8 December 1994 Establishing Economic Outward Processing Arrangements Applicable to Certain 
Textiles and Clothing Products Reimported into the Community after Working or Processing in Certain 
Third Countries, 1994 OJ. (L 322) I. 
Not all adjustments to the agreements between the EU and its associates have resulted from 
internal pressures. See, e.g., Draft Agreements on Adjusting the Europe Agreements and Interim 
Agreements Between the European Communities and the Associated Countries as a Result of 
Enlargement and the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round, BULL. EUR. UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.53 
(Council authorized Commission to negotiate adjustments needed to rebalance the agricultural 
component of the agreements and further develop trade between the parties); BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 
1995, point 1.4.50 (additional negotiating directives to improve on the concessions on farm produce). 
<67 VisegrAd Memorandum, supra note 130. See also Conclusions of the Presidency (Edinburgh 
European Council, Dec. 1992), BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Dec. 1992, points 1.1-.88, at point 1.79 
("more flexible guidelines agreed for the PHARE programme"). The Commission Guidelines, supra 
note 29, provide that the Community must "take appropriate steps to improve ... the effectiveness of 
the Community programme of economic assistance." The Commission proposed that "the granting of 
PHARE allocations be made ... on a multi annual basis, ... in order to boost the capacity of the 
countries concemed to attract investment [and in] the field of infrastructure, ... for PHARE allocations 
to be made available to provide the resources needed to give the countries access to the international 
loans they need for major projects." BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1993, point 1.3.5. See 
Commission Decision of 6 July 1993 Approving a Global Authorization for a Multidisciplinary 
Technical Assistance Fund for Certain Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, BULL. EUR. 
COMMUNITIES, July-Aug. 1993, point 1.3.8 (allocating an additional ECU 10 million to "ensure rapid 
and effective use of technical assistance appropriations by allowing ... projects to be dealt with without 
delay, by making it possible to cope flexibly and rapidly with urgent demand from the recipient 
countries for training and trade and investment promotion, and by improving the Commission's ability 
to examine and tackle in an appropriate and rapid manner any pressing problems which might arise in 
those countries and enable it to take specific action to organize the aid efficiently."). 
<68 See generally Wolfgang W. Leirer, Rules of Origin under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and 
the ACP-EEC Lome IV Convention with the GA IT Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin, 16 
U. PA. J.INT'L Bus. L. 483 (Fall 1995). In simplified terms, the issue is whether a good that originates 
50% in Hungary and 50% in Poland is entitled to the preferential duty rate fixed by the applicable EA 
for that good if it originated 100% in one or the other country. Where cumulation is allowed, imported 
inputs (e.g. Polish goods imported into Hungary for the production in Hungary of goods) which are later 
exported to another member country (e.g. Slovakia) must be treated as a product originating in Hungary 
(rather than in Poland). See Richter, supra note 290 at 7. Without the possibility of cumulation for 
goods that come from two (or more) countries, each of which has a free trade agreement with the EC, 
the preferential treatment is lost. This result is contrary to good economic sense, which dictates that 
investment and restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe should take advantage of and build on the 
synergistic possibilities already present in the region. In addition, this result is contrary to the EU's 
stated intention to encourage cooperation among CEECs. See, e.g., Commission Guidelines, supra note 
29, which provide in this regard that the "Community should encourage more rapid integration of the 
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to the development of subregional synergies, since it would enable joint 
CEFT A products to enjoy the preferential status extended by the EU on a 
bilateral (EA) basis to the individual CEFTA member states.469 The 
Visegnid Group began pushing the EU early to permit regional cumulation 
for CEFTA countries,470 but it was some time before the European Council 
finally heeded these persistent calls. At its Essen Summit in December 
1994, the European Council committed itself to take concrete steps towards 
broad cumulation of origin for goods coming from the Visegnid Group, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia.471 Progress was slow in coming,472 but a 
Pan-European diagonal cumulation system has finally been put in place.473 
An even more profound consequence is that the Central and East 
economies of the [Visegrad] countries themselves." See also Barcelona Declaration, supra note 156 
(Work Programme includes "harmonizing rules and procedures in the customs field, with a view in 
particular to the progressive introduction of cumulation of origin; in the meantime, favourable 
consideration will be given, where appropriate, to finding ad hoc solutions in particular cases"). 
469 See Lawniczak, supra note 290, at 157 (noting that the effect of cumulation would be "to 
'multi-Iateralize' the agreements so far concluded by the EC and EFT A, on a country-by-country basis 
with the CEECs"); Richter, supra not 290, at 7 (noting that diagonal cumulation "will enable a deeper 
and better division oflabour among the firms of the countries involved"). 
410 Visegrad Memorandum, supra note 130 . 
• 411 Essen Summit Conclusions, supra note 29. See also Pre-accession Progress Report, supra note 
29 (indicating that the "Commission will endeavour to complete negotiations rapidly on the cumulation 
of rules of origin, in accordance with the conclusions of the Essen European Council"). 
. 412 See Decision 1/95 of the EU-Hungary Association Council, 1995 OJ. (L 201) 39 (amending 
Protocol 4 to the EA to provide for cumulation with Poland and with the Czech and Slovak Republics); 
BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.46 (Pre-accession Progress Report indicated, as oflate 1995, 
that the Commission would "endeavour to complete negotiations rapidly on the cumulation of rules of 
origin, in accordance with the conclusions of the [Dec. 1994] Essen European Council"); Meeting of 
the EU-RomaniaAssociation Council, BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.67 (noting that "some 
of the short-term measures decided on by the Essen European Council were already being implemented 
[including] ... extending the diagonal cumulation of origin arrangements for the Visegrad countries . 
. . to Bulgaria and Romania"); Decision 4/96 of the EU-Poland Association Council, 1996 OJ. (L 208) 
33 (amending Protocol 4 to the EA); Association Councils Stress Positive, supra note 298 (reporting 
that the February 1997 meeting of the EU-Bulgaria Association Council agreed to amend Protocol 4 and 
thereby extend to Bulgaria the cumulation system that is already in place for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia); Association Councils, supra note 136; BULL. EUR. UNION, 
Apr. 1997, point 1.4.54 (EU-Hungary Association Council "noted the decisions taken since its last 
meeting regarding the cumulation of rules of origin"). See also BULL. EUR. UNION, Apr. 1997; point 
1.4.44 (noting that cumulation of rules of origin has been introduced into the revised Lome 
Convention). 
413 "The Pan-European cumulation zone comprises 15 members of the European Union, four 
members of EFTA and ten eastern EU associated countries (among them the five CEFTA members) 
which are associated members of the [EU]." Richter, supra note 290, at 7. See. e.g. Decision 1197 of 
the EU-Poland Association Council Amending Protocol 4 to the Europe Agreement, 1997 OJ. (L 221) 
1 (whereas "an extended system of cumulation is desirable making possible the use of materials 
originating in the European Community, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, the European Economic Area, Iceland, Norway 
or Switzerland, in order to facilitate trade and improve the effectiveness of the Agreement, 
modifications to the definition of the concept of originating products are required"). However, the Pan-
European cumulation system was not completely implemented on lan. I, 1997, since Hungary and 
Poland each required a transition period to adjust their rules permitting customs drawback. See Richter, 
supra note 290, at 7. See also CEFTA Website, supra note 289 (regarding implementation of the Pan-
European cumulation system within CEFT A). 
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European (and particularly CEFTA) countries have recognized the 
possibility for integrating further and faster at subregional level than is 
possible within the EO's association framework. 474 There is evidence of 
such dynamic subregional economic integration. CEFt A member states, for 
example, have been gradually m.oving towards greater integration in regard 
to agricultural goods47s and tackling tricky· technical problems. 
Furthermore, CEFTA member states have been actively considering whether 
to expand the scope of the CEFTA Agreement to include trade in services, 
free movement of capital, transport, telecommunications, energy, 
infrastructure, and privatization.477 
While the success of proposals to expand CEFT A's scope or to 
deepen its integration is not yet assured, it is entirely possible that the 
CEFTA Agreement -- which presently constitutes a diluted version of the 
EAs and an even more diluted version of the EC Treaty -- might partially 
overtake either of its predecessors. CEFTA member states could move 
beyond mere trade liberalization, and cooperate in ways that outstrip the 
level of integration achieved by the CEECs under their respective EAs with 
414 Compare C. Fred Bergsten, APEC and World Trade: A Forcefor Worldwide Liberalization, 
FOR. AFF., May/June 1994, at 20 (arguing that APEC offers "a wholly new model of regional economic 
cooperation: a steady racheting up of trade liberalization between the regional :md global I-:vels" since 
its members are likely to address at regional level issues which are not yet ripe for agreement at the 
global level). 
m The CErrA Agreement establishes a network of bilateral concessions for trade in agricultural 
goods and calls upon the member states to "examine the possibilities of granting each other further 
concessions." CEFfA Agreement, supra note 289, art. 12(2). The member states agreed at the Poznan 
Summit on Nov. 25, 1994 to seek to reduce 4uties on agricultural goods. Poznan Summit Declaration, 
supra note 296. In November 1995, they signed a protocol on agricultural trade which, according to 
Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Jagielinski: 
[p]rovides for a significant reduction of tariffs in agricultural and food trade among [CEFfA] 
countries as of January I, 1996. For nearly one half of Polish agricultural imports from these 
countries tariffs have been reduced to zero. The agreement is an important step towards 
Iiberalisation of agricultural and food trade after January I, 1998 within CEFf A. The 
agreement also signifies a great step forward in economic relations in. Europe. It also 
constitutes a serious test for the agricultural sectors in these countries as regards matching 
up to international competition, as well as an important experience before accession to the 
European Union. 
Statement by Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Jagielinski to Club of Brussels 
Conference (Feb. 22-23, 1996), Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176. See also supra note 328 (Baltic 
States free trade agreement for agricultural products concluded in 1996). 
416 For example, at their November 1995 Brno Summit, the CEFT A member states agreed inter 
alia to speed up talks on certifying industrial and agricultural products (including mutual recognition 
of certificates), and to simplify and standardize CEFT A's rules of origin. Brno Summit Declaration, 
supra note 296. Problems related to technic/il barriers to agricultural trade were discussed further in 
Budapest in June 1997, at a multilateral conference involving CEFfA members, plus Bulgaria, Croatia, 
and Lithuania. EEBIC Website, supra note 289. 
471 See, e.g., Bratislava Summit Declaration, supra note 306. The Polish government, which 
prepared the proposal on capital, suggested setting up a regional trade and investment bank. Brno 
Summit Declaration, supra note 296. 
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the EC.478 It is already clear that CEFTA countries bent on achieving further 
integration will not be deterred by the inability to achieve agreement with 
all CEFTA member states.479 Such subregional integration could drive 
further integration at the regional level, and thereby alter the course of the 
top-down integrative forces emanating from Brussels (and, in the CIS, from 
Moscow).48o 
Subregional economic integration not only furthers the cause of 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe, but also demonstrates that 
European integration can proceed not just vertically, from the top down and 
according to an agenda set by the EU (or by Moscow), but upon multiple 
fronts, and at different levels, corresponding to particular needs. Jacques 
Delors has aptly equated regionalization (and, by extension, sub- and sub-
subregionalization) with "worldwide subsidiarity."481 The existence of 
integration initiatives at the low end of the food chain -- such as the Czech-
Polish agricultural accord -- evokes the prospect of integrative pressure from 
the bottom up. 
2. Political Benefits 
The coalescence of formal and informal subregional integration 
initiatives has important political implications, both within Central and 
Eastern Europe, and beyond it.482 Not all CEECs are as enthusiastic as the 
Poles about the prospect of subregional cooperation.483 Still, the vital 
478 See, e.g., Address of Polish Foreign Minister Bartoszewski to Polish Diet (Warsaw, May 24, 
1995), Polish Gov't Website, supra, note 176 (one reason Poland "greatly appreciates" subregional 
cooperation is that it provides a forum of cooperation that goes beyond today's frames of the European 
Union"). . 
479 For example, the Czech Republic and Poland concluded a far-reaching bilateral agreement on 
cooperation in agriculture and the food industry in August 1995. They asserted that they were "forced" 
to conclude this agreement outside the CEFT A framework because of "Hungarian intransigence". See 
Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176. 
480 Francis Harris, A Different Drum, Bus. CENT. EUR., Dec. 19971 Jan. 1998, at 17 (questioning 
whether Central Europeans "are now free to decide their own government policies, or have they just 
swapped Moscow for Brussels?"). 
481 Jacques Delors, The Future of Free Trade in Europe and the World, 18 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 
715,724 (1995). See also Flora Lewis, quoted in Cremasco, supra note 419, at 451 ("aggregate the 
capacity for dealing with issues that are insoluble on a single nation basis, and not yet feasible for a 
Europe-wide solution"). 
482 Compare Cremasco, supra note 419, at 458-459 (noting that while "it is difficult to predict 
whether the ... cooperation will eventually agonize in the routine of the ministerial meetings, or 
whether it will be able to break the impasse and continue its slow cooperation process .... [t]hese 
organizations ... represent [an] attempt of small regional entities to build a pragmatic set of cooperation 
schemes capable of having a Significant political meaning and scope"). 
483 The Polish Government has been the strongest supporter of CEFT A and subregional 
cooperation. Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 484 (Polish position is "maximalist and intrinsic"). See 
also Vachudova, supra note 127, at 46 (observing that the Poles have most fervently believed that "by 
crafting ajoint approach toward the Community, the Visegrad countries can substantially increase their 
bargaining power as well as their general pOlitical standing in Europe"). 
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importance to all CEECs of participation in the process of European 
transformation should not be underestimated.484 "[A] common identity 
consisting of something more than post-communist societies awating 
European membership. . .could. . .jeopardize. . .enlargement of the 
Union."485 
Coalescence has nurtured self-confidence and sophistication in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in addition to demonstrating the 
. benefits of subregional cooperation. These effects are visible in the relations 
of the CEECs to one another, in their relations to the big regional powers in 
Europe, and also in their dealings with other countries outside Europe.486 
It bears repeating that the formal and informal initiatives in Central 
and Eastern Europe all have weak, intergovernmental institutions, with no 
power to bind member states without their consent. Still, there is evidence 
of growing confidence in the cooperative process, if not also in the new 
institutions themselves. This is especially visible in the context of CEFTA 
and the CEI, where there are signs of institutional overlapping (if not 
convergence ).487 
The most dramatic effects of coalescence are found in its effect on 
the relations between the EA countries (and particularly the CEFTA 
countries) and the EU. The current level of confidence must be measured 
against the early years of CEFTA's operation, when the member states 
cautiously avoided developing a common voice or otherwise expanding the 
484 See, e.g., Olesky CEI Speech, Oct. 1995, supra note 421 ("Every platfonn for the exchange of 
ideas and opinions is important in the face of the transformations taking place in [CEI] countries .... 
As countries of the region we have the right to speak out and to present our views on how we want to 
see a future united Europe, how we want to see the structure of security, co-operation and prosperity . 
. . . In these transfonnation processes every grouping has a role to play ... "); Statement of Polish Prime 
Minister Olesky at the Meeting with Ministers of Agriculture of the Central European Initiative 
Countries (Warsaw, Dec. 7-8, (995), Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176 (noting that CEECs are 
"meeting this week in Warsaw under CEI banner, next week in Madrid at European Council summit, 
later in CBSS in Stockholm, yesterday conference of heads of parliaments ofEAs in Warsaw ... I 
mention all these events ... to show that such meetings have enonnous, inestimable importance for all 
of us, because they demonstrate that we are building a different Europe, that we are finally getting used 
to a Europe without divisions. "). 
481 Kolankiewicz, supra note 2, at 480. The author further notes that "(w)hat each country lacks 
individually could be compensated for collectively." Id. 
486 The CEFT A Agreement contains no common provisions on commercial policy with third 
countries, not has there been any reported discussion of the possibility of moving towards a customs 
union. Notwithstanding this lack of extemal competence, CEFTA has undertaken to enter into 
discussions with other trading blocs, such as NAFT A. See, e.g., Polish Gov't Website, supra note 176, 
May 26, 1993 (Polish Prime Minister Olesky discussed CEFTA-NAFTA economic cooperation with 
Canadian Foreign Trade Minister Mac Laren. Russian Prime Minister Chemomyrdin requested a 
"dialogue of cooperation" with CEFTA in September of 1996. See The Warsaw Voice Website 
<http://www.contact.waw.pl/pl-iso/voice/v413/newOI.htm>. 
487 See, e.g. supra note 304 (the Czech and Slovak Republics chose to resolve a dispute between 
them at the CEFTA Bmo Summit, even though this dispute clearly did not fall within CEFTA 
competence). Further evidence of cross-over can be seen in the occasional discussions of technical 
CEFTA-Iike trade issues within the broader, infonnal CEI framework. 
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scope of their cooperation, largely because each ofthem was preoccupied 
with asserting itself individually vis-a-vis the EU and trying to distance itself 
from the pack in the race to accession. While the EA countries still insist 
that the EU must consider each of them on their individual merits in 
accession negotiations, they no longer hesitate to assert themselves as a 
group. This tendency may begin to compensate for the lack of any 
meaningful political opposition to EU accession at home.488 
In the context of relations between the EU and the associated 
countries in Centr.al and Eastern Europe, coalescence has served to 
ameliorate the.aspirational, participation and sovereignty paradoxes, and to 
tap the energy inherent in the cooperation-competition paradox. The most 
visible benefit of increased cooperation among the CEECs (particularly in 
the CEFTA framework) is their success in arguing for better conditions 
within the EA framework. 
The relations between the EU and the aspirants in Central and 
Eastern Europe (in particular the CEFTA member states) have been 
characterized by frustration on both sides. The Visegnid Group (which 
constitutes the core of CEFTA) has pushed the EU hard for concrete 
commitments on eventual membership. The EU, caught between its good 
intentions, on the one hand, and its own internal political and r.conomic 
difficulties, on the other, has been forthcoming, although not forthcoming 
enough to alleviate the pressures on the governments in the associated 
CEECs, which therefore continue their vigilant efforts to persuade the EU 
to take them more seriously.489 These efforts have resulted in the 
elaboration of criteria for membership specitically requested by the EA 
countries490 and the gradual strengthening and deepening of political 
dialogue.491 
Considering the weak position of the EA countries vis-a-vis the 
EU,492 they would be wise to consider the benefits of further cooperation (or 
488 See Barta & Richter, supra note I, at 20 (noting that "[p ]olitically relevant opposition to EU 
membership like the well-organized alliance of various political and economic forces in all fonner 
CEFT A countries ... does either not exist in the CEECs or is still of irrelevant leverage"). 
489 In Dec. 1994, the (then) EA countries had to plead for an invitation to attend the Essen 
European Council which had been touted as the summit that would make major decisions about Eastern 
enlargement. The invitations were finally issued just days before the actual meeting. See Lionel Barber, 
EU to Tackle Blueprint/or Enlargement, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1994, at 2 ("summit outlook has been 
clouded by the apparent Gennan decision not to invite the [CEECs] to Essen"). 
490 The Visegrad countries pressured the EC for both of these in the 1992 VisegrAd Memorandum, 
supra note 130, and again at ajoint meeting on June 7, 1993. Vachudova, supra note 127, at 46-47. 
491 See discussion infra in notes 260-63. 
492 As mentioned supra notel67, the EAs "paradoxically ... seriously weakened the [EA 
countries'] bargaining position, because the main and perhaps only relevant asset that [tl.t:,-] were able 
to offer was free access for EU exporters to domestic CEEC markets." Barta & Richter, supra note I, 
at 24. This dilemma becomes more acute as time passes and the transition period for full 
implementation of the movement of goods provisions of the EAs nears its end. Once the free trade areas 
called for by the respective EAs are in place, the EU has achieved its pan-European free trade area, and 
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at least coordination) as they prepare to undertake accession negotiations. 
When the EU commences negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, it is likely to offer a fairly standard set of 
accession conditions to all at the outset, and then rely on parallel 
negotiations with each EA country to tailor a suitable compromise. In this 
scenario, "[d]iverging individual CEEC positions on important issues may 
negatively influence CEEC bargaining power: the less demanding CEEC 
negotiators could provide precedents for the lowest [set of accession criteria] 
to which EU negotiators could refer in other bilateral relations. Thus, the 
'softest' of the CEECs may lower the chances [for] the less conciliatory 
ones. 11493 There have been calls for "joint behavior rules" and even for a 
"joint accession strategy."494 Joint behavior rules could serve, at the very 
least, to prevent "non-coordinated concessions by one or more applicant 
countries."49s As proposed by Richter, a joint accession strategy would 
"necessarily be subordinated to national accession strategies," but 
nonetheless useful: to "help each country ... identify its optimal set of 
accession conditions;" where expedient and possible to coordinate 
negotiation strategy and tactics;" and to identify issues and coordinate 
accession strategy in regard to "possible derogations from general rules."496 
In his view, "[o]ccasional meetings would most likely not be sufficient for 
a really effective coordination .... The solution could be either frequent 
regular meetings of delegations of the countries involved or an 
institutionalized form of cooperation with a council for coordinating 
accession strategies. "497 
Signals' from "fast track" countries concerning readiness to 
coordinate their accession negotiations have been mixed. On the one hand, 
there has been some talk of "reactivating" the Visegnid Group.498 More 
concretely, the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
"decided to cooperate more and coordinate their respective positions as 
might not see fit to make substantial financial commitments to the CEECs. And yet, from the 
perspective of the EA countries, their agreement to expose their economies "to the ravages of open 
competition" were secured by the prospect (if not the promise) of "some sort of payback under the 
[EU's] structural, regional or cohesion funds programmes." Long Sprint, supra note 183, at 40. Thus, 
the prospect of "second-class membership" looms ever larger. [d. The EA countries are in a precarious 
position, since they must fully implement the EAs in order to stand a chance to proceed to accession 
negotiations with the EU. See, e.g., RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, Apr. 25,1997, and Apr. 30, 
1997 (Poland "denounced some EU states for taking unfair advantage of ... Poland's weak negotiating 
position to enforce their demands over trade issues" just prior to the annual meeting of the EU-Poland 
Association Council). 
493 Barta & Richter, supra note 1, at 29. 




498 RFEIRL NEWSLINE, supra note 41, July 3, 1997 (Hungarian Prime Minister Hom to Polish 
Prime Minister Cimoszewicz). 
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much as possible in order to facilitate and accelerate the membership 
negotiations .... [I]t was agreed that the negotiators of the three applicant 
countries, but also the Foreign Ministers, would step up their working 
contacts to mutually inform one another of the state of negotiations. 
Institutionalization of this cooperation is not planned, however."499 On the 
other hand, the cooperative spirit does appear to have its limits. For 
example, CEFTA prime ministers meeting in September 1997 "on the 
request of the Hungarian government ... did not bind themselves ... to . 
provide mutual support in the process of joining the [EU]."500 Subregional 
coalescence is thus likely to play an ongoing role in the context of accession 
negotiations with the EU. 
Perhaps the most remarkable consequence of subregional 
coalescence is that the Central and Eastern European countries, which lack 
adequate participatory rights within the ED's association framework, 501 have 
created fora in which they do have full participatory rights and where they 
can playa role in setting the agenda for European integration. This is not 
to overstate the case by asserting that the tail is now firmly wagging the dog. 
In fact, all formal and informal initiatives involving EA countries are 
indisputably designed to further the aim of joining the EU as soon as 
possible. Still, the growing importance of these initiatives reflects a real 
turn of the tide. 
Since 1995, the EU has realized that it should playa more active 
role in some of the subregional initiatives (for example, the Council of 
Baltic Sea States and the Central European Initiative) and has commenced 
sending representatives of the Commission -- and even the Troika -- to key 
meetings. This suggests a recognition by the EU that it is no longer fully in 
charge of the agenda of European integration. Agenda-setting hl}~ become 
multipolar. 
In conclusion, economic and political success at subregional level, 
together with the passage of time and growing disappointment in the EU on 
the part of the Central and East European countries, has resolved the 
competition-cooperation paradox in favor of strategic cooperation. It is 
equally apparent, however, that the competition-cooperation paradox retains 
significant force. While the "in" countries can now see fit to cooperate, at 
least with some members oftheir group, competition between "in" and "out" 
countries, as well as among "out" countries, will be exacerbated by the EU's 
decision to create a two-tier enlargement process. In the face ofthis divisive 
situation, and of the certain delays ahead on the road towards union, the 
499 AGENCE EUROPE Docs., Sept. 4,1997, at 14. 
500 Potroro Summit Declaration, supra note 297. 
SOl Thus, for example, they were excluded from the IGC, and have no right to participate in other 
EU discussions that fall outside the Structured Dialogue. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
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"ins" would do well to remember, and build upon what they have already 
achieved through strategic cooperation. 
The coalescence of formal and informal integration initiatives has 
given marginal actors leverage with which to move the big regional trade 
blocs. While it would be over-reaching to speculate that a major power shift 
has occurred or is imminent, it is indisputable that even small shifts can be 
turned to real advantage by strategic actors. 
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF SUBREGIONAL COALESCENCE 
The phenomenon of subregional coalescence must be examined in 
the context of both wider regionalization and globalization. The global 
framework for analysis of both regional and subregional integration is 
provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO).so2 Many CEECs have 
already joined the WTO,so3 while others are in some stage of negotiations 
toward membership.so4 
. The WTO has begun taking a harder look at the issues raised by the 
proliferation of regional (and by definition subregional) arrangements which 
provide for the establishment of free trade areas and, to a lesser extent, 
customs unions. There is alarm over the growth of such preferential trading 
arrangements, because they tend to undercut the most-favored-nation 
principle, which lies at the heart of the multilateral trade regime.sos Article 
XXIV of the GATT permits such regional arrangements to operate as 
S02 GAlT, supra note 314. 
S03 "Czechoslovakia was a founding member of the GAlT, and maintained its membership even 
after the introduction of a strict centrally planned econooiy ... Hungary, Poland and Romania already 
made the first steps towards the GAlT in the late 1950s." Peter Naray, Integration of Central and 
Eastern Europe into the GATT System, BlJITERWORTH'S J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 425, 425 (Oct. 
1993). Poland became a member of the GAlT on Oct. 18, 1967; Romania on Nov. 14, 1971; Hungary 
on Sept. 9, 1973. 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GAlT LAW AND PRACTICE 1136 (1995) [hereinafter 
GAlT ANALYTICAL INDEX]. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia joined the GAlT on Aug. 
25, 1966. ld. In the wake of the changeover from centrally planned to market economies, these 
countries "asked for changes in their protocols of accession with the objective of eliminating obsolete 
or inoperative provisions and terminating their 'second class' participation in GAlT." ld. at 426. The 
Czech and Slovak Republics (as successor states to Czechoslovakia) became contracting parties to the 
GAlT on Apr. 15, 1993. Id. at 427. Slovenia became a member on Oct. 30, 1994. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia became members of the WTO on Jan. I, 
1995. WTO Website <http://www.wto.org/wto/aboutJorgansn6.htm>. Poland became a member on 
July 1, 1995; Slovenia on July 30, 1995; and Bulgaria on Dec. 1, 1996. Id. 
so. The following countries have applied for WTO membership and are in some stage of the 
process of negotiation : Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. WTO Website, 
supra note 503; see generally FRANK W. SWACKER ET AL., I WORLD TRADf. WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, sec. 3-2(b) (1996 Supp.). 
sos See, e.g., Bart Boaden, A Challenge and an Opportunity for Europe and East Asia, INT'L 
HERALD TRlB., Apr. 5, 1996, at 6 ("How can [regional free trade areas] be stopped from becoming so 
self-absorbed that, faced with increasing fierce competition from emerging economies ... they tum 
inward, raise protectionist barriers and drag down the world economy?"). 
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exceptions to the most-favored-nation principle, provided that they cover 
"substantially all trade" between the member states.S06 However, most (if 
not all) of the EU's association agreements with CEECs do not meet this 
prerequisite, since "sensitive" sectors are excluded from the free trade 
regime. The EU's Agricultural Commissioner has argued that the EAs are 
"not simple free trade agreements" and, thus, that concessions granted to the 
associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe are exempt from the 
most-favored-nation obligation and need not be extended to other WTO 
trading partners.S07 The first question raised by the EU's association strategy 
lOG Article XXIV provides: 
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of 
the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories 
and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories. 
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as betweell the territories of 
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an 
interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided 
that: 
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a 
customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of 
any such union ... in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union .. 
. shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties 
and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation 
of such union ... ; 
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a 
free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the 
constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area ... to the trade 
of contracting parties not included in such area ... shall not be higher or more restrictive than 
the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent 
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area ... ; 
GATT supra note 314, art. XXIV. 
507 Announcing New Initiativesfor Gradual Integration of Central and East European Countries 
in CAP, Mr. Fischler asks United States Not to Stand in Way of this Trend, AGENCE EUR., Feb. 24, 
1996, at 11 (arguing that "these agreements are simply a stage towards an enlarged EU," Fischler called 
on the U.S. to refrain from contesting the concessions that the EU was making to the CEECs and from 
asking for extension erga omnes). But see Poor Relations, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1993,54, at 55 (quoting 
a senior American diplomat as saying "If the United States can give Mexico access for agriculture, 
textiles and steel, why can't the EC do that for its neighbours?"). 
It is instructive to compare the EC's attitude towards its own policy of excluding agriculture from 
its "free trade" agreements, with its attitude towards that same policy when carried out by other 
countries. For example, Wilhelm Blankert, a trade analyst with the EC Commission in Warsaw, 
criticized CEFT A on just this basis in 1996. See Serres, supra note 3 I 1. Blankert has been quoted as 
saying that "[a) free trade zone should encompass every sector of the economy," and that the "exemption 
for agricultural products ... [calls) into question the 'authenticity' ofCEFTA ... " Id. (emphasis added). 
He concluded, in light of the fact that "agricultural and food items accounted for 17% of the inter-
regional trade among CEFTA countries" that "[y)ou can't just ignore duties on food items and call this 
free trade." Id. 
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is thus whether it is compatible with Member State obligations under the 
multilateral trading regime.50s . 
CEFTA, too, must be analyzed in the GATT framework, since all 
CEFTA countries are (and must be) members of the WTO. As a free trade 
agreement, the CEFTA Agreement must also satisfy the requirements of 
Article XXIV of the GATT. As is true of the EU's association agreements, 
the CEFTA Agreement does not cover "substantially all trade" between its 
member countries, although it does state cautiously throughout that it is 
meant to be consistent with the member states' obligations "under other 
international agreements, in particular the GATT. "509 Indeed, many 
provisions of the CEFTA Agreement refer specifically to obligations under 
the GATT.s10 
No amount of technical correctness, however, can resolve the 
underlying question whether regional and subregional integration subverts 
or strengthen the global trading system.511 Renato Ruggiero, the Directo~ 
General of the WTO, believes that preferential regionalism poses a threat to 
the multilateral system. Ruggiero has called for convergence of "big" 
regionalism and the multilateral system.512 In particular, he has urged 
regional economic groupings to aim for the creation of a global free trade 
area by moving to abolish all barriers with non-members.S13 
lOS The WTO committee on Regional Trade Agreements has undertaken to examine a number of 
the EU's association agreements with CEEC countries, principally the EAs. See WTO Website, supra 
note 503. Full consideration of the WTO procedures for approving free trade areas under Article XXIV 
of the GATT is beyond the scope of this article. 
109 See, e.g., CEFTA Agreement, supra note 289, art. 23(5), 24. 
110 For example, article 1(1) obliges the member states to "gradually establish a free trade area in 
... conformity with Article XXIV of the CEFT A Agreement]." CEFT A Agreement, supra note 289. 
Article 4(2) ties the basic duty rates under the CEFT A Agreement to the rates resulting from the 
Uruguay Round. [d. art. 4(2). The CEFT A member states' exchange of concessions regarding 
agricultural products is also tied (per Article 12(2» to the results.ofthe Uruguay Round. The remedies 
provided for state aids (Article 23), dumping (Article 26), and balance of payments difficulties (Article . 
32) are also linked expressly to the provisions of the GATT Agreement. See GATT, arts. 12(2),23,26, 
32. As for government procurement, Article 24(2) of the CEFTA Agreement uses the 1979 GATT 
Agreement as its benchmark, and Article 24(5) obliges the member states "to endeavour to accede to 
the relevant Agreements negotiated under the auspices of the GATT." CEFT A Agreement, supra note 
289, art. 24(2), (5). 
III A thorough analysis of this question must be left for the future. However, there is no shortage 
of analysis available. See e.g., THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger eds.) (1995); Symposium, Free Trade Areas: The Challenge and Promise 
of Fair vs. Free Trade, 27 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. (1996). See also Commission Communication on 
WTO Aspects of EU Preferential Trade Agreements with Third Countries, AGENCE EUR. Docs., Feb. 
27, 1997. 
m Guy de Jonquieres, Ruggiero Urges Global Free Trade:. WTO Chief Wants Regional Groups 
to Wind Down External Barriers, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at 6. . 
m In technical terms, Ruggiero is calling for open (as opposed to closed) regionalism, which 
implies that members abolish (rather than keep) external barriers at same time as they abolish internal 
barriers. [d. MERCOSUR and APEC are considered to be the only open regional trading blocs. See 
';d. See also Boaden, supra note 50S, at 6 (regional free trade blocs should "expend as much energy on 
building bridges among themselves as they do on deepening economic integration within their 
respective economic clubs"). 
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Jacques Delors has articulated the opposing view that regionalism 
(and subregionalism) should be welcomed. In the context of the EU, he has 
argued that regionalization of trade "is not at odds with the emergence of the 
global economy ... [but rather it] 'paves the way to a more coherent and 
more legitimate international order"sl4 without "abandoning cultural 
roots."SIS Delors explains that "progress towards greater global economic 
integration requires the creation of intermediate regional blocs .... When 
economies become intertwined, their operating rules need to be harmonized 
too, and this is more easily achieved by regional groupings than by a 
centralized worldwide process."SI6 
However the tension is resolved, all economic integration initiatives 
-- whether global, regional or subregional -- must respect common 
principles and strive towards a more "legitimate, coherent form. ,,517 The 
global conversation within, as well as on the fringes of the WTO framework 
must find a way to reconcile the dynamic nature of regionalism (and 
subregionalism) with the overarching obligations ofthe multilateral trading 
regime. In such a world, subregional coalescence must become a force for 
further, fairer integration. 
51' Delors, supra note 481, at 716. 
SIS Id. at 723. 
516 Id. at 723. Delors is less convincing when he argues that the EU offers an "example of how 
to draw up supranational rules through the democratic process." Id. at 724. However, we should at least 
be open to his suggestion that we view the EU as a "laboratory for experiments in sovereignty pooling" 
and even an "emerging ... outline of ... a form of worldwide subsidiarity." Id. 
1I7 [d. at 723. Delors also calls for a "new qualitative [institutional] advance." Id. 
